Inductive Pattern Formation by Mullican, Raymond Charles
INDUCTIVE PATTERN FORMATION 
 
 
A Dissertation 
by 
RAYMOND CHARLES MULLICAN 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
Chair of the Committee,  Gabriela Campagnol 
Co-Chair of the Committee,  Mardelle M. Shepley 
Committee Members,  Jay R. Walton 
  Robert K. Popp 
Head of Department,  Robert Warden 
 
 
December 2017 
 
 
Major Subject:  Architecture 
 
 
Copyright 2017 Raymond Charles Mullican
 ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
With the extended computational limits of algorithmic recursion, scientific investigation is transitioning 
away from computationally decidable problems and beginning to address computationally undecidable 
complexity.  The analysis of deductive inference in structure-property models are yielding to the 
synthesis of inductive inference in process-structure simulations.  Process-structure modeling has 
examined external order parameters of inductive pattern formation, but investigation of the internal 
order parameters of self-organization have been hampered by the lack of a mathematical formalism with 
the ability to quantitatively define a specific configuration of points. 
This investigation addressed this issue of quantitative synthesis.  Local space was developed by the 
Poincare inflation of a set of points to construct neighborhood intersections, defining topological distance 
and introducing situated Boolean topology as a local replacement for point-set topology.  Parallel 
development of the local semi-metric topological space, the local semi-metric probability space, and the 
local metric space of a set of points provides a triangulation of connectivity measures to define the 
quantitative architectural identity of a configuration and structure independent axes of a structural 
configuration space.  The recursive sequence of intersections constructs a probabilistic discrete space-
time model of interacting fields to define the internal order parameters of self-organization, with order 
parameters external to the configuration modeled by adjusting the morphological parameters of 
individual neighborhoods and the interplay of excitatory and inhibitory point sets.  The evolutionary 
trajectory of a configuration maps the development of specific hierarchical structure that is emergent 
from a specific set of initial conditions, with nested boundaries signaling the nonlinear properties of local 
causative configurations.  This exploration of architectural configuration space concluded with initial 
process-structure-property models of deductive and inductive inference spaces. 
In the computationally undecidable problem of human niche construction, an adaptive-inductive pattern 
formation model with predictive control organized the bipartite recursion between an information 
structure and its physical expression as hierarchical ensembles of artificial neural network-like structures.  
The union of architectural identity and bipartite recursion generates a predictive structural model of an 
evolutionary design process, offering an alternative to the limitations of cognitive descriptive modeling.  
The low computational complexity of these models enable them to be embedded in physical 
constructions to create the artificial life forms of a real-time autonomously adaptive human habitat.
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1998 
Blacksburg, Virginia 
Olivio Ferrari was many things to us, to me.  With his memory, the meaning of one word grows ever 
larger as the years advance:  mentor.  To us all.  The fabric of his weavings often revealed two common 
threads -- develop, then trust, your intuition, and process is ultimately larger than product.  Design, as 
well as life, seems to be about both. 
Where are we? 
Architects were then, as they are now, interested more in the appearance of 
buildings than in their functioning.   . . . .   
Witold Rybczynski   
 
“Until we have an understanding of these complicated, changing 
interactions, our attempts to balance extraction of ecosystem resources 
against sustainability will remain at best naive, at worst, disastrous.  We, as 
humans, have become so numerous that we perforce extensively modify 
ecological interactions, with only vague ideas of longer range effects.  Yet our 
wellbeing, even our survival, depends on our ability to use these systems 
without destroying them.”    
John Holland 
 
As architects we have lost or given up much of our process, as a result we have lost control of our 
product.  We have reduced ourselves to being harbingers of fashion, with little understanding of design 
consequences to both the human inhabitants and a building’s extended ecosystem.   Our cumbersome 
performance modeling tools are based on the reductionist thinking of linear relationships and are 
inappropriate for the analysis of architecture’s synergy.  Worse, they are of little or no benefit to the 
creation of architecture. 
Revolution! 
Artificial life is the study of man-made systems that exhibit behaviors 
characteristic of natural living systems.  .  .  .  .  a relatively new field 
employing a synthetic approach to the study of life-as-it-could be.  It views 
life as a property of the organization of matter, rather than a property of 
the matter which is so organized.    
Christopher Langton 
 
Artificial life and the related study of complex adaptive systems [CAS] have risen from the power of 
computers to model the nonlinear relationships common in natural systems.  Traditional science has 
placed emphasis on analyzing and explaining in terms of smallest parts; these are attempts to synthesize 
behavior and process.  Self-organization and order emerge from simple-ruled, bottom-up constructions. 
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Towards A New Architecture 
Within fifty to a hundred years, a new class of organisms is likely to emerge.  
These organisms will be artificial in the sense that they will originally be 
designed by humans.  However, they will reproduce, and will evolve into 
something other than their initial form;  they will be ‘alive’ under any 
reasonable definition of the word.    
Doyne  Farmer 
 
2050: Scientific foundation of architecture.  The tools of cellular automata and genetic algorithms are 
united with the symmetry operations of mathematical crystallography to evolve architectural morphology 
in computer time; to generate form in response to environmental forces - physical, social, cultural, 
economic.  2100:  While not derived from carbon based ‘organic’ life as we know it, building assemblies 
will be alive in every sense -- growing, adapting, reproducing and dying in symbiosis with both inhabitants 
and environment. 
Convergence 
Artificial life, CAS:  bottom-up, parallel processing, simple rules, emergent self-organization.   Biology, 
economics, psychology, physics, anthropology, mathematics, art . . . Architecture.  Déjà vu.   
Intuitively, we have been here before.  It was called design studio. 
To a giant, whose shoulders were broad enough that we may all aspire to stand.  Thank you. 
rcm, 1998 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Some ideas are reeled into our mind wrapped up in facts; and some ideas 
burst upon us naked without the slightest evidence they could be true but 
with all the conviction they are.  The ideas of the latter sort are the more 
difficult to displace.   
     (Kevin Kelly, 1994) 
1.1.  A SITUATED INVESTIGATOR 
What are alternative hypotheses but competing narratives?  Invent them as 
fancifully as you can.  Sure, they ought to avoid explicit violations of reality 
(such as light acting like a particle when everyone knows it's a wave?  
[Einstein proposes photon particles, 1905]), but censor those stories lightly.  
There is time for experiment—by you or others—to discover which story 
holds up better.   
(Roald Hoffmann, 2005) 
Although we usually think about writing as a mode of ‘telling’ about the 
social world, writing is not just a mopping-up activity at the end of a 
research project.  Writing is also a way of ‘knowing’ – a method of discovery 
and analysis.   
(Laura Richardson, 1994) 
. . .  qualitative writing in essence [is] very different from quantitative writing.  
Qualitative writing becomes very much an unfolding story in which the writer 
gradually makes sense, not only of her data, but of the total experience of 
which it is an artifact.   
(Adrian Holliday, 2002) 
Along time ago in a galaxy far far away .  .  .  ‘The big three’, Olivio Ferrari, Herbert Kramel, and Tom 
Regan, opened the door to a magical world of design, where ‘everything is important and nothing is 
impossible’. 
Designers were specialists only in the process of synthesis, freeing them to be generalists in an 
increasingly specialized society.  Encouragement was given to develop the criteria and boundaries for 
individual investigations, take risks, thoroughly document the process, and self-evaluate results:  design 
was a self-organized system of learning how to learn.  Faced with the complexities of design problems in 
a rapidly changing world, intuition was developed, checked-as-possible, and eventually trusted.  
Modeling the process of synthesis was elevated in stature to be the equal of modeling the products of 
synthesis.  It became explicit that a robust design process extended the range of synthesis beyond 
physical objects:  the language of any discipline could be translated into the universal visual model 
structures of design.  Synthesis was not a body of knowledge with established precedent that had to be 
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mastered before participating, but individual modeling precedents emerged from self-directed study.  
Christopher Alexander’s application of mathematical graph theory to design, Notes on the Synthesis of 
Form, (Alexander, 1964); Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s General System Theory (von Bertalanffy, 1969); Herbert 
Simon’s The Sciences of the Artificial (Simon, 1969); Norbert Weiner’s The Human Use of Human Beings 
(Weiner, 1954); D’Arcy Thompson’s On Growth and Form (Thompson, 1917) were instrumental in my 
development of a design process. 
Projects often began by asking the question, “What could it be?”:  an initial step of problem redefinition 
that made every investigation unique, dependent on sets of initial conditions and local interactions.  By 
repeatedly playing the game of “What if . . . ?”, the relationships of variables were investigated in a 
process of sequential visual simulations.  Iterative input-process-output-feedback loops were followed until 
they achieved the critical threshold for an Ah-ha! moment:  the emergence of a unified design concept.  
Once the design variables had achieved structural stasis, the process was repeated to develop the 
hierarchical levels of detail of the model.   
In the design of human habitats, the design process partitioned space into structured patterns, giving the 
properties that define human comfort, environmental impact, and cultural meaning.  Models were 
evaluated from an embedded ‘inhabitant-eye-view’: be here now.  The time-ensemble documentation of 
discrete design iterations traced the evolutionary trajectories of design decisions in a configuration space, 
or search space, of possible solutions.   
My big three expanded when ecologist Bob Giles explicitly formulated the concept that form determined 
properties of architectural objects, resulting in their environmental performance; crystallographer Gerry 
Gibbs opened the door to nonvisual mathematical modeling of form; and a summer in Carbondale with 
Technion architect Michael Burt introduced the concept of architectural search space as a morphological 
configuration space.   
From 1968 to 1974, the newly formed College of Architecture at Virginia Tech was a unique place in a 
unique time:  it placed the responsibility for education directly in the lap of the student and “allowed for 
the exception”.  I continue to believe in the pedagogy of that place in time, and remain a disciple of the 
collective structuralist wisdom of the ‘big six’. 
1.2.  MOTIVATION  
Each type of civilization has its own pattern of diseases.   
(René Dubos, 1969) 
We have met the enemy and he is us.   
(Pogo, 1969) 
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The human population has flourished because of the high degree of fitness held by the pattern of human 
niche constructions of our pre-connected western culture.  Current quantitative and qualitative changes in 
the connectivity structures of this pattern transcend the properties of individual artifacts to alter the 
systemic properties of our habitat.  Many of the properties that have emerged from this transformation 
can be categorized as maladaptive -- to the inhabitants of the pattern as well as to the systems external 
to the pattern.  Altering maladaptive properties necessitates a change in the pattern.  Altering the pattern 
necessitates a change in the pattern formation process. 
1.3.  POSTULATES AND CONTEXT  
architecture:  The fundamental organization of a system, embodied in its 
components, their relationships to each other and the environment, and the 
principles governing  its design and evolution.   
(IEEE, 2000) 
architecture, n.  transf. or fig. Construction or structure generally; both abstr. 
and concr.   
(OED, 2011) 
Many of the basic notions of abstract algebra could be derived from the 
single idea of structure-preserving function, or, as it is now customarily 
known, morphism.  Thus the attitude gradually emerged that the crucial 
characteristic of mathematical structures is not their internal constitution as 
set-theoretical entities but rather the relationships among them as embodied 
in the network of morphisms.   
(John L. Bell, 1981) 
Accepted scientific method and units of analysis are currently transitioning from deductive analytical 
investigations of atomistic units to inductive simulations of the structural connectivity of hierarchical 
units.  While a transition to structural investigations is a recent development in many disciplines, it has 
remained the underlying paradigm of material science for nearly a century, and is most comprehensively 
expressed by G.B. Olson as a set theoretic model of four elements:  Process; Structure; Properties; and 
Performance. (Olson, 1997a, 2001)  Processes form structures, or patterns.  Patterns hold properties.  
Properties can be evaluated for their fitness in meeting performance goals.  The fundamental postulate of 
this investigation is the structuralist relationship of processes, patterns, properties, and performance. 
The investigation is framed by the context of the connectionist properties of complex systems:  inductive 
synthesis is a nonlinear phase transition process of local interactions without a central control 
mechanism.  While an emergent pattern is dependent on the initial system state, its properties are not 
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predictable from constituent parts but are grounded in the structure of their local connections. (Simon, 
1962; Gell-Mann, 1992; Holland, 1992; 2006; Mitchell, 2006; Newman, 2011) 
1.4. GOALS  
Scientific progress may broadly be divided into two types: (1) an increase in 
factual knowledge, by the addition to the total amount of scientific 
observations; (2) an improvement in the body of theories, which is designed 
to explain the known facts and to predict the outcome of future 
observations.  An especially important case of the second type is the 
replacement of an accepted theory (or body of theories) by a new theory 
(or body of theories) which is in some sense superior to it.   
The statements of the scientist are of two types: (1) Those reporting the 
results of his observations, or of the observations of other scientists that he 
is willing to accept. (2) Generalizations, hypotheses, general laws, etc., that 
he believes are correct.  The former are his observational statements, the 
latter his theoretical statements.   
(John Kemeny and Paul Oppenheim, 1956) 
Theory is the keystone to understanding.   
(Samuel Scheiner and Michael Willig, 2005) 
The parameters of architectures of the human habitat are defined by the set of variables forming the 
intersection of three broad domains:  the human animal, human culture, and the life-support system of 
the natural environment.  Giving form to the human habitat can then be defined as a multi-variable 
optimization problem involving two parallel constructions:  a habitat information structure and its 
physical expression as a set of finite partitions of two and three dimensional space.  This is a problem of 
pattern formation. 
The sheer number of variables and the complexity of their interactions overwhelm the art-based practice 
of design.  By importing the historic precedents of habitat modelling into a computer environment, 
architecture has polished descriptive models to a gemstone gloss while ignoring several critical inclusions: 
Modeling without predictive feedback of the consequences to human 
and environmental health. 
Modelling incomplete parameters; omitting critical variables. 
Modeling atomistic objects without regard to systemic properties of 
the larger aggregate. 
Modeling limited morphologies of a very small region of architectural 
configuration space.   
Modeling static habitat constructions unresponsive to dynamic 
contexts.    
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The intent is to address these issues by developing a model of a repeatable, verifiable design process:  a 
scale invariant predictive model of comprehensive habitat parameters in a definable unbounded search 
space.  The breadth of variables necessitates the model be domain invariant; the objective of real-time 
adaptation implies a level of simplicity necessary for the model to be distributively embedded throughout 
the materials of dynamic physical constructions.   
The goal of this investigation is to develop a theoretical foundation that enables a science-based practice 
of architecture and construction of an autonomously adaptable human habitat. 
1.5.  METHOD  
We’re still stuck on that screw and the only way it’s going to get unstuck is 
by abandoning further examination of the screw according to traditional 
scientific method. That won’t work.  What we have to do is examine 
traditional scientific method in light of that stuck screw.  . . .   
(Robert Persig, 1974) 
We secure our mathematical knowledge by demonstrative reasoning, but 
we support our conjectures by plausible reasoning.  A mathematical proof is 
demonstrative reasoning, but the inductive evidence of the physicist, the 
circumstantial evidence of the lawyer, the documentary evidence of the 
historian, and the statistical evidence of the economist belong to plausible 
reasoning.  The difference between the two kinds of reasoning is great and 
manifold.  Demonstrative reasoning is safe, beyond controversy, and final.  
Plausible reasoning is hazardous, controversial, and provisional.  
Demonstrative reasoning penetrates the sciences just as far as 
mathematics does, but it is in itself (as mathematics is in itself) incapable of 
yielding essentially new knowledge about the world around us.  Anything 
new that we learn about the world involves plausible reasoning  . . .  
 (George Pólya, 1954) 
Studio structured academic preparation and the professional practice of architecture are founded on the 
art of inductive synthesis:  a recursive cognitive process of multi-variable pattern formation.  Modeling 
often assumes a situated point of view, placing architects and their clients in the space being modeled.  
Computer science recognizes this recursive process as the evolution of a-posteriori schema for 
unstructured and semi-structured data.  It is familiar in the social sciences as the foundation of qualitative 
research methods.   
Much of twentieth century science was dominated by deductive analytical external observer models of 
hypothesis verification:  investigations of linear pattern-property relationships as independent and 
dependent variables of unstructured atomistic collections.  With the advent of the computer, these 
investigations are giving way to structural examinations of pattern formation:  simulation models of 
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situated inductive synthesis are being used to investigate non-linear process-pattern relationships as 
multi-variable clustering of modular hierarchical structure.   
The closing era of deductive science contributed little to the processes of the artist, yet the intuitive art 
of inductive synthesis was the common tunic covering the shoulders of Newton’s giants.  Twenty-first 
century science is now on the threshold of a reciprocal offering to the arts, where the art of architecture 
is ideally positioned to formalize the intuitive art of inductive synthesis with the science of multi-variable 
predictive models of inductive structural pattern formation. 
The allure of predictive models of design raised the inevitable What if? to initiate in an examination of the 
causal relationship between the structures of process and pattern.  The method of investigation was 
meta-modeling:  in this case, using the recursive cognitive process of situated inductive synthesis of 
pattern formation to construct a recursive predictive model of the situated inductive synthesis of pattern 
formation.  From my perspective as an outsider self-sentenced to solitary confinement in the grand 
library of specialization, this nonlinear inductive investigation of nonlinear inductive phenomena spanned 
multiple domains, constructing a cognitive case study of Searle’s Chinese Room Argument of artificial 
intelligence.  By tracing iterative general systems theory loops of input-process-output-feedback in a recursive 
a posteriori threshold-cascade structuring of unstructured and semi-structured data, the design process 
was used to design the design process. 
1.6.  STRUCTURE AND SCOPE  
Inductive inferences are made by classifying events and the outcome of 
these events within suitable categories.  Accuracy of inference is largely 
dependent upon how good the categories are.  At even an elementary level 
of complexity, recognition of structural similarities and performance of 
substitutions become natural developments  . . .  At a slightly more complex 
level, relations, sets, and hierarchies of sets develop.    
(Ray Solomonoff, 1957) 
The inductive structure of the investigation followed the situated mathematics model of inductive 
pattern formation that the investigation produced. (Section 4)  Unlike a Markov chain of successive 
system states constructed with each state having independent probabilities of existence, the hierarchical 
clustering of particulars by inductive inference constructs a situated conditional probability sequence of 
knowledge state spaces where the clustering structure of each state is dependent on the structure of 
relationships established in the preceding state.   
A process of deductive inference establishes structure and scope prior to the investigation; the structure 
and scope of inductive inference is apparent only a posteriori.  The top-down process of deductive 
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reasoning descends from the central reserve of intellectual capital established by the accepted 
precedents of giants, where the linear linkage of categorical truth to a particular instance of investigation 
can be established with only a few key citations.  Following the bottom-up nonlinear process of inductive 
reasoning, intellectual capital in this investigation is built by crowdsourcing from science’s everyman, with 
the ascending hierarchy of categorization constructed without central control by the recursive 
abstraction of local relationships between particular instances.  Keywords, phrases, sentences and 
paragraphs of individual citations define specific grains of truth, with populations of discrete grains 
providing input for the cognitive quorum sensing consensus of categorical clustering.  As a non-
deterministic process, the size and distribution of the input sample population is related to the validity of 
the output generalizations.  
To date, the probabilistic relationships and recursive discontinuities of inductive reasoning present both 
problems of modeling and problems of methodological repeatability and verifiability.  Inductive 
constructions of knowledge domain networks structured by connectivity of citations, authors, or 
keywords are unable to differentiate hierarchical boundary structures and reflect cliques of specialization.  
Generalizations are often obscured by the divisiveness of language:  for the concept that change in the 
connectivity structure of a set of elements results in a linearly unpredictable, discontinuous change in the 
properties of the set, physics speaks of critical states and phase transitions; evolutionary biology of punctuated 
equilibrium; cognitive sciences of threshold-cascades; history of conflicts; creativity of Ah-ha! moments; 
science culture of Kuhnian revolutions; popular culture of tipping points.  Discontinuity of the phase 
transition between successive knowledge state spaces in a process of inductive inference has resulted in 
traditional ‘black box’ models of categorization and pattern recognition in the sciences of biological and 
artificial intelligence, with only the inputs and outputs verifiable to an external observer. 
To simplify documentation, the discrete granular particulars that form the input sample population of this 
investigation are considered to be individual citations.  Pattern formation output, the set theoretic 
hierarchical structure of categorical generalizations, is presented in outline form.  (Appendix A)   
The initial use of accepted terms with domain specific meaning are shown in italics, but are (generally) 
used to express a structural concept having an equivalence relation that crosses academic boundaries.  
Proposed new structural concepts, to my limited knowledge not in accepted use, are shown in bold 
italics. 
The situated conditional chain of knowledge state spaces of the investigation was structured by a 
sequence of questions, each emerging from the preceding state of the investigation.  This sequence of 
recursive meta-abstractions constructed a scope of six sets of categorical generalization: 
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(Model models):  the parameters of model space 
(Adaptation):  situated inductive pattern formation  
(Modularity):  inductive transformation and hierarchical units of synthesis-analysis  
(Proof and truth):  existing precedents and boundaries of provable truth 
(Architectural identity):  situated mathematics of configuration space 
(Life, the universe, and everything):  situated meaning 
1.6.1.  Model models  
The first recursive meta-loop of inquiry began in 1972 with Bob Giles, developing a simple multi-criteria 
decision model to optimize architectural form based on the limited parameters of climate, incident solar 
radiation, surface/volume ratio, structural stability, and net/gross ratio of habitable area.  Dawning 
recognition of the design limitations of a finite library of candidate forms considerably slowed the pulse 
for a repeatable verifiable design process.  Twenty-five years of diverse professional practice buried it 
under deadlines and dollars. 
Twin defibrillating shocks were administered by the initial publication of Artificial Life (Levy, 1992) and 
Complexity (Waldrop, 1992), inducing an Ah-ha! moment of cognitive concept formation:  evolution was a 
generative combinatorial optimization design process in an infinite library, replicable in computer-time to 
generate real-time architectural form.  The resurrected inner Don Quixote posed a question:   
Can an evolutionary design process structure the foundation of a 
science of architecture? 
The inquiry reconvened by reviewing the precedents and structures of scientific modeling and examining 
the complex adaptive system characteristics of human factor, cultural, and environmental parameters of 
habitat design to define the domain of architecture as a complex adaptive system.  The modeling domains 
of mathematics and science were themselves found to be complex adaptive systems, with peer review 
functioning as a predictive control structure.  Across academic disciplines, the structural models of 
complex systems were found to conform to Olsen’s set theoretic structural paradigm of material 
science:  (process   structure   properties  performance).  Structure = pattern.  Design and evolution 
can be defined as nonlinear inductive pattern formation processes of complex adaptive systems. 
In this phase of the investigation, the inductive process of a posteriori conceptual clustering hierarchically 
structured the specific data grains of individual citations into a union of five sets of categorical 
generalization: 
(structural design case study) 
(structures of pattern space) 
(set theoretic structuralism) 
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(model structures) 
(structure of knowledge domains) 
1.6.2.  Inductive-adaptive pattern formation 
From the previous loop, with evidence of the human habitat as a complex adaptive system of inductive 
pattern formation and of Olsen’s set theoretic structuralist paradigm underpinning complex system 
modeling across academic boundaries, the question surfaced:   
Are there invariant processes and structures of complex system 
pattern formation, independent of scale and academic 
boundaries, that encompass the range of variables that structure 
the human habitat? 
The second recursive meta-loop followed the precedent of Herbert Simon and John Holland (Simon, 
1969; Holland, 1975) in a search for similarity in the structures of nonlinear inductive pattern formation 
of natural and artificial systems.   
The emergence of commonality across genetic, cognitive, social group, and population scales of adaptive 
structural transformation lead to construction of a feedforward connectionist model, where pattern 
develops through a sequence of threshold-cascades reciprocating between information structures and 
their physical expression: a hierarchically self-similar parallel distributed processing model with predictive 
control, homomorphic to bipartite ensembles of ‘black box’ artificial neural networks.  Theoretically 
capable of being embedded in the physical materials of habitat construction, this is an adaptive meta-
model of autonomous nonlinear inductive pattern formation where the model itself evolves in response 
to the co-evolving relationships of internal and external variables.  [Appendix B]   
In this phase of the investigation, the inductive process of a posteriori conceptual clustering hierarchically 
structures the specific data grains of individual citations into a union of three sets of generalization: 
(hierarchical structures of inductive-adaptive pattern formation) 
(bipartite structures of inductive-adaptive pattern formation) 
(invariant properties of inductive-adaptive pattern formation) 
1.6.3.  Hierarchical modular units of analysis, synthesis 
The hierarchical bipartite parallel processing model of reciprocating genotypic-phenotypic development 
constructed in the previous loop raised the next broad question:   
What are the units of adaptation and the mechanism of their 
interaction?  
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Defining boundaries of hierarchical structure has historically presented problems for atomistic models of 
units of analysis and synthesis.  The adaptive interpretation of local information is a situated response 
within a level of a structural hierarchy, presenting the problem of adaptive units as one of uniquely 
defining an interacting configuration of elements and its boundary.   
The third recursive meta-loop developed the topological operation of Poincare inflation of a point to form 
its neighborhood, effectively modeling a field surrounding an element.  A set of elements undergoing 
simultaneous Poincare inflation structures a new approach to the Boolean grain model of the set, with 
continuous inflation constructing hierarchical sequence of fundamental groups of individual elements. 
(Appendix C)  The hierarchical boundaries of local fundamental groups are defined by the qualitative 
mathematics of set theory, group theory, and topology, leading to a cross-disciplinary review of attempts 
to quantitatively define a specific configuration of points using the currently accepted mathematics from 
an external point-of-view.   
In this step of the investigation, the inductive process of a posteriori conceptual clustering hierarchically 
structured the specific data grains of individual citations into a union of three sets of categorical 
generalization: 
(individual element as a local fundamental group) 
(hierarchical modular structure) 
(quantitative configuration descriptors) 
1.6.4.  Limits of proof and truth 
The previous loop evidenced the inhibition of inductive structural investigations across the disciplines of 
science, where current models of a configuration are limited to heuristic probabilistic descriptors of 
questionable validity and deterministic qualitative categorical descriptors.  The emergent realization that 
the simple quantitative definition of a specific configuration of points remains an open problem in 
mathematics raised the question: 
What are the cultural precedents and boundaries of provable 
truth structures? 
The fourth recursive meta-loop investigated the structures and properties of deductive inference of an 
external observer, the reliance of predictive modeling on atomistic quantitative mathematics or its 
probabilistic approximation, and the structural problems of consistency and completeness in the 
foundations of mathematics.   
The inductive process of a posteriori conceptual clustering hierarchically structured the specific data 
grains of individual citations into an incomplete union of four sets of categorical generalization: 
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(structures of proof) 
(structures of provable truths) 
(boundaries of provable truth structures) 
(emerging situated point-of-view in science and mathematics) 
1.6.5.  Architectural identity of a configuration 
With a knowledge state space constructed by the union of categorical generalizations from the preceding 
four meta-recursions, the emergent pattern connected the complications of structural investigation in 
science to the properties of mathematics structured from an external point-of-view: 
external point-of-view mathematical proof of external point-of-view mathematics as a 
nonexclusive, nonsingular model of an external objective reality. 
external point-of-view mathematical proof of the incompleteness and inconsistency of 
external point-of-view mathematics as a model of truth space. 
external point-of-view mathematical proof of the possibility of alternative set theory(s). 
foundational premise of external point-of-view probability theory and quantitative 
branches of mathematics as constructions of unstructured collections of atomistic 
elements. 
emergent restructuring of external point-of-view mathematics into categorical 
configurations constructed by the local relationships of structure preserving 
functions. 
emergent viewpoint in science that adaptive processes are grounded in the situated 
interpretation of local configurations of information. 
emergent viewpoint in science that nonlinear processes of complex systems are 
grounded in the local interactions of configurations of elements. 
emergent viewpoint in science that properties are grounded in the structure of 
configurations of elements. 
Constraints on truth space imposed by the boundary structure of external point-of-view mathematics 
granted the freedom to simply attempt to design the local mathematics necessary to quantitatively model 
the hierarchical structures of inductive pattern formation.  The categorical dissonance of current 
quantitative mathematical models, the prevailing view of current physics that we inhabit a stochastic 
universe, and my incorrect initial deterministic interpretation of the qualitative mathematics model of 
pattern formation developed in Section 1.5.3. prompted the question: 
Is there a local probabilistic structure underlying the 
hierarchically local interaction of neighborhoods constructed by 
topological inflation in the Boolean grain model of pattern 
formation? 
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Fifty-seven iterations of trial-and-error resulted in a model of situated local probability, where  
Poincare inflation structures the sequence of intersecting neighborhood spaces as conditional sample 
spaces, constructing a sequence of discrete local probability spaces in a situated conditional probability 
chain.  The concept of topological distance that emerged from the model constructed in section 1.5.3 
was expanded into the concept of Boolean topology as a situated replacement of traditional point-set 
topology developed from the external point-of-view.  In the sequential construction of a complete 
Boolean topology, simultaneous development of the situated metric, topological and probability spaces 
unique to a set of points provide a triangulation of connectivity measures that define a unique 
quantitative identity of a configuration and structure the parameters of configuration space.  Each 
discrete step in the sequence constructs a hierarchical boundary definition, with the complete sequence 
tracing the developmental trajectory of a configuration in configuration space.  These initial constructions 
of situated mathematics structure the formalism for a domain invariant predictive model of the nonlinear 
hierarchical structures of pattern formation.   
In this phase of the investigation, the inductive process of a posteriori conceptual clustering hierarchically 
structured the specific data grains of individual citations into a single set of categorical generalizations 
that were used to inform situated local constructions: 
(structures of external point-of-view mathematics) 
1.6.6.  Life, the universe, and everything 
With the recursive process of situated inductive inference eventually constructing a simple space-time 
model of itself, the uncanny parallels to the journey of Arthur Dent (Adams, 1979) could prompt only one 
question: 
What does it all mean? 
Extrapolation of the trajectory of conceptual configurations that formed the penultimate knowledge state 
space constructed the incomplete union of four sets of situated categorical conjecture:   
(structures and properties of the model) 
(structures and properties of human niche constructions) 
(structures and properties of science)  
(structures and properties of provable truth) 
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2.  ONCE AND FUTURE HABITAT 
Architects were then, as they are now, interested more in the appearance 
of buildings than in their functioning.   . .  
(Witold Rybczynski, 1986) 
Until we have an understanding of these complicated, changing 
interactions, our attempts to balance extraction of ecosystem resources 
against sustainability will remain at best naive, at worst, disastrous.  We, as 
humans, have become so numerous that we perforce extensively modify 
ecological interactions, with only vague ideas of longer range effects.  Yet 
our wellbeing, even our survival, depends on our ability to use these systems 
without destroying them.    
(John Holland, 1992) 
2.1.  ONCE AND FUTURE STATES OF MODELING 
2.1.1.  The current state of modeling 
Throughout history, two and three dimensional descriptive models have been the tools used to design 
objects that comprise human habitats.  While the external physical representation of the object is 
traditionally thought of as the model, the modeling processes of variable attention, variable integration 
and the AH-HA! moment of pattern formation are internal cognitive processes of the modeler.  This 
interplay of internal and external modeling is a process of distributed cognition.  Developed by Edwin 
Hutchins in the late 1980’s, distributed cognition extends the cognitive unit of analysis to include the 
social groups and physical artifacts of an individual’s environment.  (Hutchens, 1988)  
Design, the art of synthesis of the human habitat, works in a distributed cognition descriptive modeling 
paradigm, severely restricted by the cognitive modeling process, the descriptive modeling process, and 
the selection of disjoint atomistic objects as the units of synthesis and analysis.   
Cognitive modeling presents two critical limitations, the number of parameters included in the model, 
and the inference of properties from the model: 
1.  Modeling pattern parameters:  Distributed cognition descriptive modeling of the human 
habitat is an iterative process of pattern formation.  (Sloman, 1998; Thompson, 2000; Robertson, 
2003; Palmeri, 2004; Barsalou, 2005; Uchida, 2006)  As such, model development is limited by 
the individual modeler’s cognitive load limit: the restricted ability to hold only three to seven 
chunks of information in working memory at one time. (Miller, 1957; Simon, 1974; Gobet, 2001)  
This creates a mismatch between the set of model parameters and the modeler’s cognitive 
ability to integrate that set into a single cohesive pattern.  
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The design professions have attempted to overcome this problem by adopting parallel group 
processing (Rumelhart, 1987), but there is an upper limit of membership in an effective parallel 
process.  As processing components increase, inter-component communication time reaches a 
threshold where it engulfs processing time and effectively halts computation.  (Bhuyan, 1987; 
Dally, 1990; Kotsis, 1992, 1993; Blazewicz, 1993; Fraigniaud, 1994)   
With a set of parameters exceeding the individual and collective cognitive load limits of a design 
team, a subset of parameters will always remain unaddressed by a descriptive distributed 
cognition model, often resulting in the untimely consequences of unforeseen interactions.   
2.  Modeling pattern properties:  Were it possible to include the full set of pattern 
formation parameters in its development, an external descriptive model remains just a 
descriptive model:  it is a visual description of a pattern, allowing no inference about the 
properties a pattern may hold, or inference of its performance in relation to design goals.  The 
relationship of a pattern to its properties and performance resides in the internal cognitive 
model of the designer, with this cognitive coupling evidenced by the four states of a modeler’s 
professional development: 
State 1.  Academic mentoring: :  With the assumption that students have yet to acquire 
the experiential memory of object-property relationships, academic evaluations 
traditionally consist of faculty speculation about possible property and performance 
implications inferred from students’ external descriptive models.   
State 2.  Professional mentoring:  After five or six years of academic mentorship, up to 
3 years of mentored professional apprenticeship is compulsory to qualify for state 
licensure examination in the United States.  This represents the final step in the oral 
tradition of transferring pattern-property-performance knowledge across generations. 
State 3.  Early to Mid-career specialization:  A practicing architect begins to form 
cognitive relationships of patterns, properties and performance in individual objects by 
repetition of project-specific cycles of design ‘AH-HA!’ pattern formation and 
experiential feedback of physical pattern construction.  The cognitive load-limit for 
pattern formation and the extended duration of design-construction cycles suggest a 
causal relationship to the trend of specialization by functional typology. 
State 4.  Late career categorical cascade:  There is considerable anecdotal evidence that 
architects typically do their best work late in their careers, only after accumulating 
thirty or forty years of experiential memory.  This is a hierarchical structure of 
cognitive pattern formation, where the accumulation of individual project-specific ‘AH-
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HA!’ pattern formation moments coalesce to form the meta-pattern ‘AH-HA!’ of a 
categorical  cascade.   
Dependence on the cognitive coupling of pattern and properties from an experiential sample of 
historically homologous objects has restricted architectural synthesis to a narrow band of 
deviation from established morphological precedent.  The attention given to typology and not 
topology has rendered architects to be conceptually incognizant of a search space.  With the 
pioneering work of Michael Burt (Burt, 1972, 1974, 1984) being the seminal exception, 
architectural history is absent any exploration of the structure or boundaries of architectural 
search space as a morphological configuration space. 
2.1.2.  Current units of analysis 
The modeling precedents in architecture that define the units of synthesis and analysis to be individual 
disjoint buildings are grounded in the cultural mores of ownership and legal precedents formulated under 
the concept of the world as a 2-dimensional flat surface. (George, 2006)  The cultural concept of land 
ownership is the controlling parameter in pattern formation of the human habitat.  With the global 
ascension and dominance of western culture, the commodity of land is defined by partitioning a 2-
dimensional surface into closed regions that are projected both below and above that surface to create a 
discrete 3-dimensional boundary of individual ownership.   
The cultural partitions of the earth’s biosphere reduce architectural models to a single atomistic unit of 
synthesis and analysis, precluding any ability to examine the collective properties of groups of objects, in 
both static and changing relationships. 
2.1.3.  Situated hierarchical structure 
Borrowing hierarchical concepts from physics that structure the relationships of objects, every object is 
type of matryoshka doll.  Descending a hierarchical structure, every object is composed of a set of sub-
objects, where each sub-object is composed of a set of sub-objects, and each of those sub-objects is 
composed of sub-objects . . .  Likewise, ascending a hierarchical structure, each object is a member of a 
set that defines a larger object, with each larger object being a member of a set that defines an even 
larger object . . .  In every level of a hierarchical structure, an object is a set, or cluster, of smaller objects, 
giving a unit of synthesis or analysis multiple definitions.  Each level of hierarchical objects is defined by a 
discrete boundary, with that boundary defined by its local interaction with boundaries of adjacent 
objects.  The definition of an object is a situated definition.  
In a set of objects that form no physical connections, a discrete object is a readily definable unit of 
synthesis and analysis.  But as Newton established in the 17th century, objects absent a physical 
 16 
 
connection have other interactions.  Relationships of objects, even if not physically connected, are 
defined by the union of the set of variables involving the relative location of objects and the set of 
variables involving intervals in time of object interactions.  Properties are grounded in the structure of 
interactions, or connections, of sets of objects.  The set of variables of temporal object interactions can 
be categorized as having non-binding, quasi-binding, and binding interactions.   
With an atomistic object defined as a unit of synthesis or analysis, set structures of can be used to define 
the situated local locations and situated local interactions of collections of objects: 
A configuration is defined by the set of spatial location variables and the set of temporal 
interaction variables of a set of objects.  The properties of a configuration are 
grounded in the structure of its sets of location and interaction variables.  Variables of 
relative location and local interaction of objects define a configuration as a situated 
structure.  The initial configuration of a set of objects is defined by the set of location 
variables that initiate the model.  A configuration space is a structure on the set of all 
possible configurations formed from a set of objects:  the set of all possible 
configurations includes an operation, or morphism, that transforms one configuration 
into another configuration.  A morphism structures the neighborhood adjacency and 
accessibility distances of a configuration space.   
As the values of its variables change, a configuration will assume different states.  A 
configuration state is the overall condition of a configuration at a specific instance in 
time:  the sets of values for the sets of location and interaction variables of a set of 
objects at a specific instant in time.  The initial state of a set of objects is defined by the 
set of values for the location variables and the set of values for the interaction variables 
that initiate the model.  A state space is the set of all possible configuration states of a 
set of objects in a set of time:  the sets of all possible values for the sets of location and 
interaction variables of a set of objects in a set of time.  A temporal sequence of states 
traces a path in state space, defining the evolutionary trajectory, or time-ensemble, of a 
configuration. 
A phase transition is change in state space that results in a discrete morphism in 
configuration space.  For a set of objects, a phase transition is a change in a 
configuration state that results in a discontinuous jump to a new configuration:  change 
in the values of the location and interaction variables at a specific instant in time that 
yields a discrete transformation in the sets of location and/or interaction variables.  A 
phase space is a mapping of a state space onto a configuration space.  The variable 
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values of a configuration state entering a phase transition are the values of the initial 
state in the initial configuration that exits a phase transition. 
2.1.3.1.  properties of situated hierarchical structure 
A full range of continuous values for the sets of location and interaction variables result in configurations 
of nonbinding interactions, having the properties of a gas. 
As the range of continuous values for the set of location variables contract to a threshold range and the 
range of continuous values for the set of interaction variables contract to become discrete, a 
configuration with nonbinding interactions jumps to a configuration with quasi-binding interactions, 
having the properties of a liquid.   
As the range of continuous values for the set of location variables contract to become discrete and the 
state values for the set of interaction variables remain discrete, a configuration with quasi-binding 
interactions jumps to a configuration of binding interactions, having the properties of a solid. 
With set structures of discrete location and interaction variables, sets of objects form binding 
interactions, where boundaries of disjoint discrete objects are subsumed by clusters of objects with a 
common boundary.  With properties grounded in hierarchical cluster-objects, hierarchical cluster-objects 
become the appropriate units of synthesis and analysis.   
In large sets of objects where every object has multiple binding interactions, current ‘objective’ scientific 
modeling has difficulty defining discrete boundaries of hierarchical structure, making this a problem that 
consumes much of current scientific research. (Rohlf, 1970, 1974; Sokal, 1985; Bolker, 2000; Borgani, 
2001; Schlosser, 2002; Grimmett, 2003, 2006; Newman, 2003; 2006, 2009; Spirin, 2003; Kosak, 2004; 
Danon, 2005; Kahn, 2005; Krause, 2005; Leydesdorff, 2006; Koseska, 2010; Landau, 2010; Everitt, 2011; 
Pivovarov, 2011; Molina, 2012; Qian, 2012; Arbelaitz, 2013; Bock, 2013)  For structures of binding 
interactions, defining appropriate units of synthesis and analysis has become the open problem of the 
definition of discrete units of hierarchical structure. 
Modeled from an external point-of-view, nested hierarchies of object clusters present no discrete 
boundaries, forming near-infinite strings, or walks, in a complex network of variables defining a hierarchical 
configuration.  Following the work of Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, (Whitehead, 1910) 
every model of a hierarchical configuration would then begin from a union of the sets of spatial location 
and temporal interaction variables of a set of Higgs particles and work its way up to the objects under 
investigation:  
“Begin at the beginning," the King said, very gravely, 
 "and go on till you come to the end: then stop.”  
(Lewis Carroll, 1865) 
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Evolution of adaptive and non-adaptive configurations is an undecidable problem.  There is no central 
controller orchestrating the top-down formation of configurations in natural systems.  A probabilistic 
universe is dependent on the situated probabilistic local interactions of objects for a bottom-up 
formation of configurations.  External point-of-view mathematics can provide a quantitative description of 
structure, but natural systems perform no complex internal calculations to form structure.  Adopting the 
situated point-of-view and situated logic of the configuration models the process of pattern formation. 
The union of the set of situated location variables and the set of situated probabilistic temporal 
interaction variables of a set of objects reveal the discrete hierarchical boundaries of random hierarchical 
structure.  The intervals of randomness accumulate to form discrete hierarchical structure:  the deep 
simplicity of complex systems. 
2.1.4.  Current configuration state of the human habitat 
With cultural partitioning of space reducing human habitat models to atomistic units of analysis, habitat 
configurations readily admit to analysis by their set theoretic structure of interactions: 
The configuration of the human habitat is can be defined by the set of situated location 
variables and the set of situated interaction variables of a set of building-objects.  The 
sets of location and interaction variables are globally ubiquitous to define all sets and 
subsets of building-objects as having the same configuration.   
Currently, and for any instant in time in Western culture, the values for the set of 
location variables of building-objects have been culturally contracted to become 
discrete.  Constrained by fixed locations, values of the set of interaction variables 
between building-objects have also contracted to become discrete.  Having a discrete 
values for both location and interaction variables historically gives the state of the 
configuration of building-objects the binding connection properties of a solid.   
With a non-hierarchical structure given by the partitions of land ownership and 
discrete horizontal boundaries above and below the surface, the configuration of 
Western human habitats can be categorized as a solid sheet or film of discretely varying 
thickness on the surface of the earth. 
Having the property of solid structure reveals the configuration state properties of the 
human habitat to be no longer grounded in disjoint building objects.  Properties held by 
the physical human habit cannot be derived from examination of individual buildings any 
more than the properties of diamond can be derived from examination of single atoms 
 19 
 
of carbon.  In both cases, properties are grounded in the interaction structures, or 
configuration of connections, formed by the collections of objects.    
Limiting habitat analysis to individual disjoint building-objects precludes analysis of their configuration of 
connections.  The configuration of connections determines the properties of the configuration of human 
habitation.   
New units of analysis are required to correctly evaluate the properties and performance of the 
configuration of human habitation. 
2.1.5.  Global phase transition of the human habitat 
According to the World Bank’s 2009 World Development Report, the year 2000 CE marked a global 
transition, with more than half of the human population living in cities and 85% of the developed world 
population living less than 1 hour from a city.  While 95% of our population inhabits only 10% of earth’s 
land area, ‘remote’ areas, defined as being at least 48 hours from a major city, have been reduced to just 
10% of this surface. (World Bank, 2009)   
This presents a mismatch between the current pattern of human habitation and the unit of synthesis and 
analysis accepted for modeling.  With units of synthesis and analysis restricted to individual disjoint 
objects, architects are free to practice habitat design as art, unburdened of any responsibility for the 
combinatorial properties resultant from their individual object’s interactions with other similar objects:   
Each type of civilization has its own pattern of diseases.   
(Rene Dubos, 1969) 
The pandemics of obesity; depression; seasonal affective disorder; attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; 
regional urban and global scale climate modification; ecosystem fragmentation and instability are all 
properties inherent to our pattern of habitation.   
Little house on the prairie is no longer an apt metaphor for our pattern of human habitation, nor is it 
appropriate as a singular unit of synthesis and analysis.  To fully understand the human behavioral and 
environmental properties of our current pattern of habitation, units of synthesis and analysis need to 
extend beyond the disjoint object of an individual buildings to include their collective hierarchical 
interactions:  immediate local neighborhood; a cluster of local neighborhoods or extended 
neighborhood; precinct; borough; city; county; region; sub-continent; continent; globe:  
Does the Flap of a Butterfly's Wings in Brazil Set Off a Tornado in Texas? 
(Edward Lorenz, 1972) 
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The properties of hierarchical systems constructed from a large number of components, or complex 
systems, cannot be simply inferred from the properties of its individual component objects, but instead 
are a function of the relationships, or connectivity, of those objects:  
Interactions at a lower scale emerge as objects expressing their own 
properties at a higher scale. Scaling is the key to emergence; emergent 
properties arise as new objects from one scale to the next.  
(Joris Deguet, 2006) 
As several objects in a local neighborhood interact to form a configuration, the properties originally 
grounded in an individual object become the collective properties of the configuration.  As several 
configurations connect to form a larger configuration, and larger configurations connect to form even 
larger configurations, the properties at each level of the hierarchy become less dependent on the nature 
of the individual objects and become increasingly dominated by the connectivity of the configuration.  
Eventually, a collection of configurations interact to form a single large configuration, or a giant 
component.   
The emergence of a giant component indicates a phase transition in a system, and a discontinuity in its 
properties.  At this level of connectivity, properties are not derivable from the individual objects and 
bear no resemblance to the properties of the ascending hierarchy of configurations.  Just prior to the 
formation of a giant component, the collection of large configurations achieve a threshold level of 
connectivity that defines a critical state preceding a phase transition.  The critical state of a system might 
be inferred by one of its inhabitants only if that inhabitant had knowledge of a similar system experiencing 
a phase transition:  with only an inhabitant-eye-view, a system in a critical state exhibits little evidence of 
a pending phase transition. 
When a clustering process is confined to local interactions, the initial disjoint atomistic objects interact 
to form a set of local configurations, defining the local boundary and properties of the initial hierarchical 
level of a system.  As the first set of configurations increasingly connect to form their own local giant 
components, this second set of local phase transitions defines the boundaries and properties of a second 
level of hierarchical structure.  The third iteration, increasing the connectivity of second-order 
configurations, produces a third set of local giant components, where this set of local phase transitions 
defines the boundaries and properties of a third level of hierarchical structure.  Hierarchical pattern 
formation is then defined by sequential sets of increasing local connectivity that result in ascending local 
phase transitions of local giant components.  
On a finite 2-dimensional surface, such as a game board, disjoint objects can be divided into two groups 
and placed randomly on the board such that objects of each group form connections within their own 
group, but do not interact with objects of the other group.  Grey objects interact only with Grey 
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objects, and Green objects interact only with Green objects, and never the twain shall meet.  The 
process of pattern formation for one group by itself would follow sequential stages of connectivity to 
eventually produce a single giant component that fills the entire board, with the board assuming the 
properties of the giant component.   
However, simultaneous pattern formation of both groups becomes a zero sum game, with the 
connections formed within the Grey group blocking possible connections between Green members, and 
vice versa.  If the Grey and Green sides make their connections at the same rate, the game typically 
results in a draw, with neither side achieving the single giant component that dominates the board.  The 
final board is a mix of disjoint Grey and Green clusters, or patches, having similar properties.   
But if one side connects more quickly, growing at a significantly faster rate, it will achieve a phase 
transition, forming a single giant component that dominates the board in spite of the opposing group.  If 
Grey wins, a few isolated grey patches may remain unconnected, but the connectivity level predicates 
that the overall board will assume the giant component properties of Grey.  Isolated disjoint Green 
patches remain also, but generally will not significantly alter the Grey properties of the board.   
The most common variation of this game is played with one side opening play with established 
connections of a giant component and dominating the properties of the board, while the other side starts 
as randomly distributed isolated objects.  In the alternating play of sides, each side may add objects to 
locations on the board adjacent to existing objects in their own group.  This variation is also played with 
two additional connection rules:  
The first modifies the qualitative nature of connections, with the initial dominant 
pattern gradually constructing endurance connections with slow-twitch polarity, while the 
isolated objects of the opposite side are capable of quickly fabricating power 
connections of fast-twitch polarity.  
The second connection rule sets a minimum connectivity threshold for an isolated 
patch to remain intact.  Below this threshold, new objects may not be added, and 
existing objects are removed on each turn to eventually leave a void on the game 
board.  
The game is traditionally starts with Green as the dominant group on the board, and Grey opening play 
by adding objects to form several small local clusters.  Green’s traditional opening response is to 
eliminate as many isolated Grey objects as possible, and reduce the connectivity of the few initial Grey 
clusters.  After only a few turns, Grey’s speed and power break through the thicket of Greens’ 
connections to link several of the Grey clusters and establish the second hierarchical level of pattern 
formation.   
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As Grey’s population remains small in relation to Green’s, there is a period of establishing and severing 
connections on both sides, producing a middle game pattern of thinly connected and disconnected 
clusters of Grey and Green.  However, with Grey’s increasing population and accelerated growth of 
fast-twitch connections, the middle game pattern of dynamic stasis is short-lived.  Green’s connectivity 
is rapidly overwhelmed by Grey’s blitzkrieg as large clusters achieve the connectivity threshold of a 
Grey critical state. 
The end game begins as Grey forms a single giant component, leaving Green broken into disconnected 
clusters, reversing their initial dominance and deference roles on the board.  With a giant component 
achieved, Grey’s metabolism slows, few additional Grey objects are added to the board, and the polarity 
of connections reverse.  Grey’s fast-twitch connections of conquest decelerate into the slow twitch 
links of maintenance.  The smaller isolated Green clusters begin to drop below the minimum 
connectivity threshold and decompose to become voids on the board.   
After several turns, the voids increase to achieve their own critical threshold, triggering a second set of 
cascades in both Green and Grey, initiating another role reversal.  Grey’s giant component begins to 
fragment, the population of Grey objects drops precipitously while voids erode Grey connections and 
isolate clusters from the central pattern.  In the few remaining Green clusters, the process of adding 
objects accelerates to create new generation fast-twitch Green connections.  Now the roles are fully 
reversed, and the slow-twitch Grey connections begin to collapse under the counterattack of a fast-
twitch Green blitzkrieg.  Green’s rebound returns the board to the middle game pattern of thinly 
connected and disconnected clusters of Grey and Green. 
The accumulation of probabilistic local interactions on the board of Grey and Green objects have now 
reached a bifurcation point, with the end game playing out a path in one of the following four groups of 
trajectories: 
End game scenario 1:   
A handful of Grey’s remaining clusters stabilize above the connectivity threshold and 
preserve the accepted precedents for pattern formation.   Grey’s pattern retains its 
pre-collapse properties.  Grey adapts to the recent catastrophe by introducing a 
central control mechanism to limit population growth and confine new pattern 
formation to strict boundaries.  A middle game pattern of thinly connected and 
unconnected Grey and Green clusters form a long term dynamic stasis.  The end-board 
is shared by Grey and Green.   
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End game scenario 2:   
Green’s counterattack is unrelenting as Grey’s population continues to decline.  The 
smaller isolated Grey clusters begin to drop below the minimum connectivity threshold 
and decompose to become voids on the board.  Green’s pattern formation continues 
unchecked, rapidly filling the voids left by Grey’s collapse.  Grey’s larger clusters 
continue to contract, drop below the connectivity threshold, and become voids.  
Green’s pattern achieves a phase transition, producing a second giant component.  
Grey’s last cluster continues to deconstruct, but briefly holds out On the Beach before 
finally being overrun by Green.  The end-board is Green. 
End game scenario 3:   
Grey’s decimated population stabilizes into several disconnected clusters that remain 
above the connectivity threshold.  Filling the voids of Grey’s collapse, Green’s pattern 
formation achieves a phase transition, producing a giant component that engulfs Grey’s 
stabilized clusters.  As Green’s population stabilizes after the phase transition, its 
connections reverse polarity and revert to slow-twitch links.  There is a brief period of 
stasis that ends as Grey’s population again explodes.   
The cascade of new objects and their new generation of fast-twitch connections follow 
Grey’s accepted precedents of pattern formation to quickly unite its isolated clusters 
and fragment Green’s giant component.  The board returns to the middle game pattern 
of thinly connected and disconnected patches of Grey and Green.   
Green’s decimated population stabilizes into several disconnected clusters that remain 
above the connectivity threshold.  Filling the voids of Green’s collapse, Grey’s pattern 
formation achieves a phase transition to produce a giant component that engulfs 
Green’s stabilized clusters.  As Grey’s population stabilizes in its old pattern, its 
connections reverse polarity and revert to slow-twitch links.  There is a brief period of 
stasis that ends as Greens population again explodes . . .  The end-board becomes a 
blinker, oscillating between predominant Grey and Green states.  
End game scenario 4: 
Green’s counterattack is unrelenting as Grey’s population continues to decline.  The 
smaller isolated Grey clusters begin to drop below the minimum connectivity threshold 
and decompose to become voids on the board.  Green’s pattern formation continues 
unchecked, rapidly filling the voids left by Grey’s collapse.  Grey’s larger clusters 
continue to deconstruct, its population decimated, but a handful of disconnected 
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clusters teeter on the connectivity threshold.  Green’s pattern formation achieves a 
phase transition, producing a giant component that engulfs Grey’s quasi-stable 
threshold clusters.   
As Grey continues to collapse, a succession of three independent quasi-stable clusters 
break from the old precedents of pattern formation, restructuring their connections 
into a new pattern.  This pattern holds the new property of allowing Green’s 
connections to pass uninterrupted through a Grey cluster.  Grey’s new pattern 
formation process no longer blocks Green’s pattern formation.  Grey and Green are 
no longer engaged in a zero sum game for the surface of the board.   
In the real-world, the 2-dimensional game board is a sphere.  The pattern formation of natural 
ecosystems is modeled by Green, while Grey models the current pattern formation of human habitation.  
2009 World Bank data indicates the pattern of human habitats has likely achieved the connectivity 
threshold of a critical state, strongly suggesting it will form the giant component of a global phase 
transition in the 21st century.   
This is a structural system state induced by a single parameter:  the physical connectivity of the pattern of 
human habitation.  The specific pattern of habitat connectivity is a function of the accepted cultural 
precedents of land and ownership.  The current dominant global pattern of human habitation defines 
partitioning earth’s biosphere as a zero sum game.  In its current state of connectivity, the properties 
associated with this pattern of human habitation are no longer dependent on the properties of the 
individual objects that comprise the pattern.   
Human habitats require new units of synthesis to enable formation of a new pattern; a new configuration. 
2.2.  THE CRITICAL THRESHOLD STATE  
Artificial life is the study of man-made systems that exhibit behaviors 
characteristic of natural living systems.  .  .  .  .  a relatively new field 
employing a synthetic approach to the study of life-as-it-could be.  It views 
life as a property of the organization of matter, rather than a property of 
the matter which is so organized.   
(Christopher Langton, 1989) 
The history of mathematics and science both reveal a transition from the investigation of seemingly 
disparate objects to structural investigations of object connections.  These investigations focus directly 
on the process-pattern and pattern-property relationships of systems.  With design disciplines 
 25 
 
intrinsically involved in pattern formation of unrelated objects, this evolutionary trajectory may prove to 
be prophetic. 
Prior to 1874, mathematics consisted of the investigation of a wide range of independent and seemingly 
unrelated mathematical objects.   Cantor’s development of Set Theory and its subsequent acceptance as 
the unifying foundation of mathematics in the early 1900’s provided a structural basis for relating these 
disparate objects: (Kline, 1972; Eves, 1990, Bourbaki, 1994) 
The reduction of mathematics to set-theory was the achievement of the 
epoch of Dedekind, Frege and Cantor, roughly between 1870 and 1895. 
As to the basic notion of set (to which that of function is essentially 
equivalent) there are two conflicting views: a set is considered either a 
collection of things (Cantor), or synonymous with a property (attribute, 
predicate) of things. In the latter case “x is a member of the set y” in the 
formula x ∈ y, means nothing but that ‘x’ has the property 'y’.  
(Hermann Weyl, 1946) 
With the publication of General Theory of Natural Equivalences in 1945, MacLane and Eilenberg introduced 
the beginnings of Category Theory:  a relation of mathematical objects through processes, or morphisms.  
While this has generated ongoing debate about Category Theory displacing Set Theory as ‘the’ 
foundation of mathematics, it is clear they simply address different segments of the process–pattern–
properties structure.  Set Theory organizes mathematical objects as pattern-property couples, while 
Category Theory organizes mathematics in terms of process–pattern couples. 
2.3.  THE CASCADE:  MODELING A BRAVE NEW WORLD  
Within fifty to a hundred years, a new class of organisms is likely to 
emerge.  These organisms will be artificial in the sense that they will 
originally be designed by humans.  However, they will reproduce, and will 
evolve into something other than their initial form; they will be ‘alive’ under 
any reasonable definition of the word.   
(Doyne  Farmer, 1989) 
We are as gods and might as well get good at it.   
(Edmund Leach, 1968) 
Unlike a blank canvas model of artistic synthesis, observations of synthesis in the natural world have 
produced a model of pattern formation in science founded on the concept of a search space:  a 
theoretical pre-existing universe of all possible solutions to a design problem.   
Architectural design initially follows a science model of synthesis, where a problem is defined by 
identifying the input of a pattern formation process: the set of variables that contribute to a solution.  
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After this, the currently accepted practices of pattern formation diverge, with architecture relying on the 
distributed cognition of descriptive models and science trusting the certainty of mathematical models.  
James Audubon may have been the one of the last great descriptive visualization modelers in science. 
In comparison to architectural modeling, scientific modeling increases the number of variables able to be 
included in a model, extends the local exploration of a search space to become a global exploration of all 
possible solutions, and offers the predictive capability of quantitative mathematics. . 
Once a set of all possible variables influencing a problem are identified, the search space of all possible 
combinations of all possible variables can be defined as a power set: a set of all of the possible subsets of a 
set.  The power set of variables of a can be structured as a configuration space.  The set and power set 
of variables and their associated configuration space can extend beyond limited finite constructions to 
become infinite discrete structures.  There are no boundaries to an infinite configuration space, it simply 
structures the endlessly creative possibilities of design.  The search space of a collective architectural 
form can be defined and structured as an infinite discrete morphological configuration space.   
The pattern formation process of design then becomes a search to discover configurations, or patterns, 
having the properties to match performance goals.  The obvious but pragmatically incomprehensible 
approach is the exhaustive process of generating and analyzing every configuration in the space.  
Traditional optimization strategies engage in variations of this process, but are limited to problems with 
manageably small finite configuration spaces. (Alexander 2001)  Artists’ intuitive search methods work 
with an infinite configuration space, but artists are restricted by their cognitive load limit to local 
explorations, and their pattern formation process is virtually impossible to repeat or reproduce.   
Evolution offers a third search option: it is an adaptive pattern formation and evaluation process that 
models the movement of a population through a multi-variable infinite configuration space in a search for 
fitness to quickly arrive at near-optimum configurations holding the properties that correlate to 
performance goals.  The path, or evolutionary trajectory, of a population examines a small finite subset of 
an infinite configuration space.  (Wright, 1932, 1988; Mitchell, 1996).   
The process of evolution is a member of a set of homologous adaptive processes of pattern formation, 
or adaptive configuration formation.  The common structure of the adaptive process establishes a 
hierarchical parallel distributed processing model of adaptive configuration formation, connecting the scales 
of individual neuro-cognitive, clustered social group, and genetic-evolutionary population adaptation.   
The interlocked scales of the adaptive process enable synthesis of hierarchical configurations in a 
complex multi-variable infinite search space.  Adaptation is the universal process of synthesis of the living 
world:  it is the process that forms patterns, structures, or configurations.  Those patterns, structures, or 
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configurations hold properties that can be evaluated for their situated performance in meeting goals that 
are specific to a context.   
The process of adaptive configuration formation is defined by the relationships adaptive objects establish 
with each other as well as the relationships they establish with non-adaptive objects.  An adaptive object 
holds the property of adaptation: 
the ability of self-adjustment or self-modification in accordance with 
changing conditions of environment or structure.  
(Aseltine, 1959) 
2.3.1.  Predictive control  
Properties are grounded in configuration, or structure, making adaptive and non-adaptive objects 
structurally different:  adaptive objects have an adaptive control, or predictive control, mechanism; (Aseltine, 
1958; Widrow, 1964; Qin, 2003; Xu-Wilson, 2009; Lee, 2011) non-adaptive objects do not.  Adaptive 
control is based on the semantic interpretation external and internal environments, or the interpretation 
of current external and internal configuration states, to guide formation of the next internal configuration 
state.  The complexity of the adaptive control mechanism varies with the level of hierarchy in an adaptive 
configuration, with the most basic being a digital switch: if I sense ‘this’, I switch on, if not I do nothing; or 
if I sense ‘this’ I switch off, else I do nothing.  In adaptive configurations of higher hierarchical levels, 
predictive control mechanisms are models of the configuration: they are models of self. 
The process of adaptation can be quantitatively modeled in computer-time to generate hierarchical 
configurations in a complex multi-variable infinite search space.  It has the property of prediction.  It 
breaks the chunking limits cognitive pattern formation.  Adaptive objects in every hierarchical level use 
this process to form the configuration of their habitats.  The model of adaptation is an architectural 
modeling process of design:  
. . . birds do it; bees do it . . ..Let’s do it . . .  
(Cole Porter, 1928) 
The current interpretation that our universe is probabilistic at the lowest level of hierarchical structure 
encountered to date infers all ascending hierarchical levels of structure are also probabilistic.  The 
indeterminacy of hierarchical structure infers that one or both of the parameters that form hierarchical 
structure are indeterminate: relative location and temporal local interaction. 
In the 17th century deterministic model of the universe, a force is the result of an interaction, leading to 
Newton’s formulation of laws of motion: object at rest will remain at rest unless an outside force acts on 
it, and an object . . .  will remain in motion in a straight line unless acted upon by an outside force.  The 
19th century initiated the transition to a probabilistic model of the universe with Maxwell and Boltzmann 
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applying randomness to the interactions of individual gas particles, followed by Gibbs models of entire 
particle fields, or ensembles of particles:  the accumulation of temporal intervals of random events 
produced probability distributions of possible configuration states. 
The application of probability theory to Newtonian mechanics results in a model of temporal intervals of 
randomness that interrupt an otherwise deterministic universe, with Newton’s laws of motion inviolate 
between the random events of object interaction.  Configuration modeling follows by defining the initial 
condition of a set of objects and structuring the subsequent relationships of random and/or deterministic 
interaction events in a set of objects.   
2.3.2.  Adaptive configurations 
If the motion of adaptive objects is indeterminate, they form indeterminate location relationships with 
both adaptive and non-adaptive objects.  Locations of adaptive objects are probabilistic, giving adaptive 
objects two intervals of indeterminacy:  intervals of object location and time intervals of object 
interaction.  
Adaptive objects engage in discrete probabilistic bidirectional local interactions with adaptive and non-
adaptive objects to form adaptive configurations: 
An adaptive configuration is defined by the set of location variables and the set of interaction 
variables of a union of sets of adaptive objects and non-adaptive objects.  The adaptive 
properties of an adaptive configuration are grounded in the structure of its sets of location and 
interaction variables.  The initial adaptive configuration of a union of adaptive and non-adaptive 
sets is defined by the set of location variables initiating the model.  An adaptive configuration 
space is a structure on the set of all possible adaptive configurations formed from a union of sets 
of adaptive objects and non-adaptive objects:  the set of all possible adaptive configurations 
includes an operation, or adaptive morphism, that transforms one adaptive configuration into 
another adaptive configuration.  An adaptive morphism structures the neighborhood adjacency 
and accessibility distances of an adaptive configuration space.   
As the values of its variables change, an adaptive configuration will assume different adaptive 
states.  An adaptive configuration state is the overall condition of an adaptive configuration at a 
specific instance in time:  the sets of values for the sets of location and interaction variables of a 
union of adaptive and non-adaptive sets of objects at a specific instant in time.  The initial 
adaptive state of a union of adaptive and non-adaptive sets of objects is defined by the set of 
values for location variables and the set of values for location variables initiating the model.   
 29 
 
An adaptive state space is the set of all possible adaptive configuration states in a set of time:  the 
sets of all possible values for the sets of location and interaction variables of a union of adaptive 
and non-adaptive sets of objects in a set of time.  A temporal sequence of adaptive states traces 
a path in adaptive state space, defining the evolutionary trajectory, or adaptive time-ensemble, of 
an adaptive configuration. 
An adaptive phase transition is change in adaptive state space that results in a discrete adaptive 
morphism in adaptive configuration space.  For a set of adaptive objects, an adaptive phase 
transition is a change in an adaptive configuration state that results in a discontinuous jump to a 
new adaptive configuration:  change in the values of the location and interaction variables at a 
specific instant in time that yields a discrete transformation in the sets of location and/or 
interaction variables:   
A full range of continuous values for the sets of location and interaction variables result 
in adaptive configurations of nonbinding interactions, having the properties of a gas. 
As the range of continuous values for the set of location variables contract to a 
threshold range and the range of continuous values for the set of interaction variables 
contract to become discrete, an adaptive configuration with nonbinding interactions 
jumps to a configuration with quasi-binding interactions, having the properties of a 
liquid exhibited in the dynamic swarming, flocking, and herd behaviors of animals.   
As the range of continuous values for the set of location variables contract to become 
discrete and the adaptive state values for the set of interaction variables remain 
discrete, an adaptive configuration with quasi-binding interactions jumps to a 
configuration of binding interactions having the properties of a solid. 
An adaptive phase space is a mapping of an adaptive state space onto an adaptive configuration 
space.  The variable values of an adaptive configuration state entering a phase transition are the 
values of the initial adaptive state in the initial adaptive configuration that exits a phase 
transition. 
2.3.3.   Subjective fitness 
A key feature in models of adaptive processes is a fitness function, or cost function: the set of rules or 
evaluative criteria that provide the basis for change of a configuration.  A fitness function is an adaptive 
morphism initiated by a predictive control mechanism.  The quantitative models of adaptation used in 
engineering, economics, and science rely on the definition of objective quantifiable fitness functions, 
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(Bremermann, 1962; O’Donald, 1970; Lande, 1983) and are directly applicable to the quantitative 
parameters of human habitat configuration formation.   
But they omit the important cultural parameters of configuration formation that establish the truths of 
the art of architecture:  the subjective non-quantifiable design parameters Isamu Noguchi distilled to:   
‘make you feel better, feel happier to be there.’  
(Isamu Noguchi, 1948) 
Subjective non-quantifiable fitness functions have also been used successfully in adaptive configuration 
formation processes. (Frazer, 2002; Ibrahim and House, 2004, Mullican, 2005).  The difference between 
purely quantitative and dual qualitative-quantitative fitness functions in adaptive modeling suggests the 
traditional structure of empirical research:  the control group and the experimental group.  In a 
qualitative-quantitative modeling process, the artist acts as a culturally biased subjective predictive control 
mechanism to periodically interrupt the quantitative model of adaptation and shepherd the evolutionary 
trajectory of habitat configurations.   
In a world of quantitative modeling, subjective fitness functions save architecture’s soul.   
2.3.4.  Memotype-phenotype interaction 
That adaption occurs simultaneously in interactive hierarchical scales necessitates simultaneous modeling 
in multiple interactive hierarchical scales:  a situated local phase transition in a hierarchical configuration 
produces the next hierarchical level of configuration.  With genetic-evolutionary adaptation existing 
simultaneously in individual and population scales, a minimum adaptive modeling requirement would 
include both levels of hierarchy in a parallel model structure. 
The subsets of adaptive physical clusters that compose the physical morphology of an adaptive object 
define it as a phenotypic configuration.  The distributively embedded information structure used to 
construct and maintain a phenotypic configuration is composed of subsets of information clusters that 
define it as a genotypic configuration.  As a cultural artifact in a human habitat, this embedded information 
structure would be re-defined by biologist Richard Dawkins as a memotypic configuration: 
The new soup is the soup of human culture.  We need a name for the new 
replicator, a noun that conveys the idea of a unit of cultural transmission, or 
a unit of imitation. ‘Mimeme’ comes from a suitable Greek root, but I want 
a monosyllable that sounds a bit like ‘gene’. I hope my classicist friends will 
forgive me if I abbreviate mimeme to meme.  
(Richard Dawkins, 1976) 
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2.4.  IT’S ALIVE!  (the zero-sum game continued) 
In one of the quasi-stable threshold clusters approaching collapse, a monk in the Grey Albertian Order of 
Leibowitz experiences random electronic encounter on a still partially connected fragment of the old 
world’s giant electronic component.  Recovering from initial disbelief, she forwards the link to fellow 
oblates in two small remote Grey clusters housing the Order.  Her dim display reveals a garbled but 
partially readable electronic file, Situs identitatem arkhitektura et spatium conformation, describing a process 
of pattern formation that allows Green’s connections to pass uninterrupted through a Grey cluster:  
Conceptually treating 3-dimensional space as the simple projection of a closed boundary on a 2-
dimensional surface produces a configuration with the properties of a solid.  With the 
properties of a solid, human habitat configurations reduce the interaction with other ecosystem 
habitats to a zero sum game.  Co-evolution requires a more complex partitioning of 3-
dimensional space to form a different configuration. 
Disjoint building-objects partition 3-dimensional space into two discrete regions.  Another 
configuration that partitions space into two discrete regions but has very different properties is 
expressed in the 3-dimensional labyrinth of solid and void exhibited by individual corrals in their 
formation of reef structures.  The equivalent regular periodic structures of space partitioning 
were notably explored by inorganic chemist A.F. Wells, (Wells,1970,1977) with architect 
Michael Burt later defining the regular and semi-regular geometric surfaces of polyhedral 
configuration space. (Burt, 1967, 1996)  Even more complex partitions of 3-dimensional space 
are possible, but unlike the surface boundaries of corral manifolds that partition space into two 
interpenetrating regions, the 2-dimensional surfaces of these configurations partition 3-
dimensional space into at least seven interpenetrating bounded continuous regions.  (Hyde, 
2003)  
Deformed in response to local seasonal solar trajectories, the bounded regions of these 3-
dimensional infinite weavings of partitioned continuous space can be used as the infrastructure 
for human habitation: some fully occupied, some partially occupied, and some unoccupied by 
human presence.  Regions accessible to humans integrate the subsystems of enclosed human 
habitation, habitat service space, connective transportation, urban parks, and urban agriculture.  
Regions inaccessible to humans provide uninterrupted connectivity of natural systems, while 
continuous voids allow every occupied region to have direct surface contact with the local 
climate.  With its extensive surface area collecting incident water and solar radiation, these 
configurations hold the inherent properties necessary to maintain a human population and its 
natural world life support system in a dynamic co-evolutionary state of equilibrium. 
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While not derived from carbon-based organic life as we know it, the enclosed region of human 
habitation will be alive in every sense; growing, adapting, dying, and perhaps even reproducing in 
symbiosis with human inhabitants and environment.   Habitat constructions will become 
hierarchically interacting structures of fully autonomous discrete spatial partitions that are 
embedded with distributed systems of sensors and predictive control modules.  Just as every 
physical living cell contains its own adaptive information structures, our physical habitat 
structures will transcend simple static physical form to contain its genotype, or more precisely, 
its memotype:  the locally embedded distributed information structures that define ‘self’ and 
allow for a situated adaptive physical response to changing human behaviors, environmental 
forces, and cultural mores.  Locally adaptive, self-regulating, self-healing, and potentially self-
aware, this is a portrait of the house as a young dog. 
It was a grand AH-WHOOM.   
(Kurt Vonnegut, 1963) 
As Karl Gauss first observed in 1847, quantitative mathematical models are the only models to hold the 
property of prediction.  (Gauss, 1847) 
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3.  SITUATED STRUCTURAL MODELING 
We're off to see the wizard, The Wonderful Wizard of Oz 
We hear he is a whiz of a wiz, if ever a wiz there was 
If ever, oh ever a wiz there was, The Wizard of Oz is one because 
Because, because, because, because, because 
Because of the wonderful things he does   
(H. Arlen, E.Y. Harburg, 1939) 
 
Johnny, rosin up your bow and play your fiddle hard. 
'Cause Hell's broke loose in Georgia and the Devil deals it hard. 
And if you win you get this shiny fiddle made of gold, 
But if you lose the devil gets your soul.   
(Charlie Daniels, 1979) 
 
Never trust anything that can think for itself if you can't see where it keeps 
its brain.   
(J.K. Rowling, 1999) 
What if, in search of prediction, design of the human habitat turned from its history of art-based 
descriptive models to adopt multi-variable quantitative models of pattern formation?  What are the 
precedents for quantitative modeling?  What are their origins?  Their limitations?   
To buy-in, do I have to sell out?   
(John Careatti, 1984) 
3.1.  OZ AND THE MAN BEHIND THE CURTAIN:  MODELING PRECEDENTS 
Cum Deus calculat et cogitationem exercet, fit mundus. 
-When God calculates and exercises thought, the world is made.-
(Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, 1677) 
All these things being considered, it seems probable to me, that God in the 
Beginning form'd Matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable 
Particles, of such Sizes and Figures, and with such other Properties, and in 
such Proportion to Space, as most conduced to the End for which he form'd 
them.   
(Isaac Newton, 1704) 
3.1.1.  17th century:  God’s universal truth 
With few exceptions, the precedents in mathematics and science established in the 17th century 
remained unquestioned through the end of the 20th century.  Newton, Leibniz, Fermat, Pascal, Huygens, 
and Bernoulli, among others, abandoned Descartes’ prevailing descriptive models of hierarchical 
structure to develop pattern-property models based on the quantitative linear relationships of atomistic 
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non-hierarchical collections.  Guided by the deeply held belief in a singular supreme creator, they 
assumed the viewpoint of an omniscient external observer to construct new mathematics on the 
foundations of ancient Greek culture:  the atomistic philosophy of fundamental indivisible elements 
attributed to Leucippus and Democritus in the 5th century BCE and a top-down deductive method of 
inquiry dating to Aristotle in the 4th century BCE.  (Kline, 1953; Boyer, 1968) 
Continuing the Aristotelian tradition in his 1666 Dissertatio de arte combinatorial, Gottfried Leibniz took 
the first step toward his dream of a universal language for deductive reasoning, resuming in 1679 to begin 
outlining the basic concepts of symbolic logic.  (Eves, 1958)  In the preface of his 1678 Treatise on Light, 
Christiaan Huygens introduced the now ubiquitous hypothetico-deductive method, or at the time, simply 
'the method of hypothesis':   
One finds in this subject a kind of demonstration which does not carry with it 
so high a degree of certainty as that employed in geometry; and which 
differs distinctly from the method employed by geometers in that they prove 
their propositions by well-established and incontrovertible principles, while 
here principles are tested by the inferences which are derivable from them.  
The nature of the subject permits of no other treatment. It is possible, 
however, in this way to establish a probability which is little short of 
certainty. This is the case when the consequences of the assumed principles 
are in perfect accord with the observed phenomena, and especially when 
these verifications are numerous; but above all when one employs the 
hypothesis to predict new phenomena and finds his expectations realized. 
(Christiaan Huygens, 1678) 
3.1.1.1.  continuous determinism  
Taking up a range of geometry problems that had preoccupied mathematicians in the early part of the 
17th century, Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz independently recognized the calculation of area and 
the calculation of tangents were inverse operations, inaugurating concepts of continuous mathematics 
and establishing the basis of integral and differential calculus. 
In letters to the Royal Society of London, Newton first publicly documented his thinking in 1676, and 
published portions of his work in his 1687 Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica.  His manuscript 
Method of Fluxions, completed in 1671, was finally published in 1736.  Unaware of Newton’s effort, Leibniz 
began working on similar problems in 1672, publishing Nova methodus pro maximis et minimis in first 
German scientific journal, Acta Eruditorum, in 1684.  Their results produced very different algorithms to 
deal with variable quantities, with Newton structuring change over time and Leibniz constructing 
differences in a sequence of infinitely close values.  In conceptualizing an infinitesimal, Leibniz effectively 
shrunk discrete atomistic elements to their vanishing point, creating an unbroken continuum of real 
numbers, or points in a line.  (Wilson, 1982) 
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Newton’s coupling of continuous linear mathematics with the concept of continuous linear nature of 
time produced the first quantitative predictive models of physical reality, underpinning deterministic and 
stochastic models in science for nearly three centuries.  As a model of causation, the prevailing dogma of 
theological determinism was challenged by the new quantitative ‘truth’ of mechanical determinism.  The 
scientific belief in catastrophism, with its roots in the Judeo-Christian creation story, was displaced by 
another ‘truth’ of continuous mathematics:  the inherent gradualism of incremental change. 
3.1.1.2.  chances of continuous determinism 
Although the oral and written traditions of gambling found in all cultures reveal empirical origins of 
probability dating to at least 3500 BCE, a series of letters between Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat in 
1654 are generally acknowledged as inaugurating combinatorial probability as a branch of mathematics.  
(David, 1955, 1962; Kendall. 1956; Maistrov, 1974; Green, 1981;Bellhouse, 1993;  Batanero, 2005) 
Christiaan Huygens, a founding member and mentor of Leibniz at the Académie Royale des Sciences in 
Paris, published the first monograph on mathematical probability in 1656, with his Van Rekeningh in 
Speelen van Geluck remaining the definitive reference into the next century.  (David, 1955, 1962; Kendall. 
1956; Maistrov, 1974)  Pascal’s own treatise, Traite du triangle arithmetique, avec quelques autres petits traits 
sur la meme matiere, was completed in 1654, but not circulated until 1665.  (Bernstein, 1996; Adamson, 
2005; Cooke, 2005) 
James Bernoulli began work on probability in 1684, with Ars Conjectandi published in 1713, eight years 
after his death, outlining a comprehensive foundation of modern probability theory.  Bernoulli provided 
theorems and proofs to formalize the combinatorial work of Pascal and Huygens, and developed the 
concept of the law of large numbers:  as the number of observations increases, the relative frequency of an 
empirical event will approach the ‘truth’ of the theoretical probability of its occurrence.  The final section 
of Ars Conjectandi also introduced the new concept of subjective probability:  a situated quantification of 
certainty-uncertainty of belief in a statement’s truth. (Bernoulli, 1713) 
While the 17th century produced the seeds that would later flower into accepted belief of a stochastic 
universe, the founders of mathematical probability retained a strictly deterministic worldview.  (Sylla, 
1998; Adamson, 2005)  For them, probability was a comprehensive and consistent method of reasoning 
to be used when faced with insufficient information to formulate a deterministic model of events:   
Given a certain position of a die, [its] velocity and distance from the board 
at the moment when it leaves the thrower’s hand, it cannot fall otherwise 
than it actually does.  …  So these phenomena take place owing to their 
immediate causes with no lesser necessity than the phenomena of the 
eclipses follow from the movement of the heavenly bodies.  And still, usually 
only the eclipses are ranked among necessary phenomena whereas the fall 
of a die and the future weather are thought to be contingent.   
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The sole reason for this is that what is supposed to be known for 
determining future actions, and what indeed is such in nature, is not enough 
known.  And, even had it been sufficiently known, geometrical and physical 
knowledge is inadequately developed for subjecting such phenomena to 
calculation in the same way as eclipses can be calculated beforehand and 
predicted by means of known astronomical principles.  And, for the same 
reason, before astronomy achieved such perfection, the eclipses themselves 
had to be reckoned as future chance events.   
(Jakob Bernoulli, 1713) 
3.1.1.3.   God’s eye  
For over 2000 years, the intellectual world, of which mathematics are a 
part, accepted Aristotle’s logic.  It is true that Descartes, who questioned all 
beliefs and doctrines, did raise the question of how we know that the 
principles of logic are correct.  His answer was that God would not deceive 
us.  The assurance we possess of the correctness of these principles was 
thereby justified to him.   
(Morris Kline, 1980) 
Until the latter part of the 20th century, historians modeled 17th century Europe as a culture of conflict, 
harmony, or intellectual segregation between non-overlapping secular and religious domains.  (Shea, 
2007)  These longstanding models reflected the cultural bias of an external observer from the modern 
era, built on the implicit assumption that the cultural objects of ‘science’ and ‘religion’ are invariant with 
respect to time and place.  The dichotomy is perfectly encapsulated by the title of Massimo Mazzotti’s 
2007 review, The two Newtons and beyond.  (Mazzotti, 2007) 
A situated investigation of history assumes a point of view from within a culture in time, with current 
research recognizing the Judeo-Christian roots of western mathematics and science:   
Western science grew out of Christian theology. It is probably not an 
accident that modern science grew explosively in Christian Europe and left 
the rest of the world behind. A thousand years of theological disputes 
nurtured the habit of analytical thinking that could be applied to the analysis 
of natural phenomena.  . . .  The common root of modern science and 
Christian theology was Greek philosophy.   
(Freeman Dyson, 1998) 
Theological truth structured scientific investigation and by turn, new truths in mathematics and science 
were interpreted for theological significance.  (Davis, 2002)  Although there was unanimity in the dual 
threads of truth, weaving a fabric of belief exhibited considerable variation, as contrasted by Leibniz and 
Newton’s differing theological implications of their mathematics. 
A Christian believer, Gottfried Leibniz theorized God to be the most perfect rational being, with reason 
forming the common bond between God and man, differentiating man from the remainder of creation.  
For the divine creator-mathematician that calculated all possible worlds before selecting the one with 
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maximum harmony, continuous intervention in the world was both unnecessary and unworthy.  Yet the 
divine law embedded in a perfect creation was ‘mostly not understood by the creatures within which it 
inheres', making God’s intermittent intervention in the world vital.  For Leibniz, exploring mathematics 
was working in the service of God; his universal harmony of diversitas identitate compensate parallels his 
concept of the Christian Trinity. (Garber, 1998; Antognazza, 2003; Breger, 2005; Caro, 2012) 
For Isaac Newton, God was continually involved in the world, with divine causation acting through the 
structures of creation, such as gravity.  Mathematics provided the tools to decipher the ideas of God as 
they were expressed in the laws of nature.  Believers of Newtonian natural philosophy saw no conflict 
between unravelling God's message in the parallel truths of the Book of nature and the Bible, with both 
requiring devout study and insight (Hall, 1979; Force, 1981; Davis 2002; Shapiro, 2004; Markley, 2005): 
Natural philosophy as such was a discipline and subject-area whose role and 
point was the study of God’s creation and God’s attributes. Thus, no-one 
ever undertook the practice of natural philosophy without having God in 
mind, and knowing that the study of God and God’s creation — in a way 
different from that pursued by theology — was the point of the whole 
exercise.   
(Andrew Cunningham, 1991) 
Leibniz and Newton’s new mathematics of continuous determinism and the development of probabilistic 
inference of continuous determinism marked an abandonment of the internal truth of mathematics as a 
platonic ideal unrealizable in physical reality.  While the nascent calculus did lack the solid deductive 
foundation necessary for internal truth, mathematics was now developed by a culture of observation of 
the natural world, its truth confirmed by congruence to an external physical reality.  (Kline, 1972)  To a 
present day external observer, the 17th century empiricist confirmation of absolute mathematical truth 
presents a logical woozle: 
Mathematics is developed from observations of the natural world.  
As the unwritten word of God, the Book of nature is an absolute truth. 
If mathematics is isomorphic to the natural world, it is isomorphic to the absolute truth 
of God.   
Therefore, mathematics that is isomorphic to the natural world is an absolute truth. 
Deviating from a church doctrine of God’s direct causation, the consensus of 17th century scientists 
accepted Descartes’ view of mechanistic causation while sharing his deeply held belief in a supreme 
creator.  (Torrance, 1972; Smarr, 1985; Ramati, 2001)  For Newton, Leibniz, Pascal, Fermat, Huygens, 
and Bernoulli, a singular omniscient being structured the universe with mathematics and continued to 
maintain, directly or indirectly, an integral position of omniscient central controller.  By literally assuming 
 38 
 
a ‘God’s-eye view’ as an external observer and deciphering the mathematics of the natural world, man 
may gain privilege in sharing the creator’s divine vision: 
And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let 
them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, 
and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing 
that creepeth upon the earth. 
So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; 
male and female created he them.   
(King James Bible, Genesis 1:26-27) 
3.1.2.  18th century:  return of discrete structure 
Following his creation of continuous functions, Leibniz proposed an entirely different direction for 
mathematics in a 1679 letter to Huygens: 
I believe we lack another analysis, properly geometric or linear, which 
expresses location directly as algebra expresses magnitude.   
(Kline, 1972c) 
Like his concept for a universal logic, Leibniz’ proposed study of geometria situs or analysis situs was only 
partially developed and contained few examples, but he articulated a vision of a mathematics of structural 
properties more fundamental than those measurable by geometry. (Hopkins, 2004; Zaytsev, 2008)  
In 1736, Leonhard Euler realized this vision with the publication of Solutio problematis ad geometriam situs 
pertinentis, or “The solution of a problem relating to the geometry of position”, now widely known as the 
problem of the 7 bridges of Königsberg.  It is ironic that in this single short paper of 13 pages, one of the 
most prolific mathematicians in history inaugurated the entirely new fields of graph theory and topology:  
qualitative models of discrete structure; the mathematics of pattern.  
Graph theory builds a structural representation of discrete points connected, or not, by lines to show 
paired relationships of objects in their relative location.  Topology defines the properties of structure or 
pattern that remain unaltered by continuous geometric distortion.  Although the deformation processes 
under consideration are continuous and exclude ’tearing’ a surface, the properties that remain invariant 
throughout a pattern deformation, such as the number of ‘holes’ in an object, are themselves discrete.  
3.1.3.  19th century:  indeterminism and discontinuity  
3.1.3.1.  evolution of  indeterminate models of material structure  
In the early 18th century, Jakob Bernoulli's posthumous publication of Ars Conjectandi and Abraham de 
Moivre's The Doctrine of Chances outlined a sound mathematical basis of probability.  Statistics in that time 
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was unrelated to probability and consisted largely of ad hoc treatments of data collected by city--states, 
bereft any predictive ability.  (Kendall, 1956; Bernstein, 1996) 
With an 1812 publication that remained influential until the beginning of the 20th century, Pierre Simon 
Laplace’ Théorie analytique des probabilities consolidated these separate endeavors by introducing 
probability as a rigorous foundation for statistical inference. (Molina, 1930; David, 1955)  Despite 100 
years of established mathematical foundations of probability and his broad application of statistical 
models, Laplace retained a firm belief in Descartes’ deterministic universe:   
We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of 
its anterior state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for 
one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which 
nature is animated,  .  .  .  it would embrace in the same formula the 
movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest 
atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would 
be present to its eyes.  
(Pierre Simon Laplace, 1814) 
For Laplace, probability and statistics were simply methods to approximate what is not known but 
presumed to be knowable. (David, 1962; Cooke, 2005; Pepin, 2012)  It would take almost another 100 
years and the development of comprehensive probabilistic models of physical structure for scientific 
determinism to be seriously challenged.  
Shortly after the publication of Ars Conjectandi, Jakob’s nephew, Daniel Bernoulli, outlined the basis of the 
kinetic theory of gasses:  the observable physical properties of a body of gas, such as temperature and 
pressure, were the result of the disorderly movement of discrete microscopic particles. (Stigler, 1990)  
Even with the belief that, at equilibrium, all of the particles moved at the same speed, the independence 
of individual particles presented an insurmountable problem for the accepted deterministic Newtonian 
models of motion, inhibiting the development of quantitative models of kinetic gas theory as well as 
broader efforts investigating the relationship between the patterns and properties of materials. 
In 1856, countering the prevailing astronomical belief that the rings of Saturn were a fluid, James Clerk 
Maxwell published a model showing how the spinning motion of discrete bodies could appear visually 
united as fluid flow. (Maxwell, 1855)  This lead to his interest in the thermodynamic problems presented 
by the kinetic theory of gases, and the unconventional realization that, as a result of their collisions, not 
all particles in a volume of gas at equilibrium moved at the same speed/velocity.  
From his familiarity with Laplace’ writings,  Théorie analytique des probabilities, Maxwell recognized the 
success of probability theory in investigating the properties of unstructured collections of a large number 
of similar objects, and considered this radically different approach to the variation of individual particle 
velocities in kinetic gas theory.  With his 1860 publication of Illustrations of the Dynamical theory of gasses, 
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he presented the first non-deterministic model of material structure:  a probability distribution of the 
varying particle velocities in an ideal gas in thermal equilibrium. (Maxwell, 1860)  
In 1866, Ludwig Boltzman published a Newtonian model of kinetic gas theory.  After reading criticisms of 
Maxwell’s 1860 paper, Boltzmann responded with a mathematically sound derivation of his own that 
confirmed Maxwell’s probability distribution of particle speeds. (Porter, 1986; Renn, 2008)  He then 
continued with an extensive series of papers, extending the probabilistic gas model beyond the ideal state 
of mono-atomic particles considered by Maxwell and constructing a probabilistic basis of the second law 
of thermodynamics:  systems always evolve toward thermodynamic equilibrium, the state of maximum 
disorder, or maximum entropy.  With his work, equilibrium is now conceived of as the most probable 
state of a system and no longer seen as a stationary state. (Renn, 2008; Uffink, 2006) 
After a prolific career establishing that systems naturally evolve from less probable to more probable 
states, Boltzmann somehow retained a core belief in determinism.  His lectures and writings toward the 
end of his life are surprisingly explicit:   
. . . present day atomism is a perfectly apt picture of all mechanical 
phenomena, and given the closed nature of this domain we can hardly 
expect it to throw up further phenomena that would fail to fit into that 
framework. Indeed, the picture includes thermal phenomena: that this is not 
so readily proved is due merely to the difficulty of computing molecular 
motions.   
(Boltzman, 1897) 
. . . I am the only one left who still grasped the old doctrines with unreserved 
enthusiasm – at any rate I am the only one who still fights for them as far 
as he can.  I regard as my life’s task to help to ensure, by as clear and 
logically ordered an elaboration as I can give of the results of classical theory 
. . .  (Boltzmann, 1899) 
In nature and art the all-powerful science of mechanics is thus ruler,  .  .  .  
The god by whose grace kings rule is the fundamental law of mechanics.   
(Boltzmann, 1900) 
Boltzmann, along with 200 years of scientific determinism, did not go gentle into that good night. 
In 1873, J. Willard Gibbs published two papers, developing both 2 and 3 dimensional phase diagrams:  
graphical models of the relationship between the thermodynamic properties and patterns of material 
structure.  He followed this with the 1876-1878 publication of On the Equilibrium of Heterogeneous 
Substances, effectively defining the field of classical thermodynamics with a treatment that remains little 
modified to this day.  This work delineates his theories of the phases of matter and introduced the 
concept of a phase transition:  each individual substance is a component of a system, each equilibrium 
 41 
 
state of a system is a different phase, and a phase transition is a discontinuous transformation between 
the equilibrium states of a system. (Maistrov, 1967; Kadanoff, 2009) 
In 1884 he published a paper that initiated the term statistical mechanics, differentiating the probabilistic 
models of Maxwell and Boltzmann from the traditional deterministic model of Newtonian mechanics.  By 
1892 he was working on a comprehensive treatment of this new field:  
Just now I am trying to get ready for publication something on 
thermodynamics from the a priori point of view, or rather on 'statistical 
mechanics' [...] I do not know that I shall have anything particularly new in 
substance, but shall be contented if I can so choose my standpoint (as 
seems to me possible) as to get a simpler view of the subject.  
(Gibbs, 1892) 
Maxwell and Boltzmann limited the applicability of their results to dilute gasses by modeling the 
probabilities of independent particles: solid and liquid states of matter are comprised of strongly 
interacting particles that cannot be regarded as statistically independent.  Gibbs generalized their work 
and extended it to all states of matter by developing a probabilistic model based not on the state of a 
particle, but on the state of the entire system of particles.  (Kadanoff, 2014)      This work culminated 
with the 1902 publication of Elementary Principles of Statistical Mechanics: 
We may imagine a great number of systems of the same nature, but 
differing in the configurations and velocities which they have at a given 
instant, and differing not merely infinitesimaiIy, but it may be so as to 
embrace every conceivable combination of configuration and velocities. And 
here we may set the problem, not to follow a particular system through its 
succession of configurations, but to determine how the whole number of 
systems will be distributed among the various conceivable configurations . . .  
(J. Willard Gibbs, 1902) 
Based on his previous work of 1876-1878 that deduced a system of particles in equilibrium could be in a 
number of different states, Gibbs developed the concept of an ensemble: a set of system states containing 
each possible state that a particle system might assume.  An ensemble is the micro-state space, or the 
configuration space of a system.  Keeping the number of particles in the model constant by the selection 
of one or more extensive properties, he calculated the probability that a system might assume each of 
these possible states, constructing a statistical ensemble as the probability distribution for the 
configuration space of a system in equilibrium. (Gibbs, 1902) 
3.1.3.2.  evolution of discontinuous mathematical structure 
The development of probability and statistics and their subsequent incorporation into physics, with 
probabilistic models of material structure reaching a critical threshold of at the end of the 19th century, is 
paralleled by the evolution of continuous mathematics.  The synergy of developments in mathematics and 
 42 
 
physics initiated by Newton and Leibniz also achieved a critical threshold at the end of the 19th century 
with the inclusion of discontinuity in continuous mathematical structure. 
Colin Maclaurin was appointed to the chair of mathematics at the University of Edinburgh on Newton’s 
letter of recommendation of 1726 and published the first systematic treatment of Newton’s calculus in 
1742.  In his Treatise of fluxions, Maclaurin introduced several mathematically sound derivations and 
demonstrated a diversity of applications with the construction of mathematical models employing 
empirical data.  
The gradualist concept of continuity stemming from Newton’s fluxions is apparent in the work of James 
Hutton, a student of Maclaurin’s at Edinburgh and now considered the founder of modern geology.  
Hutton’s 1785 lectures Concerning the System of the Earth, Its Duration, and Stability to the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh refuted the accepted estimates of the age of the earth derived from theology:  the observable 
geological formations of the present were the result of the slow accumulation of incremental change 
over incredibly long periods of time.  Niles Eldredge succinctly summarized geological gradualism in 2006:  
. . .  however joltingly abrupt any earthquake may be, it takes a lot of them 
regularly interspersed through lots of geological time to make a mountain 
chain out of a seafloor.  
(Niles Eldredge, 2006) 
In the early 1830’s, Hutton’s gradualism was incorporated by Charles Lyell in his influential Principles of 
Geology,  which in turn was instrumental in Charles Darwin’s 1859 conception of gradual incremental 
change in the evolution of life forms: The Origin of Species. 
While the gradualist concept of incremental continuity embedded in the calculus of Leibniz and Newton 
spread to other disciplines, the concept of continuity itself was changing within mathematics as the 
concept of a mathematical function evolved. 
With Leonhard Euler’s 1748 publication of Introductio in analysin infinitorum, the interrelated concepts of 
function and continuity became a central focus in the development mathematics.  In 1755, Euler followed 
with Institutiones calculi differentialis, giving a modern general definition of a function as a one-to-one 
correspondence:  
If some quantities so depend on other quantities that if the latter are 
changed the former undergoes change, then the former quantities are 
called functions of the latter. This definition applies rather widely and 
includes all ways in which one quantity could be determined by other. If, 
therefore, x denotes a variable quantity, then all quantities which depend 
upon x in any way, or are determined by it, are called functions of x. 
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He restricted his definition by examining only functions of different types of well-established 
mathematical operations but retained a global concept of continuity not dissimilar to that of Leibniz and 
Newton: continuity was a property of the entirety of a function of a single analytical expression.  Euler’s 
identification of a function and its global continuity with an analytical expression remained largely intact 
until the early 19th century when the problems encountered in the physics of particle mechanics, 
equilibrium states, and material properties stimulated successive expansions. 
Bernard Bolzano’s 1817 Rein analytischer Beweis des Lehrsatzes, dass zwischen je zwey Werthen, die ein 
entgegengesetzes Resultat gewähren, wenigstens eine reele Wurzel der Gleichung liege and Augustin-Louis 
Cauchy's 1821 Cours d'Analyse de l'École Royale Polytechnique departed from Euler’s interpretation of 
continuity as a whole-function global property to define continuity as a local property specific to an 
interval of a function.  Cauchy’s work extended the operation of integration to include functions having a 
finite number of discontinuities on a bounded interval, giving  a definition of continuity that conforms to 
the generally accepted meanings of continuous and discontinuous used today: 
In other words, the function f(x) remains continuous with respect to x in a 
given interval, if an infinitesimal increase in the variable within this interval 
always produces an infinitesimal increase in the function itself. 
Cauchy’s work of 1821 also introduces a key refinement in the definition of a function that would prove 
to have a lasting effect on mathematical modeling: 
When variable quantities are related so that, given the value of one of them, 
one can infer those of the others, we normally consider that the quantities 
are all expressed in terms of one of them, which is called the independent 
variable, while the others are called dependent variables. 
Bernhard Riemann’s 1854 lecture Ueber die Darstellbarkeit einer Function durch eine trigonometrische Reihe 
extended the process of integration to include functions having an infinite number of discontinuities, 
thereby reducing the local measure of discontinuity from Cuachy’s intervals to sets of points and 
precipitating the modern term of pointwise connectivity.  Riemann’s work stands as the first systematic 
investigation of discontinuous functions.  
Throughout the 19th century the mathematical concepts of continuous and discontinuous reflected the 
expanding abilities to calculate derivatives and integrals of functions, evolving to tame discontinuity with 
the expanding apparatus of continuous mathematics.   
The end of the century is marked by Henri Lebesgue’s work to establish the most stringent manifestation 
of continuity, absolutely continuous, where a function is the integral of its derivative and Rene-Louis Baire’s 
extending the examination of continuity and discontinuity to the convergence of a sequence of functions. 
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In the 1904 publication of Leçons sur l'intégration et la recherche des fonctions primitives, Lebesque writes: 
If we wished to limit ourselves always to these good [that is, smooth] 
functions, we would have to give up on the solution of a number of easily 
stated problems that have been open for a long time. It was the solution of 
these problems, rather than a love of complications, that caused me to 
introduce in this book a definition of the integral that is more general than 
that of Riemann and contains the latter as a special case. 
Baire follows in 1905 in his Lecons sur les functions discontinues: 
Is it not the duty of the mathematician to begin by studying in the abstract 
the relations between these two concepts of continuity and discontinuity, 
which, while mutually opposite, are intimately connected? 
3.1.4.  20th century:  the modern synthesis; properties of modeling precedents 
Mathematics and science themselves are simply large patterns of information that conform to the 
structuralist subsets of process-pattern-properties-performance and exhibit the characteristics of 
complex systems: each are sensitive to initial conditions or assumptions, lack a central controlling agent, 
and are predicated on local interactions percolating to a critical threshold to produce emergent systemic 
change.  While they are not Gibbs closed systems of equilibrium states, undergoing phase transitions, 
they are the open systems of von Bertalanaffy in homeostatic states experiencing phase transitions.  
In this light, the late 17th century can be seen as a phase transition in mathematics and science initiated by 
the predictive ability of the continuous mathematics introduced by Newton and Leibniz.  The 18th-20th 
centuries is then seen as a period of stasis, where advancements were largely incorporated into the 
established framework, and challenges to accepted precedents, the most notable being indeterminacy, 
remained below a critical threshold.  However, the end of the 20th century is witness to a change of 
focus in science, with attention shifting from the properties of objects examined as linear relationships, to 
properties resulting from the nonlinear relationships between objects: networks and complex systems; 
patterns, or configurations.  The investigation of relationship configurations presents new set of modeling 
problems that, to date, have proven to be not amenable to solution.  The grounding of properties in the 
nonlinear relationships of objects and not in the objects themselves represents a serious challenge to the 
accepted precedents of current mathematics and science and suggests an impending 21st century phase 
transition. 
The current state of math and science, based on precedents established from the 17th through 19th 
centuries, are evident in the 3 dimensions of accepted 20th century mathematical modeling: 
continuous – discrete 
quantitative – qualitative/categorical-qualitative 
deterministic – stochastic 
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While these dimensions are often used specifically to categorize scientific models, they also provide a 
useful framework to examine the underlying mathematics used to construct models.  They are 
properties of mathematical structures that can be used to partition the body of current mathematics into 
three sets:  continuous, discrete, and stochastic.   
The discontinuities between continuous, discrete, and stochastic mathematics have resulted in a mélange 
of approaches to 20th century scientific modeling.  Continuous and stochastic mathematics define change, 
thereby enabling prediction, but remain unmindful of pattern.  Discrete mathematics defines pattern, but 
remains unmindful of change, thereby precluding prediction.   
Bridging the discontinuities between continuous, discrete, and stochastic mathematics and deeply 
embedded in scientific modeling, two precedents that were effectively handed down from God in the 17th 
century have remained sacrosanct in the 20th:  the objective truth of mathematics and the omniscient 
objective external observer. 
3.2.  A PROMISE OF PARADISE:  STRUCTURING UNIVERSAL TRUTH 
No one shall be able to drive us from the paradise that Cantor created for 
us.   
(David Hilbert, 1926) 
3.2.1.  Logical foundations of universal truth 
Georg Cantor’s 1874 set theory presented a unifying structure that encompassed the previously 
unrelated branches of mathematics to provide a foundation for mathematics that remained unquestioned 
for nearly a century.  (citation)  Using Cantor’s set theory as a blueprint, Gottleib Frege resurrected 
Leibniz’ unrealized idea of a universal logic with his attempt to derive a complete set theoretic 
restructuring of mathematics using only constructions of formal logic.  (Kline, 1980; Kline, Vol.3, 1982; 
Stillwell, 2010)  In 1902, with Volume 1 of his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik already in print and Volume 2 
delivered to the publisher, Frege famously received a letter from Bertrand Russell revealing a logical 
inconsistency in the fundamental structure of set theory, now known as Russell’s paradox (Stewart, 
1975; Davis, 1981; Weisstein, 2015):   
Let R be the set of all sets which are not members of themselves. Then R 
is neither a member of itself nor not a member of itself.  
Russell often used a story about a village barber to put the structural 
problem in popular form (Eves, 1958; Kline, Vol.3, 1982): 
A village barber states that he shaves all in the village who do not shave 
themselves. Who shaves the barber?  
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This, and other emerging contradictions, prompted Russell’s exhaustive work with Alfred Whitehead 
from 1910-1913 to produce a three volume landmark in propositional logic to structure mathematics:  
Principia Mathematica.  
I wanted certainty in the kind of way in which people want religious faith. 
(Russell, 1956) 
3.2.2.  Axiomatic foundations of universal truth 
Understanding that contradictions were to be expected in a young and evolving discipline, David Hilbert 
suspected the inconsistencies were rooted in the logicist approach to mathematical unification, where a 
truth value is structured as one-to-one relationship between a mathematical object and a concept.  
(Giaquinto, 1983; Cory, 1997; Cantini, 2009)  Hilbert understood truth to present a more complex 
structure: 
. . . a concept is really fixed in a net with other concepts and this net is 
specified by the axioms; so only the consistency of the axioms that define 
the concept grants the legitimacy of [a mathematical concept].   
(Cantini, 2009) 
Using Cantor’s blueprint and treating a proof itself as a mathematical object to be studied by 
mathematical methods, Hilbert began an extensive research program in the early 1920’s to restructure 
mathematics using the formal axiomatic techniques of mathematics, conceiving metamathematics: 
The chief requirement of the theory of axioms must go farther [than merely 
avoiding known paradoxes], namely, to show that within every field of 
knowledge contradictions based on the underlying axiom-system are 
absolutely impossible.   
(David Hilbert, 1918) 
For logical deduction to be certain, we must be able to see every aspect of 
these [extralogical concrete] objects, and their properties, differences, 
sequences, and contiquities must be given, together with the objects 
themselves, as something which cannot be reduced to something else and 
which requires no reduction.  This is the basic philosophy which I find 
necessary, not just for mathematics, but for all scientific thinking, 
understanding, and communicating.  The subject matter of mathematics is, 
in accordance with this theory, the concrete symbols themselves whose 
structure is immediately clear and recognizable.   
(David Hilbert, 1925) 
Hilbert’s program initiated the transition in mathematics from the external verification of truth back to 
an internal verification:  the completeness and consistency of the formal axiomatic system.  Internal 
consistency requires that no logical contradiction can be deduced from the axiomatic system:  a 
proposition A and its negation not A cannot both be derived from the same set of axioms.  (Kleene, 
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1952)  Internal completeness requires that all possible assertions that can be deduced from a set of 
axioms are provable by that set, an additional independent axiom cannot be added that is consistent with 
the set.  (Kleene, 1952; Kline, 1972c) 
The precedents of consistency and completeness remain the accepted standards for mathematical truth, 
with accepted truth in empirical science a close parallel to mathematics:  consistency translates to 
empirical repeatability and reproducibility while completeness translates to empirical causality and 
correlation. 
The goal of my theory is to establish one and for all the certitude of 
mathematical methods.  
. . . Insight is procured for us by a discipline which comes closer to a general 
philosophical way of thinking  . . .  This discipline, created by Georg Cantor, 
is set theory.  . . .  the finest product of mathematical genius and one of the 
supreme achievements of purely intellectual human activity.   
. . . Admittedly, the present state of affairs where we run up against the 
paradoxes is intolerable.  Just think, the definitions and deductive methods 
which everyone learns, teaches, and uses in mathematics, the paragon of 
truth and certitude, lead to absurdities!  If mathematical thinking is 
defective, where are we to find truth and certitude?   
(David Hilbert, 1925) 
3.3.  PARADISE LOST: THE EMERGENCE OF LOCAL MATHEMATICS 
It is to the writer’s continuing amazement that ten years after Godel’s 
remarkable achievement current views on the nature of mathematics are 
thereby affected only to the point of seeing the need of many formal 
systems, instead of a universal one.  Rather has it seemed to us to be 
inevitable that these developments will result in a reversal of the entire 
axiomatic trend of the late 19th and 20th centuries, with a return to 
meaning and truth.   
(Emil Post, 1941) 
3.3.1.  Multiple truths:  non-Euclidean geometries 
For more than 2000 years of western civilization, mathematics was believed to be the accurate 
description of physical phenomena that illuminated the underlying design of the universe.  Mathematics 
was held as the embodiment of absolute truth about the external natural world.  (Gray, 2006) 
Secure in this belief, mathematics in the 17th and 18th centuries all but neglected the early Greek methods 
of deductive proof and continued develop on pragmatic and empirical grounds.  Euclid’s axioms outlining 
the properties of physical space were held as a triumphal exemplar of the attainment of absolute truth, 
with the defining axiom eventually revealed to be Euclid’s 5th, or parallel, postulate:  given a straight line 
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and a point not on that line, one and only one straight line can be constructed through that point that 
never intersects the first line, even if they are infinitely extended. 
The first strike against mathematics and logic embodiment of absolute truth was delivered between 1812 
and 1823 by the formulation of alternative, non-Euclidean, geometries.  By the mid-18th century, a handful 
of mathematicians had come to the conclusion that the parallel postulate could not be deduced from the 
other axioms of geometry – that it was independent of Euclid’s remaining axioms -- with Karl Gauss the 
first to recognize that Euclidean geometry held no privileged claim on truth.  In his personal writings 
between 1799 and 1829, Gauss became convinced of the independence of the 5th postulate, that a non-
Euclidean geometry was logically consistent, and that it might be applicable to the representation of 
physical space.  (Knoebel, 2007; Stillwell, 2010) 
Publishing independently in 1823, Nikolai Lobachevsky and Janos Bolyai are generally credited with 
establishing non-Euclidean geometry: they each derived fully formed systems of geometry based on the 
logical consequences of accepting an initial axiom that contradicts Euclids’ parallel postulate. (Kline, 
1972c; Kline, 1980; Knoebel, 2007)  
The representation of physical space by multiple geometries, each consistent within itself, but 
contradictory with each other, was the first realization that mathematics did not represent a singular 
universal/absolute truth about the external natural world. (Kline, 1980)  Having surrendered the tenet of 
universal external truth to non-Euclidean geometry, the premise of universal internal truth remained:  
mathematics was surmised to be both internally complete and internally consistent. 
3.3.2.  Incomplete truths:  Godel’s incompleteness theorems 
The second strike against mathematics and logic as an objective and absolute truth was delivered in 1931 
with Kurt Godel’s proof of two theorems that establish the inherent limitations of proof in formal 
axiomatic systems. (Boyer, 1968) 
His first incompleteness theorem shows that in any consistent axiomatic system strong enough to 
develop simple integer arithmetic, there will always be truths that can be expressed/ derived from its 
axioms that can be neither proved nor disproved based on those axioms. (Devlin, 1999)  Using the 
logical structures outlined in Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica, Godel constructed a 
statement equivalent to “This sentence is not provable.”  Of course, if this statement is true, then it is 
not provable.  However, if it is false, and provable, then the axiomatic system can be used to prove a 
statement that is not true in that system.  Later developments extend these results to any formal 
axiomatic system:  if logic and mathematics are consistent, they cannot be complete. (Stillwell, 2010) 
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Godel’s second incompleteness theorem extends the unprovable statements of his first incompleteness 
theorem to include statements of an axiom systems’ own consistency:   any formal system robust enough 
to formulate its own consistency can prove its axiomatic consistency if and only if it is inconsistent. 
(Stillwell, 2010)  Truth does not reside exclusively in the province of proof. 
3.3.3.  Local truths:  Cohen’s independence proofs 
The third strike against mathematics and logic as a representation of absolute truth was delivered in 1963 
with Paul Cohen’s re-examination of the relationship/ roles of the continuum hypothesis and the axiom 
of choice to the consistency of set theory.   
Prior to 1873, Aristotle’s potential infinity was recognized in mathematics primarily as something to be 
avoided.  Actual infinity was devoid of structure or measurement, consequently a formal definition 
remained beyond the capabilities of mathematics.  Georg Cantor’s seminal construction of set theory 
included infinite sets, thereby giving measure and definition to actual infinity as a mathematical object.  
(Kline, 1953; Maor, 1987; Kaplan, 2003)  Cantor presented proof that set of whole numbers had fewer 
elements in it than the set comprised of the continuum of real numbers:  there are ‘lesser’ and ‘greater’ 
sizes of actual infinity.  This lead to his formulation of the continuum hypothesis in 1884/88?:  there is no 
infinite set having a number of elements between the lesser infinite set of whole numbers and the greater 
infinite set of real numbers. (Dauben, 1979)  In his famous lecture delivered to the International 
Congress of Mathematicians in 1900 outlining the significant outstanding problems in mathematics, 
Hilbert listed the continuum hypothesis as number one. (Elwes, 2011) 
In 1904, to resolve the contradictions/paradoxes inherent in Cantors initial constructions of set theory, 
Ernst Zermelo formulated the axiom of choice to prove a basic theorem in his initial axiomatic 
formulation/treatment of set theory. (Wilder, 1952)  This axiom formally states a deceptively simple and 
intuitive concept: for any collection of unrelated sets, where each set contains at least one object, it is 
possible to select one object from each set to form a new set, a choice set. (Mac Lane, 1986)  In 1928, 
Abraham Fraenkel amended / extended Zermelo’s axioms to be more inclusive/ comprehensive, resulting 
in their widespread acceptance as the unifying foundation of mathematics: Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory 
with the axiom of choice.  (Luce, 1977; Dieudonne, 1992) 
In 1940, Godel offered a proof that both the axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis were 
consistent with set theory, provided the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel were themselves consistent:  on 
the basis of Zermelo-Fraenkel, the axiom of choice could not be disproved, nor could the existence of an 
infinite set between the greater and lesser infinite sets defined by Cantor. (Kline, 1972c; Johnson, 1972; 
Dawson, 1984; Uspensky, 1994; Devlin, 2002; Goldstein, 2006)   
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Thirteen years after Godels proof of consistency, Paul Cohen conceived of a new approach that resulted 
in the proof of inconsistency:  neither the axiom of choice nor the continuum hypothesis can be proved 
from the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel, provided set theory is itself consistent.  Further, Cohen showed 
that Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory broadened by the inclusion of the axiom of choice is also incapable of 
proving the continuum hypothesis.  Godel proved the absence of an infinite set between the set of whole 
numbers and the set of rational numbers was consistent with set theory.  Cohens’ later proofs showed 
the existence of an infinite set between the set of whole numbers and the set of rational numbers was 
also consistent with set theory. (Stewart, 1995; Stillwell, 2010) 
Just as proof of the independence of Euclid’s parallel postulate gave rise to consistent and complete non-
Euclidean geometries, the proofs of Godel and Cohen reveal the continuum hypothesis and the axiom of 
choice to be independent of the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel, and allow the potential formulation of 
equally valid alternative set theories. (Eves, 1990; Stillwell, 2010)  Set theory, accepted as the unifying 
foundation of mathematics for nearly a century, has no more claim to universal truth than did Euclidean 
geometry before it, resurrecting the debate over the foundation of mathematics.  What became clear in 
the aftermath of Cohen’s work was that the provable truths of mathematics are dependent on the initial 
postulates. (Eves, 1990; Chaitin, 2002; Davis, 2005) 
The vision of mathematics as a model of absolute truth has been proven to be little more than mirage.  
Lobachefsky and Biarani’s independent axomizations of non-Euclidean geometries in 1923, Godels 
incompleteness proofs of 1931, and Cohens independence proofs of 1963 have resulted in the reluctant 
acceptance that universal/absolute truth is unattainable within the known framework of mathematics and 
logic.  Mathematics is a cultural construct that has achieved neither a standard of universal objective 
external representation nor a standard of internal completeness and consistency:  
The questions of the ultimate foundations and the the ultimate meaning of 
mathematics remains open; we do not know in what direction it will find its 
final solution or even whether a final objective answer can be expected at 
all.  ‘Mathematizing’ may well be a creative activity of man, like language or 
music, of primary originality, whose historical decisions defy complete 
objective rationalization.  
(Hermann Weyl, 1946) 
Truths provable by mathematics and logic endure, but it must be recognized that these truths are 
constrained by their context and initial postulates to remain relative and local.  Mathematical properties 
do not reside in disparate mathematical objects, but are defined by the pattern of local relationships of 
mathematical objects.  Thus spake category theory: provable truth is situated.  
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3.4.  LOCAL TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES:  SITUATED MODELING 
One of the profoundest instances of this phenomenon arose in the 
transition from classical (Newtonian) to relativistic physics, when physical 
concepts such as simultaneity of events and mass of a body formerly 
ascribed an absolute meaning were seen to possess meaning only in 
relation to local coordinate systems. 
There is an evident analogy between local mathematical frameworks and 
the local coordinate systems of relativity theory:  each serve as the 
appropriate reference frames for fixing the meaning of mathematical or 
physical concepts respectively.   
(John L. Bell, 1986) 
3.4.1.  Incompleteness of knowledge 
In 2008, David Wolpert followed Godel’s proof of the incompleteness of axiomatic systems to construct 
a proof of the incompleteness of any method to acquire knowledge of a physical system:  any device 
embedded in a physical system that performs observations, predictions, recollections, or inference, about 
that system is incapable of obtaining complete knowledge of that physical system. (Wolpert, 2008)  
Provable truth is incomplete, absolute truth is unobtainable. 
In the absence of absolute truth, the position of the external objective observer also becomes 
unattainable.  The observer of local truth is situated, defined by the observer’s context and initial 
postulates.  The properties of an observer are not defined by a disparate ‘observer-as-object’, but are 
defined by the local pattern of interactions ‘observer-as-constituent’.   
3.4.2. Naturalistic inquiry 
From their divergent points of inception, the collection of investigative methods grouped under the 
umbrella of qualitative research, or naturalistic inquiry, have followed the relativistic revolution of early 20th 
century physics to accept a situated observer as a core tenant:   research reflects the embedded nature 
of the investigator in the context of the local universe in which observations are made as well as the 
unstated or often unrecognized internal postulates of the investigator. (Lincoln, 1985)  The ‘Godelian 
truths’ that hide in the interstitial spaces of provability suggest a possible role for the continued 
development of naturalistic methods in science:  the verification of non-provable truths. 
3.4.3.  Modeling situated configurations 
The emergence of the locally situated observer as an alternative to the external ‘objective’ observer 
establishes? an investigators point-of-view as another dimension of scientific modeling:  external – 
situated.  An ‘external’ model assumes an omniscient ‘God’s-eye view’ perspective of phenomena.  A 
situated model assumes a locally embedded ‘particle-eye view’ perspective of phenomena.  
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To date, the situated models of naturalistic inquiry are descriptive models, generally derided by the 
scientific community for their lack of rigor.  It’s not their fault:  all of existing mathematics begins and 
ends with the external point-of-view.  The mathematical foundation for the accepted dimensions of 
modeling in 20th century science can be defined by the following subsets of properties: 
(continuous, quantitative, deterministic, external) 
(continuous, quantitative, stochastic, external) 
(discrete, quantitative, stochastic, external) 
(discrete, qualitative, external) 
That the mathematics from an external point-of-view has revealed itself to be situated, the obvious 
question is then of the possible subsets of mathematics created by the substitution of the characteristic 
situated for that of external.  This question rises not from the ‘Because it’s there.’ raison d'être lamented 
by Morris Kline as ‘mathematics as the study of arbitrary structures’ (Kline, 1980), but rises from the 
spirits of the 19th century and earlier, when the hard line between mathematician and scientist had not 
yet been drawn, and new mathematics was often a response to the call of new problems in the scientific 
exploration of the natural world. 
Today much of science continues to hold to the precedents of the 20th century and accept atomistic 
objects as the unit of analysis on the assumption that properties are grounded in objects.  But virtually 
every discipline now has an expanding faction that views their subject from a connectionist perspective:  
investigation converges on the relationships between objects, with a growing realization that properties 
are grounded in these relationships.  Many of these diverse investigations share the vocabulary of 
networks and complex systems, but they are perhaps more expediently defined as structures, patterns, 
or configurations.   
While this transition is underway, most disciplines remain incognizant that their work can be defined by 
the set of categorical elements in structuralist philosophy accepted by material science nearly a century 
ago:  (Phillips, 2001) 
(process, pattern, properties, performance).   
Processes define pattern, patterns define properties, properties define performance.  The issue of 
structure, pattern, or configuration, has become a common problem throughout science.   
Pattern is where science intersects the art of architecture:  distilled to its abstract essence, the 
profession of architecture is a discipline of patterns and pattern formation of the human habitat.  
Architectural modeling is currently a process of distributed cognition employing descriptive models.  
With a history at least as long, if not longer, than mathematics, and considerably longer than science, the 
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seminal precedent for architectural modeling is the concept of atomism:  the human habitat is conceived 
as a collection of disparate objects, buildings, with properties grounded in the object.  In that sense, the 
art of architecture and the accepted precedent for much of 20th century scientific modeling share the 
same foundation.  The limitations inherent in this assumption are revealed by Boltzmann’s atomistic 
modeling of material properties:  it is a model applicable only to weakly interacting systems of particles; 
quasi-binding and non-binding interactions, having properties of dilute gases.   
Modeling systems of objects with binding interactions is the science of structure, pattern, or 
configuration, and can be distilled into two discrete problems:  pattern identity and pattern formation.  
Both of these problems appear to reside in the discontinuities between the existing objective 
frameworks of continuous, discrete, and stochastic mathematics. 
A pattern, or configuration, is a definition of the connections between discrete objects, indicating a 
discrete model.  Categorical definitions of pattern lack the specificity to rigorously define a single 
configuration that uniquely differentiates it from other similar configurations.  The problem of 
configuration identity is non-categorical, implying a quantitative model.  That configuration identity eludes 
the extensive body of external quantitative mathematics suggests a situated model.  These prerequisites 
combine to form the set of characteristics of a mathematical model of pattern identity as: 
(discrete, quantitative, situated) 
Pattern formation is the evolution of the connections between discrete objects, requiring a discrete 
model.  The local interactions at the heart of pattern formation suggest an ‘object-eye view’, or situated 
model that answers the question:  what did the object know and when did it know it?  Local interactions 
at all scales in the physical and life sciences have some degree of indeterminacy, entailing a stochastic 
model.  These prerequisites combine to form the set of characteristics of a mathematical model of 
pattern formation as: 
(discrete, quantitative, stochastic, situated) 
A discrete quantitative definition of configuration identity inherently gives a measurable degree of 
configuration similarity or dissimilarity, or a distance metric for configurations.  A discrete quantitative 
definition configuration formation gives a transformation operation that changes one discrete 
configuration identity into another; a discrete configuration morphism.  
The combination of distance metric and morphism define the configuration space of pattern, enabling the 
definition of evolutionary trajectories of patterns and allowing the operations of discrete configuration 
interpolation and extrapolation.  A discrete quantitative model of configuration space has the property of 
prediction. 
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3.5.  SITUATED STRUCTURE:  CONFIGURATION UNITS OF ANALYSIS 
The local interpretation of mathematical concepts, based as it is on category 
theory, has an essentially relational character.  According to the local 
interpretation, the reference of a mathematical concept, insofar as it can be 
construed as an entity, is no longer to be regarded as being a thing in itself, 
whose nature is independent of other things, and whose characteristic 
properties are entirely intrinsic to it.  On the contrary, the properties of a 
mathematical entity are now determined by, and indeed only have meaning 
in terms of, the totality of its relationships with other entities.   
(John L. Bell, 1986) 
3.5.1.  Loss of individual identity 
Adaptive systems have a history of individuals presenting evidence for properties that have blurred the 
definition of an object to expand the unit of analysis.  With the interpretation of local information 
forming the basis of an adaptive process (Battail, 1997; Bookheimer, 2002;  Jablonka, 2002; Friederici, 
2003; Khallad, 2004; Maguire, 2004; Noppeney, 2004; Binder, 2005; Gupta, 2006; Schultz, 2006), this 
blurring extends across the hierarchy of adaptive scales; cellular-genetic, neural-cognitive, and social 
group:  
In 1896, psychologist James Baldwin introduced the concept of evolution now known as the 
Baldwin effect:  adaptive learning at the scale of an individual accelerates genetic evolution of 
a phenotype. (Baldwin, 1896) 
In 1941 biologist Conrad Waddington proposed the concept of epigenetics:  initially defined as 
inclusive of all of the factors in an organism’s development, the concept is now restricted 
to factors of heritable change that do not involve modification of DNA structure. 
(Waddington, 1941) 
In 1947, Georgy Gause proposed the concept of phenotypic plasticity:  the ability of a single 
genotype to produce differing phenotypes in response to different environments. (Gause, 
1947) 
In 1951, biologist Victor Freeman reported the first observed instance of horizontal gene transfer:  
the transfer of genes between organisms, often of different species, through local 
interactions completely unrelated to a reproductive process. (Freeman, 1951)  
In 1967, biologist Lynn Margolis presented evidence for endosymbiosis: one or more organisms 
living inside another organism that define the properties of a single individual. (Margolis. 
1967)  
In 1978, biologist Richard Dawkins proposed the concept of the extended phenotype: the 
redefinition of a phenotype beyond an individual to include the effects of an individual’s 
genes on the environment. (Dawkins, 1978) 
In 1982 biologist Richard Lewontin proposed the concept of niche construction:  the 
environmental modification processes of organisms that alter the evolution their own 
species as well as others. (Lewontin, 1982) 
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In 1987, anthropologist Lucy Suchman proposed the concept of situated-embedded cognition:  the 
examination of cognition and learning in its natural physical, environmental and social 
context. (Suchman, 1987) 
In 1988, cognitive scientist Edwin Hutchens proposed the concept of distributed cognition:  
extension of the cognitive unit of analysis to include the social groups and physical artifacts 
of an individual’s environment. (Hutchens, 1988) 
While initially met with skepticism, these concepts have all been incorporated into their respective 
branches of science as areas of active research.  In adaptive systems, units of analysis no longer conform 
to discrete boundaries of objects, but extend to the sum of the object and its local interactions.  This set, 
or cluster, of objects forms a nonlinear local group structure:  a situated pattern, a situated configuration. 
Systems biology can be characterised as an approach to the understanding 
of life through the study of how the properties of biological systems arise 
through interactions between components, as these are situated and 
organized within the system.  What is regarded as the ‘system’ is, inevitably, 
bounded and is itself situated within some environment, with which the 
system (through its components) may have relevant interactions.  It is an 
open system, whose boundary is to some extent drawn at our discretion. 
(Tom Melham, 2013) 
3.5.2.  Situated units of analysis:  problem definition 
Expanding the unit of analysis beyond an individual object to form a situated configuration creates two 
problems: 
1.  Definition of the situated configuration boundary.  
2.  Definition of the situated configuration internal to the boundary.  
The connectivity structures and connectivity metrics of topology and graph theory can be used to 
examine both problems.  
3.5.3.  Configuration units:  boundary structure definition 
In an atomistic model, the boundary of the unit of analysis has been defined by the property of individual 
objects to be physically disjoint, but that disjoint property boundary is being called into question by the 
extended grounding of properties found in hierarchical structures of situated-embedded adaptive 
systems.  A unit of analysis has no meaning without a definable boundary. 
Expanding the unit of analysis from a single individual object to include other objects in the individual’s 
neighborhood can be visualized in 2 dimensions as the inflation of a point into a circle: the initial inflation 
transforms the point into an infinitesimally small circle, opening an infinitesimally small space inside the 
point.  This initial inflation partitions space into two regions, inside the circle and outside the circle, with 
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the line of the circle defining the boundary of the partition.  The circle can then continue to inflate or 
deflate to any size without changing its boundary property of dividing space into two parts.   
Of course, the space partitioning property is not unique to the shape of the circle; any number of shapes 
made with a single continuous closed line will also separate a 2-dimensional space into two regions.  But 
there are more complex shapes that also divide space into two regions that have very different boundary 
properties than a simple closed line.  The connectivity of a boundary is a topological property that remains 
invariant with a continuous change from one shape into another.  Topological categories of boundary 
connectivity can be defined by the fundamental group of paths that start from an arbitrary point inside the 
boundary, loop through the interior space, and return to the original point. The loops from an arbitrary 
point inside a circle are all equivalent, defining the boundary as 1-group-connected or simply connected, 
topologically categorizing the boundary as fundamental group [1].  All space partitioning boundaries of 
fundamental group [1] can be generated from a point and reduced back to a point with the topological 
morphisms of Poincare inflation and Poincare deflation.   
Expanding the unit of analysis from a disjoint atomistic object to include its relationship to neighboring 
objects can be modeled as a Poincare inflation of a point-object.  The object-eye-view is that of the 
object inflating to engulf its neighboring point-objects.  However, the object-eye-view of a neighbor is 
also one of inflation to engulf its own set of neighbors.  The inflating boundaries between two disjoint 
neighboring point-objects initially touch then infinitesimally overlap to form the union of a single 
boundary.  The objects are now related, and the properties attributable to a single object are no longer 
distinguishable.  This transfers the unit of analysis from a single object to the group of two objects.  Any 
loop traveled from an arbitrary point inside this new boundary can include the object-points, so in the 
case of the union of two circles, the topological boundary categorization remains unchanged as 
fundamental group [1]. 
In an example of a static random field of point-objects undergoing Poincare inflation, the boundary of one 
object may merge with the boundary of a second, followed by a third joining the initial pair, then perhaps 
a fourth and fifth merging with the first three simultaneously.  These sequential unions result in a 
hierarchy of boundaries that define a discrete hierarchical structure for situated pattern units of analysis.   
As multiple objects are joined, the boundary union can become more complex, potentially resulting in a 
cluster boundary having ‘holes’ that interrupt the interior space.  This can be visualized in three 
dimensions as a tunnel through a sphere:  the walls of the tunnel join the surface of the sphere, forming 
an unbroken boundary to contain the space inside the sphere, yet the space outside the sphere can flow 
through the tunnel:  like a simple sphere, the tunnel-through-the-sphere construction partitions space 
into two regions.  However, the boundaries of the two shapes are fundamentally different, with the 
tunnel-through-the-sphere boundary being topologically equivalent to a donut, or torus, where the 
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interior loop-paths have to contend with the tunnel, resulting in two different kinds of loops.  One group 
of loops does not circumnavigate the obstructing tunnel, remaining in the undifferentiated space adjacent 
to the tunnel.  These loops are of the same nature as those inside the undifferentiated space of a sphere 
or circle.  The second group of loops does circumnavigate the tunnel to return to their points of origin.  
The boundary of the tunnel-through-the-sphere is then said to be 2-group-connected, topologically 
categorized as the fundamental group [2]. 
The different equivalency groups of possible loop-paths inside a boundary having to contend with the 
number of tunnels passing through the enclosed space gives topological measure to the nature of the 
boundary of the space.  In answer to the situated question ’What did the object know?’, the object-eye-
view of an arbitrary point-object inside the space partitioning boundary ‘knows’ the nature of the 
boundary from the different types of loops it can travel in the bounded region of space.  An object 
situated inside the enclosed space ‘knows’ the discrete sequential evolution of boundary states  
Boundaries and units of analysis are then not drawn at the investigators discretion; they are selected at 
the investigators’ discretion in recognition of the situated pattern of relationships specific to the 
phenomena being investigated and the hierarchical boundaries defined by those relationships.  
3.5.4. Configuration units: internal structure definition 
The topological morphism that developed the boundary of a collection of objects also models the pattern 
of object-points inside the boundary:  as the inflating boundaries of two adjoining objects intersect form a 
union, the relationship between the objects can be established, modeled as a line connecting the two 
points.  When applied to a point field of objects, Poincare inflation defines a type of Boolean grain model, 
or germ grain model, first comprehensively developed by Georges Matheron in his 1975 Random Sets and 
Integral Geometry.  The relationship structures delineated in a Boolean grain model are defined by graph 
theory, with objects modeled as points, or vertices, and their relationships as lines, or edges.   
Directed graphs, or digraphs, have been extensively used to model structure, where edges are expressed 
as directional arrows to represent a one-way relationship.  A situated pattern unit of analysis is based on 
the interaction of objects forming two-way relationships, modeled as an undirected graph.  Some 
relationships between objects are stronger than others, often modeled as numerical weights assigned to 
edges in a weighted graph.  This raises the subtle difference between structure and configuration:  a 
configuration is a spatial structure.  Strengths of relationships in a configuration are modeled by distance:  
edge length expresses the relative intensities of relationships in a spatial graph.  A spatial graph defines an 
object’s location relative to other objects, the critical parameter of situated local interactions, and allows 
the construction of sub-graph boundary partitions to reveal the covert hierarchical structure of a point 
field. 
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A configuration graph is special case of a spatial graph that contains the hierarchical sets of boundary 
partitions.  The situated interactions of objects can be modeled as hierarchically nested pattern sub-
graphs. 
3.5.4.1.  situated sub-graph structures 
One category of sub-graph structure that can define a situated configuration unit of analysis is a 
neighborhood:  a closed neighborhood of a vertex v is defined as the set of all vertices adjacent to v and 
including v, joined with the set of all of the edges connecting those vertices.   
If one object in a situated configuration unit of analysis has a relationship with every other object in the 
configuration, it forms a neighborhood unit of analysis.   If every object in a situated configuration sub-
graph has a relationship with every other object in the sub-graph, it forms a complete sub-graph, or a 
complete neighborhood unit of analysis.    What are encountered frequently in empirical network models 
are hubs:  objects with a higher number of relationships than typically found in the remaining structure, 
modeled as vertices with a ‘high’ number of edges.   
If no object in a situated configuration pattern-object of analysis has a complete set of relationships with 
every other object, it is no longer a neighborhood structure, but can be categorized as a ring unit of  
analysis.  The structure of a Boolean ring is defined when every possible union of two subsets of objects is 
also a set, and these unions and their relative complements are all within the unit of analysis.  A Boolean 
grain model partitions a point field into hierarchical sets of Boolean rings.  A Boolean ring defines the 
minimum standard for a collection of things to be considered a unit of analysis. 
The definition of a hub can also be used to categorically differentiate sub-graph ring structures, as being a 
simple ring, single-hub ring, or multi-hub ring.  More specifically, a multi-hub ring containing 2 hubs 
would be a 2-hub ring. 
3.5.4.2.  situated sub-graph connectivity 
Neighborhood and ring structures can further be categorized by their connectivity.  The connectivity of a 
graph or sub-graph is given as the number of vertices that must be removed from a graph for it to 
become disconnected, defined as total number of vertices in the graph minus 1.  In a pattern of 6 objects, 
5 have to be removed for it to become disconnected: it is 5-vertex-connected.   
Vertex degree is the measure of connectedness of an individual object in a configuration, given in graph 
theory as the number of edges that connect to a specific vertex.  An object forming a closed 
neighborhood with 4 other objects has a vertex degree of 4.  A hub has a ‘high’ vertex degree. 
The concept of topological connectivity can also be applied to a graph structure, with the number of 
different loop-paths from an arbitrary vertex in the graph giving measure to the fundamental group of a 
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graph, where loops, called cycles or closed walks, are restricted to the vertex-edge structure of the graph.  
A graph having five equivalence groups of cycles is 5-cycle-connected.  This measure is based on the 
definition of a graph being embedded in an undifferentiated topological space, where a cycle bounding a 
region of space that is not divided by a graph edge produces a ‘hole’ in the space.  However, a situated 
configuration sub-graph resides in a finite region of topological space already partitioned by a boundary. 
The spatial positions of independent point-objects define the boundary that can be topologically 
categorized by a fundamental group, establishing the independence of the boundary from the internal 
relationship structure.  A situated pattern sub-graph is embedded in a bounded region of topological 
space, with the boundary defining the ‘holes’ in the space.  The equivalences of closed walks are then 
restricted by the boundary definition of the enclosed region so the situated fundamental sub-group of 
the graph is equal to the fundamental group of the boundary of the sub-graph.   
The measurable reduction of the fundamental group of a graph to the situated fundamental group of a 
sub-graph is an additional categorization of the connectivity of internal structure, measuring the boundary 
effect on the connectivity of the internal pattern.  A 5-cycle-connected sub-graph whose connectivity is 
reduced by its boundary topology to be 2-cycle-connected is 3-cycle-disconnected. 
The partitioning of a large graph into manageable sub-graphs suggests using connection topology to 
formulate a definition of individual vertex connectivity in terms its contribution to the fundamental group 
of a graph, thereby giving a discrete measurable definition of a hub vertex.  The removal of a vertex from 
a graph can reduce the number of equivalency groups of cycles in the graph:  if a 5-cycle-connected graph 
is reduced to a 3-cycle-connected graph by the removal of a vertex, that vertex can be defined as being a 
2-cycle-connected vertex.   
The removal of some vertices may have little or no impact on the overall connectivity of the graph, while 
the removal of others may result in a reduction of topological connectivity to become the fundamental 
group of a graph [1].  This suggests the minimum definition of a hub to be a vertex whose removal 
reduces the fundamental group of a graph or sub-graph, or an internal-hub.   
A more critical case is where the removal of a vertex alters the situated fundamental group of the sub-
graph.  In this case, vertex removal has not only altered the topological connectivity of the internal 
configuration, it has altered the topological boundary definition of the configuration.  A vertex in this 
case may be defined as a boundary-hub.   
This leads to the general differentiation in larger patterns between an object-point whose boundary 
contributes to the union of boundaries defining an object-pattern as a boundary-vertex and every other 
object-point in the pattern as an interior-vertex.    
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3.5.5. Situated variable space 
A hub neighborhood structure is a graph theoretic expression of the relationship independent and 
dependent variables.  Deterministic independence-dependence relationships in continuous mathematics 
can be modeled as a digraph hub neighborhood, while the strength/degree of the bi-directional 
relationships of a hub in an undirected graph can be examined as partial correlation measures in 
stochastic mathematics.  While introduced as an analysis tool of structure, it can also be used for 
synthesis of structure:  partial correlation measures can be translated into spatial distance between 
points to establish the initial conditions of a hub neighborhood. 
If the initial conditions of a point field are known and the degree of independence of variables can be 
approximated, the distance between two variables can be proportioned as the degree of independence-
dependence.  As this process is repeated around an ‘independent’ hub vertex-variable to include its 
‘dependent’ neighboring vertex-variables, the asymmetric boundary resulting from a Poincare inflation of 
a point can be defined.  This implies both differences in the directional inflation rates of a point and 
differences in the inflation rates of different points.  Poincare inflation then becomes a situated 
topological morphism, dependent on both the strength of local interactions with its neighbors and the 
initial condition of the spatial location of a neighborhood.  
3.5.5.1.  Boolean ring as synergistic structure 
Empirical models have demonstrated the importance of hubs in the structure of networks, but those 
same models reveal the relative infrequency of their occurrence.  Much of the bounded subset structure 
in spatial graphs is defined as a simple Boolean ring:  a discrete sub-graph representing the varying 
degrees of cooperative interaction in a set of variables that contains no independent variable.  It is this 
synergistic structure of variables that restricts modeling applicability of objective continuous and 
stochastic mathematics to small subsets of their extensive body of provable truths.   
However, following their application to network hubs, partial correlation measures can be methodically 
employed to translate relationships of non-dominant variables into a spatial point field.  This might be 
accomplished as a situated process of iteration, starting with one variable and examining its related 
variables to form the adjacency structure of an initial neighborhood, followed by this first generation 
neighborhood producing the second, the second producing the third . . .  Fortunately, a pattern graph 
developed from a Boolean grain model is generated from situated local interactions, so the model need 
extend only beyond the boundaries of a unit of analysis. 
Situated pattern modeling begins by structuring a portion of variable space and follows by the hierarchical 
partitioning this spatial structure prior to the selection of a pattern-unit of analysis.  While pattern graphs 
were previously introduced with the aid of two and three dimensional visualizations, independent 
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variables are traditionally modeled as having a degree of freedom, indicating the graph structures of 
configuration-units of analysis are likely constructed in higher dimensional spaces. 
3.5.6.  Situated indeterminacy  
That our universe is understood to be probabilistic at the very smallest scale implies indeterminacy is 
pervasive in our observable reality.  It is the accumulation of randomness that gives rise to the properties 
of pattern formation:  the situated locally controlled interactions of objects that are dependent on their 
initial state to precipitate the emergent local phase transitions of hierarchical structure.  The 
accumulation of random events defines both the evolutionary trajectory and devolutionary trajectory of a 
system, with the threshold-cascade rhythms of punctuated equilibrium being ubiquitous to empirical 
observation.   
A series of small random events insufficient to alter a pattern’s connectivity results in a period of 
apparent equilibrium.  To an embedded object that ‘knows’ only this period of stasis, the object-eye-view 
might best be expressed by Frank Zappa:  It can’t happen here.  (Zappa, 1966) 
As a buildup of random events continues, the connectivity of a pattern approaches a critical threshold 
where a single random event, or the proverbial ‘straw-that-broke-the-camel’s-back’, results in a systemic 
structural transformation.  Even in a non-critical state, a single random event can induce systemic 
structural change when it alters the connectivity of a critical hub component in a hierarchical pattern.  In 
each of these cases, the object-eye-view of an unanticipated devolution might best be expressed by 
Walter Jacobs:  Boom, boom, out go the lights.  (Lewis, 1957)  When either a single random event interacts 
with a critical component, or randomness accumulates to a critical threshold, there is a discontinuous 
change in a pattern, or a phase transition: 
To make this [criticality] less abstract, consider the scenario of a child at 
the beach letting sand trickle down to form a pile.  In the beginning the pile 
is flat, and the individual grains remain close to where they land.  Their 
motion can be understood in terms of their physical properties.  As the 
process continues, the pile becomes steeper, and there will be little sand 
slides.  As time goes on, the sand slides become bigger and bigger.  
Eventually, some of the sand slides may even span all or most of the pile.  
At that point the system is far out of balance, and its behavior can no 
longer be understood in terms of the behavior of the individual grains.  The 
avalanches form a dynamic of their own, which can be understood only 
from a holistic description of the properties of the entire pile rather than 
from a reductionist description of individual sand grains: the sandpile is a 
complex system.   
(Per Bak, 1996) 
The degree of randomness is measured over intervals:  the frequency of probabilistic events in time, 
located in space.  If randomness is independent of space and time, any two objects in the universe of 
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objects have an equal probability of interacting over any distance and any time interval.  This is a universe 
of absolute randomness, with no apparent structure, often modeled as an Erdos-Renyi random graph.  
In a structured universe, randomness is applied uniformly across space and time, with the probability of 
interaction becoming a function of the interval of indeterminacy between two objects.  Indeterminacy in 
a structured universe is then a function of the density of a set of objects:  the relative location of two 
objects in space and time constrains the degree of randomness of their interaction.  Randomness is 
situated. 
Intervals of spatial randomness are expressed as the relative location of points in a point field, defining 
the situated initial conditions of a model.  ‘Tuning’ the parameter of spatial indeterminacy models sets of 
objects in different phases, or states: 
Intervals of spatial randomness defined by a continuous random variable produce the initial 
condition of random dynamic point fields that model the properties of a gas or a liquid. 
Intervals of spatial randomness defined by a discrete random variable produce the initial 
condition of random static point fields that model the properties of amorphous solids. 
Intervals of spatial randomness defined by a discrete random constant produce the initial 
condition of static point fields that model the properties of crystalline solids. 
An interaction between two objects can be defined by its location in space and duration in time.  With 
intervals of spatial randomness necessary to specify an initial set of objects, the intervals of temporal 
randomness are sufficient to specify the interaction of objects in that set.  Intervals of temporal 
randomness are expressed as pattern by the set structures of the interactions of objects and their 
boundaries:   
If nonintersecting sets of boundaries have nonintersecting sets of their interior elements, 
patterns of interaction are created that model the systemic properties of a gas.  
If intersecting sets of boundaries that form a union have nonintersecting sets of their interior 
elements, patterns of interaction are created that model the systemic properties of a liquid.  
If a ‘small’ number, or cluster, of intersecting sets of boundaries that form a union have 
intersecting sets of their interior elements that also form a union, patterns of interaction are 
created that model the systemic properties of a liquid. 
If a ‘large’ number of intersecting sets of boundaries that form a union have intersecting sets of 
their interior elements that also form a union, patterns of interaction are created that model 
the properties of a solid.   
In sets of objects where interior elements do not form unions, the temporal interval of randomness, 
expressed as the probability of local interaction, is 0.  This leaves a model with one indeterminate 
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parameter:  the dynamic interval of spatial randomness.  The non-intersecting set structure of temporal 
indeterminacy in systems exhibiting the properties of gasses or liquids allows the unit of analysis to be 
disjoint objects and their boundaries.  These units are appropriately modeled by the atomistic properties 
of objective stochastic mathematics with one parameter of indeterminacy; their periods of dynamic stasis 
can be modeled by objective continuous mathematics. 
In sets of objects where interior elements form unions, both parameters of indeterminacy are expressed:  
the interval of temporal randomness is constrained by the interval of spatial randomness to produce 
hierarchical structure.  Fully expressed randomness is hierarchical.  The union set structures of temporal 
indeterminacy in systems exhibiting the properties of solids necessitate the object-unit of analysis and its 
boundaries expand to become a pattern-unit of analysis and its boundaries.  Hierarchical pattern-units of 
analysis appropriate to indeterminate hierarchical structures preclude the modeling abilities of much 
objective stochastic and continuous mathematics. 
Intervals of temporal randomness are expressed by the interactions of objects constrained by the initial 
conditions of their interval of spatial indeterminacy.  A point field models the initial condition of intervals 
of spatial indeterminacy of situated objects, the probability of edge formation in a point field models the 
local interaction of intervals of temporal indeterminacy of situated objects.  In a fully indeterminate 
Boolean grain model, the pattern sub-graphs and their boundaries are formed by the interaction of the 
intervals of spatial and temporal indeterminacy.  While indeterminacy is not a property of the boundary 
itself, a boundary separates discrete levels of fully indeterminate units of structure, expressing the 
internal set of probabilistic connections as a single measurement of situated discrete probability.   
Derived primarily with objective discrete mathematics, the model of hierarchical pattern formation and 
bounded pattern-units of analysis presented thus far is not fully indeterminate, having the set of 
properties: 
(discrete, quantitative, stochastic, situated) 
3.5.7.  Configuration units of analysis:  partial definition 
The approach outlined above achieves the level of specificity necessary for a model of object interactions 
to reveal hierarchical structures that are appropriate for situated pattern-units of analysis, but falls short 
of the level of specificity required for their precise definition.   
This is a situated model of pattern formation that corresponds to the situated interactions empirically 
observed in complex systems, dependent on the initial condition of objects and evolving by their local 
interactions.  The model is developed from an ’object-eye-view’ of each of the objects inside the model, 
with each object iteratively answering two questions as its relationships to other objects evolve:  
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1.  What do I ‘know’? 
2.  When did I ‘know’ it? 
To provide an appropriate language to answer those questions, the almost-global provable truths of 
external viewpoint mathematics were recast to reflect the situated viewpoint of an object, resulting in 
some mathematical structures that may make little sense or become provable untruths if extended 
beyond the object’s point of view.  That this local language was expressive of an object’s situation 
suggests the possibility of a 21st century extension of external viewpoint mathematics to define situated 
mathematical structure that parallels the 19th century extension of continuous mathematics to define 
discontinuity. 
Reframing the perspective from an external point of view mathematics to a situated point of view 
expands the boundaries of provable truth, and provides narrower categories for the definition of 
mathematical objects.  But in the end, current objective mathematical structures and their situated 
extensions are limited to produce only a categorical definition of a pattern-object of analysis.   
The properties of repeatability and reproducibility are the cornerstones of scientific inference and 
induction, providing the grounds to approach provable truth.  A categorical definition of a unit of analysis 
provides neither property, making it imperative that a configuration-unit of analysis has a uniquely 
measurable identity. 
The measurable identity of the interior structure of a configuration is a problem of the definition of a 
graph identity.  The boundary of the interior structure describes its external morphology, with the 
measurable identity of both boundary and interior structure being a problem of the definition of a 
morphological identity, or an architectural identity. 
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4.  ARCHITECTURAL IDENTITY AND CONFIGURATION SPACE 
This intuition of two-oneness, the basal intuition of mathematics, creates not 
only the numbers one and two, but also all finite ordinal numbers, inasmuch 
as one of the elements of the two-oneness may be thought of as a new two-
oneness, which process may be repeated indefinitely . . . therefore all 
mathematical sets of units which are entitled to the name can be developed 
out of the basal intuition, and . . . any previously constructed set or any 
previously performed constructive operation may be taken as a unit.   
(L.E.J. Brouwer, 1913) 
4.1.  SITUATED BOOLEAN STRUCTURES OF TOPOLOGICAL SPACE 
4.1.1.  Situated Boolean topology of a set 
The topological morphism of continuous Poincare inflation of the boundary of an isolated point can be 
used to partition the undifferentiated local space around the point, defining a topological neighborhood.  
While boundary inflation can assume any shape having an invariant topological characteristic of 
fundamental group [1], the 2-dimensional models in this investigation are restricted to the uniform 
omnidirectional inflation of circular neighborhoods. (Appendix C) 
As the neighborhoods of two adjacent points inflate to their initial intersection limit point, the two 
topologically equivalent local spaces are connected.  Inflation beyond the limit point produces an 
‘overlap’ of the two connected neighborhoods to form a third topologically inequivalent local space: a 
limit point neighborhood.  Topological equivalence of different neighborhoods is a function of the 
number of local spaces that have connected in forming a neighborhood:  the local space of a singleton 
neighborhood connected only to itself, a 1-connected neighborhood, is inequivalent to the space 
formed by the intersection of three singleton neighborhoods, a 3-connected neighborhood.   
Simultaneous and continuous Poincare boundary inflation of a set of points develops a sequence of 
neighborhood intersection limit points to connect local regions of finite topological space, delineating the 
discrete hierarchical subset structures that define a situated Boolean topology of the set:  the 
complete set of inequivalent topological neighborhoods developed by a Poincare inflation of a set of 
points.  [Figures 4.1A. - 4.1B.]   
4.1.2.  Locally complete topological space 
The Boolean topology of a set of points provides a measure of the completeness of the local topological 
space.  Inflating neighborhood intersections connect previously disjoint local regions of topological space 
to form a local cluster:  a union of a set of neighborhoods.  When the all the neighborhoods of a union 
connect with a single inclusive intersection, the neighborhoods form a completely connected 
topological space:  a complete union of neighborhoods.  A sequence of inflating neighborhood 
intersections partitions an increasing sequence of finite topological spaces into incompletely and 
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completely connected regions:  nested sets of locally incomplete  and locally complete unions of 
neighborhoods. 
In a set of three points, a, b, and c, an initial Poincare inflation produces three singleton neighborhoods, 
a’, b’, and c’.  If continued inflation results in the neighborhood intersection a’b’, then  a’ and b’ are 
completely connected local topological spaces and form a complete union a’ b’.  If the subsequent step in 
an inflation sequence results in the intersection a’c’, forming the union a’b’c’, the neighborhoods a’, b’, 
and c’ are connected but not completely connected:  a’b’c’ is an incomplete union, with the subsets of 
locally complete unions a’b’ and a’c’.  When the set of three neighborhoods inflate to form the locally 
complete intersection a’b’c’, the union of finite topological spaces has become completely connected to 
define the locally complete union of neighborhoods and the complete Boolean topology of the set of 
points. 
Not all possible subsets of a set of points are spatially realized in a complete Boolean topology.  The 
complete Boolean topology shown in Figure 4.1B.(h) develops four subsets of equivalently connected 
neighborhood structure:   
four 1-connected neighborhoods: (a’, b’, c’, d’) 
four 2-connected neighborhoods:  (a’b’, b’c’, b’d’, c’d’) 
three 3-connected neighborhoods:  (a’b’c’, a’b’d’, b’c’d’) 
one 4-connected neighborhood:  (a’b’c’d’) 
Limit point neighborhood a’d’ is not formed; the intersection of neighborhoods a’ and d’ occurs within 
the boundary of b’ to give the 3-connected neighborhood a’b’d’.  [Figure 4.1A.(d)]  Likewise, 
neighborhood a’c’ is not formed, with a’ connecting to c’ in the 3-connected neighborhood a’b’c’ [Figure 
4.1b.(g)] and neighborhood a’c’d’ is not formed, subsumed by the 4-connected neighborhood a’b’c’d’.  
[Figure 4.1B.(h)] 
Twelve of the fifteen possible Boolean neighborhood subsets are formed by the complete union  a’b’c’d’, 
to structure a complete Boolean topology on the set of points (a,b,c,d).  The degree of completeness of 
an incomplete union formed in a step of the developmental sequence can be determined retrospectively, 
after a complete Boolean topology has been developed.  Completeness of a union of neighborhoods can 
be expressed as the ratio of the number of Boolean neighborhood subsets formed by the union in a 
given step and the number of neighborhoods formed by the complete Boolean topology of the set.  
4.1.3.  Situated connectivity of topological space 
With the development of inequivalent subsets of interior space, the full measure of connectivity of a 
finite topological space needs to consider invariant boundary characteristics as well as invariant 
characteristics of the interior partition structure.    
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Figure 1A.  Discrete developmental sequence of a situated Boolean topology from a set of random 
points.  Local space states a-d, showing formation of neighborhood intersection limit points and 
topological partitioning.   
4.1.3.1.  local fundamental groups 
In reviewing existing mathematical structures that might be applied to develop a situated unit of analysis, 
Section 3.5.3. presented a brief overview of topological fundamental groups as a measure of the number 
of ‘holes’ in a bounded finite region of space.  This is a mathematical structure that transitions readily 
from its external viewpoint precedent to a situated viewpoint from within a space. 
A loop is a closed path in the interior of a finite topological space that starts and ends at the same 
arbitrary point,   
 68 
 
    
    
Figure 1B.  Locally complete Boolean topology terminates sequence.  Local space states e-h, showing 
formation of neighborhood intersection limit points and topological partitioning.   
or base point.  A set of loops that can be continuously deformed into each other are topologically 
equivalent:  a loop that encircles a ‘hole’ cannot be continuously deformed into a loop that does not 
encircle a ‘hole’ without exiting the topological space by passing through the boundary of the hole, 
making the two paths topologically inequivalent.  
A set of topologically equivalent closed paths structure a mathematical group, where the number of 
inequivalent groups of paths in a space becomes a function of the number of boundary ‘holes’ that can be 
encircled.  The number path groups in a space give an invariant topological measure of its boundary 
connectivity:  the fundamental group of a space.    
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In a space with no ‘holes’, all loops are equivalent to form a single group, fundamental group [1].  With 
one ‘hole’ in a space, the set of possible paths form a group that encircles the hole, and a group that 
does not, giving a fundamental group [2].  The union of neighborhoods in Figure 1B.(e) presents a local 
topological space with a ‘hole’ in the boundary between the neighborhoods a’, c’, and d’, categorizing the 
union a’b’c’d’ as fundamental group [2]. 
4.1.3.2.  local Boolean neighborhood groups 
The loop constructions used to determine the boundary connectivity of a union of connected 
neighborhoods can also be used to determine invariant topological connectivity of the interior space 
partitions formed by the neighborhoods.  Subsets of loops in a fundamental group connect topologically 
inequivalent subsets of a union of neighborhoods to define the homology groups of a finite topological 
space. 
In a local Boolean neighborhood structure, the number of topologically inequivalent groups of loops is a 
function of the combinatorial possibilities inequivalent base points and path lengths.  Closed loops that 
start and stop in topologically inequivalent neighborhoods have inequivalent base points:  a base point in 
a 2-connected neighborhood is inequivalent to a base point in a 3-connected neighborhood.  Path length 
is measured by the number of inequivalent neighborhoods traversed before a loop returns to its base 
point; a path traversing a single 2-connected neighborhood is inequivalent to a path traversing both a 2-
connected neighborhood and a 3-connected neighborhood.  The combinatorial problem of base points 
and path length is simplified by the odd-even adjacency pattern of Boolean neighborhoods:  a 2-
connected neighborhood is always bounded by 1-connected and/or 3-connected neighborhoods; a 3-
connected neighborhood is always bounded by 2-connected and/or 4-connected neighborhoods. 
With the diameter of the union limiting a path length to eight inequivalent neighborhoods, the complete 
Boolean topology in Figure 1B.(h) constructs sixty-three local homology groups, or Boolean 
neighborhood groups:  
  4 groups traversing a single neighborhood, 
  3 groups traversing two adjacent neighborhoods, 
  7 groups traversing three adjacent neighborhoods, 
  5 groups traversing four adjacent neighborhoods, 
12 groups traversing five adjacent neighborhoods, 
  7 groups traversing six adjacent neighborhoods, 
16 groups traversing seven adjacent neighborhoods, 
  9 groups traversing eight adjacent neighborhoods.    
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4.1.3.3. compound connectivity groups 
The fundamental group categorizing boundary connectivity and the neighborhood subgroup categorizing 
interior spatial partition connectivity are both necessary to fully categorize the connectivity of a 
structured finite topological space, suggesting a compound notation: 
[fundamental group . neighborhood subgroup] 
The union of neighborhoods in Figure 1B.(e) forming fundamental group [2] and neighborhood subgroup 
[23] can be expressed as the compound connectivity groups [2.23].   
4.2.  TOPOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SITUATED LOCAL PROBABILITY SPACE 
A situated point of view from within the boundary of a finite topological space limits the probability of an 
interaction event to the population of the ‘known universe’ within the space:  the boundary of the 
topological space creates the boundary of a local probability sample space.  Disjoint finite topological 
spaces create a structure of independent probabilistic sample spaces, giving no probability of an 
interaction event between the spaces.  In a Poincare inflation producing two disjoint unions of 
topological neighborhoods, situated local event probabilities develop independently in each union until 
their inflating boundaries intersect to form a single connected sample space.   
Unlike a Markov chain of independent probabilities of successive system states, a Poincare inflation 
process structures a sequence of intersecting neighborhood spaces where the situated probability of a 
local interaction event for any step of the sequence is dependent on the probabilistic interactions of the 
preceding step.  The sequential development of a complete Boolean topology from a set of points 
generates a sequence of discrete local probability spaces that form a situated conditional probability 
chain.  Probabilistic events are a function of spatial proximity, where neighborhoods or points of closer 
adjacency have higher probabilities of interaction that those that are more remote. 
4.2.1.  Situated  probabilistic neighborhood structure 
The situated probability of a neighborhood intersection is function of the set of neighborhoods that form 
a union of locally connected topological spaces where the situated local sample space of possible 
intersections is number of possible discrete Boolean subsets that can be formed by the number of 
neighborhoods in the union.   
A disjoint singleton neighborhood has a situated local sample space of possible intersections of 0.  
 71 
 
    
    
Figure 2A.  Situated local probability space.  Sequential development of conditional sample space states a-
b.  Left: neighborhood structure.  Right:  probability graph structure. 
A sequence of discrete neighborhood intersections generated by Poincare inflation produces a sequence 
of conditional sample spaces:  the number of possible intersections in each step of the sequence is the 
difference between the number of possible Boolean subsets in the current step and the number of 
subsets formed by the previous step.  Sequential steps that add previously disjoint neighborhoods to an 
existing union increase the local sample space, steps that form a neighborhood intersection within the 
existing union decrease the local sample space.  [Figures 2A. – 2D. left column] 
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Figure 2B.  Sequence of local conditional sample space states c-d.  Left: neighborhood structure.  Right:  
probability graph structure. 
4.2.2.  Situated probabilistic graph structure  
Intuitively, following the logic of probabilistic neighborhood intersections, it may first appear that the 
probability of an edge forming between two points in a finite topological space would also be a function 
of the union of neighborhoods that structure the space.  Yet when a Poincare inflation creates a union of 
neighborhoods to form a locally incomplete topological space where some neighborhood intersections 
have not been formed, the situated probability space of the union is structured as a collection of disjoint 
subsets of situated sample spaces.  This structure of independent local sample spaces restricts the 
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Figure 2C.  Sequence of local conditional sample space states e-f.   
situated probability of edge formation in a union of neighborhoods to the Boolean subsets of locally 
complete topological space.  [Figures 2A. – 2D. right column] 
In an inflation sequence of a union of neighborhoods, a single step that produces a subset of two 
intersecting neighborhoods presents only one possible edge to be formed, defining the subset as a local 
probability sample space of 1.  A single step in an inflation sequence that produces a subset of more than 
two intersecting neighborhoods presents the possibility of multiple edges forming, but in all cases, edges 
formed earlier in the sequence leave only one possible edge remaining to be formed, defining the 
topological subset formed in the current step as a local probability sample space of 1.  
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Figure 2D.  Sequence of local conditional sample space states g-h.  Locally complete Boolean topology(L) 
and complete graph (R) terminates sequence. 
In a set of random points with no two points equidistant from a third, steps in an inflation sequence of a 
union of neighborhoods produce intersecting neighborhood subsets that define local probability edge 
formation sample spaces of either 0 or 1.  Inflations yielding edge formation sample space subsets of 0 
close ‘holes’ in the topological boundary to reduce the fundamental group of the union.  Inflations 
yielding edge formation sample space subsets of 1 return a 100% probability of edge formation in the 
corresponding subset of locally complete topological space.    
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If a Boolean neighborhood a’b’ defines a local edge formation sample space of 1, the probability of edge 
formation between the points a and b in a union of neighborhoods containing a’b’ is equal to the 
probability of neighborhoods a’ and b’ intersecting to form the neighborhood a’b’.  
The final step in an inflation sequence of a union of neighborhoods forms a locally complete intersection 
of the union to define both a locally complete topological space and a locally complete probability 
space.  With this step, all possible edges have been sequentially formed to probabilistically construct a 
locally complete graph of the points in the space. 
The sequential formation of edges by Poincare neighborhood inflation establishes a relative distance 
metric between points to structure a local metric space, where formation of a locally complete graph 
defines a locally complete metric space.  The relationship of topologic, probabilistic, and metric 
distance is introduced in Section 4.3. 
4.2.3.  Situated probabilistic hierarchical structure 
In an infinite set of random points, the initial steps in a neighborhood inflation sequence form small local 
unions of neighborhoods, which in turn, intersect with each other to locally structure ever larger regions 
of finite topological space.  With indefinite inflation, these probabilistic constructions develop a countably 
infinite hierarchy of local set structures:  hierarchical unions in locally complete and incomplete 
topological, probability and metric spaces. 
4.3.  TOPOLOGICALLY INFERRED  AND CONSTRUCTED METRIC SPACES 
A metric can be defined for a topological space provided that points a, b, and c in the space meet the 
following conditions (Bing, 1951): 
1.  The distance from  a  b is a nonnegative real number, and the distance from a  a is zero.  
(positivity) 
2.  The distance from a b equals the distance from b  a.  (symmetry) 
3.  The sum of the distance a  b and the distance b  c is greater than or equal to the 
distance a  c.  (triangle inequality) 
A semi-metric can be defined for a topological space provided that points a, b, and c in the space meet the 
following conditions (Wilson, 1931): 
1.  The distance from  a  b is a nonnegative real number, and the distance from a  a is zero.  
(positivity) 
2.  The distance from a b equals the distance from b  a.  (symmetry)    
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Figure 3.  Development of topologically inferred metric space, states a-d.   
A metric space and a semi-metric space are each sets where every edge length is defined in the complete 
graph of the set to conform to the above conditions. 
4.3.1.  Metric distance 
Throughout history, from cubits, to yards, to one minute of arc of a great circle of the Earth, distance 
metrics have been established by cultural precedent and applied by an external observer to a finite region 
of space. (NIST, 1974)  The cultural precedent of the external viewpoint in mathematics has resulted in a 
convoluted intersection of less restrictive topological space being developed from a more restrictive 
metric space, producing a metric topology having topological properties that are a function of an externally 
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Figure 4.  Local  metric distance and coordinate axes inferred from topological space. 
applied metric space.  A topological space is metrizable if a metric can be defined that induces a topology 
on the space. 
From a situated viewpoint from within a local topological space, metrics can be inferred from the 
structure of the space itself.  However, no metrics can be inferred from within a singleton neighborhood.  
The intersection of two neighborhoods provides the initial basis for situated metric inference by 
establishing a referential a unit of measure between the two points.  That additional neighborhoods have 
not been encountered, and assuming the known neighborhood inflation rate is universal, a situated 
inference can also be made to extend the reference metric to the unknown region of unstructured space 
external to the neighborhood boundary.  [Figure 3.] 
While situated inference can generate a local metric space that covers holes and extends beyond the 
boundaries of its precursor topological space, Section 4.2 presented a construction sequence of local 
metric spaces as a determinate of the probabilistic intersections of inflating topological neighborhoods.  A 
constructed metric space is defined by the boundary of the underlying local union of topological 
neighborhoods of a set of points.   
A locally incomplete topological union of neighborhoods defines the boundary of a locally incomplete 
metric space, with the boundary of a locally complete metric space defined by the boundary of the 
underlying locally complete topological and probability spaces.   
Following Auguste Bravais’ logic in his 1850 delineation of coordinate axes forming the five possible plane 
lattices and fourteen possible space lattices in Euclidean metric space (Buerger, 1956; Bloss, 1971; 
Giacovazzo, 1992), local coordinate axes can be inferred from a constructed metric space.   
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Figure 5A.  Development topological distance and semi-metric topological space.  Discrete neighborhood 
intersection sequence, states a-b. 
In a Poincare inflation sequence, the limit point of the final intersection constructing a locally complete 
union of neighborhoods presents an appropriate origin for a local coordinate metric on locally complete 
metric space.  In two dimensions, the first two steps of an inflation sequence construct the two shortest 
edges in the graph of a local union of neighborhoods.  Assuming they are nonparallel, each edge can be 
translated to map an endpoint on to the selected origin point, defining the angular relationship and unit 
lengths of two local coordinate axes.  [Figure 4.(h)] 
4.3.2.  Topologic distance 
The unit interval of structural change in the development of a Boolean topology of a set of points is 
marked by the formation of a limit point of a neighborhood intersection.  In a locally connected 
neighborhood cluster containing two points a and b, the topological distance between a and b can then 
be defined as the number of limit point intervals developed by the Boolean topology to produce an 
intersection of the neighborhoods a’ and b’ to form a locally complete topological space.  [Figure 5A.(a)] 
In simple cases, the spatial pattern of intersecting neighborhoods can be examined graphically in a 
manner similar to a dendrochronology investigation of the growth rings of trees:  topological distance 
can be determined by counting the number of neighborhood boundary rings that have formed between 
adjacent points. 
The sequence of limit points generated by intersecting neighborhoods forms a path of equal edge lengths, 
each with the topological unit distance 1.  [Figure 6.(i)]  The sequence of edges generated by  
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Figure 5B.  Topological distance and semi-metric topological space.  Discrete neighborhood intersection 
sequence, states c-g. 
intersecting neighborhoods form a topological graph, with the edge lengths revealing a complete Boolean 
topology to be a semi-metric space.  [Figure 6.(h)]   
The early discrete steps in a developing Boolean topology that have no ‘holes’, a local boundary 
connectivity of fundamental group [0], and the first discrete step that yields at least one boundary ‘hole’, 
fundamental group [>0], define edge lengths in a topological graph that meet the prerequisites of a metric 
space.  In these cases, metric space and topological space are homeomorphic:  a continuous function and 
its continuous inverse exist between the two spaces.  [Figure 7.(e)]  
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Figure 6.  Locally complete semi-metric topological space.  (h):  Discrete sequence of inflating 
neighborhood intersections (blue) constructs a locally complete union of neighborhoods and a complete 
graph (red), defining topological distance between vertices.  (i):  Path of limit points trace a neighborhood 
intersection sequence to form topological graph of uniform edge length 1. 
   
Figure 7.  Local topological-metric space phase transition, space states e and h.   
(e): Homeomorphic critical state of local topological and metric space.  (h):  Discontinuity between semi-
metric local topological space and local metric space. 
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Figure 8.  Situated probability distance.   
After an initial ‘hole’ closes to change boundary connectivity from fundamental group [n] to fundamental 
group [n-1], the next sequential edge formed by neighborhood inflation alters the graph structure to no 
longer fulfill the conditions of triangle inequality:  topological space jumps from a metric space to a semi-
metric space.  Development of a locally complete Boolean topology introduces a discontinuity between 
topological and metric spaces, with continuous mappings between the two no longer possible.  [Figure 
7.(h)] 
4.3.3.  Probabilistic distance 
The probabilistic formation of neighborhood intersections from a set of points establishes a situated local 
probability space, where the probability of an edge forming between two points can be interpreted as a 
distance between those points.  Counter to an intuition that greater distances correspond to increasing 
metric values, increasing distances in probability space are measured as decreasing probabilities.  [Figure 
8.] 
Edge lengths formed in the sequential development of a complete Boolean topology of an infinite set of 
points construct a one to one mapping between a decreasing probability sequence that converges to the 
limit 0 and an increasing metric sequence that converges at the limit infinity.  The probability of points 
interacting in space is inversely related to their metric distance. 
An interpretation of probabilistic distance as the reciprocal function of intersection probability, 1/p, 
allows edge formation in a probabilistic graph of an infinite number of points to generate an increasing 
sequence that converges to the limit infinity.  This graph structure reveals situated probability space to 
be a semi-metric space, homeomorphic to situated topological space.    
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Figure 9.  Locally complete composite spaces, state h.  (Left)  Topologic-metric composite space.  (Right):  
Probabilistic-metric composite space.  
4.4.  BRIDGING TOPOLOGICAL – METRIC SPACE DISCONTINUITY 
The morphism of Poincare neighborhood inflation can be interpreted as a multidimensional vector, or 
tensor, that establishes the local space interior to a union of connected neighborhoods as a topologic 
vector space, a probabilistic vector space, and metric vector space.  This commonality of vector spaces 
suggests a method of bridging the discontinuity between the structures of metric space and the semi-
metric structures of probabilistic and topological spaces.  The edges of a graph formed by neighborhood 
tensor inflation define collinear metric, probabilistic, and/or topological vectors.  The product of a pair of 
collinear metric and semi-metric vectors yields a scalar distance to structure a composite space. 
4.4.1.  Topologic-metric index 
The product of the topological vector and the collinear metric vector between two points in a locally 
structured Boolean space produces a scalar topological-metric distance between the points: a topologic-
metric index value.  The topologic-metric index graph reveals the composite topological-metric space to 
be semi-metric.  [Figure 9.]   
4.4.2.  Probabilistic-metric index 
The product of the probability vector and the collinear metric vector between two points in a locally 
structured boolean space produces a scalar probability-metric distance between the points: a 
probability-metric index value.  The probability-metric index graph reveals the composite probabilistic-
metric space to be semi-metric.  [Figure 9.]    
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Figure 10A.  Architectural identity.  Initial development of architectural descriptors leading to the 
architectural identity of a locally complete 3-composite topologic-probabilistic-metric space.  Discrete 
neighborhood intersection sequence states a-d. 
4.5.  ARCHITECTURAL IDENTITY  
A unique numerical identity defining of a set of points can be obtained by the combination of situated 
connectivity measures of local metric, probabilistic, and topological spaces developed by the complete 
Boolean topology of the set:  
The situated distance metric inferred from a Boolean topology defines a connectivity 
triangulation structure:  the relative positional distances specific to a set of points. 
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Figure 10B.  Discrete sequence states e-h, terminating in the locally complete Boolean topology and 
unique architectural identity of the situated configuration (a,b,c,d). 
The situated probability sequence of neighborhood intersections developed by a Boolean 
topology defines a temporal semi-metric connectivity structure:  the assembly sequence specific 
to a set of points. 
Situated topology defines both boundary and internal connectivity structures of local space:  the 
spatial partitioning specific to a set of points.   
Taken together, these three situated connectivity measures of a locally complete Boolean topology form 
a unique numerical architectural identity to define a specific set of points.  
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4.5.1.  Ordered pair identity 
To bridge the discontinuity between semi-metric and metric spaces, Section 3.4 introduced the 
combined the probabilistic and metric components of an architectural identity, the probabilistic-metric 
index, to create a distance function in a composite probabilistic-metric space.   
That a sequence of connection probabilities rapidly descends several orders of magnitude for even a very 
small set of points, probabilistic-metric index values have been expressed as the base 10 logarithm of the 
product of the probability and metric vectors.   
By using the probabilistic-metric index, the architectural identity of the completely developed finite 
space of a set of points can then be reduced to two terms, expressed as an ordered pair [Figures 10A. – 
10B.]:  
(probabilistic-metric index, compound connectivity group).   
4.5.2.  Architectural descriptor   
In an incomplete union of neighborhoods, the ordered pair (probabilistic-metric, compound 
connectivity) may represent a range of similar but inequivalent point sets, yielding a non-unique 
architectural descriptor.  In the developmental spaces of a large set of points that form disjoint clusters 
structured as incomplete unions of neighborhoods, a subset cluster can be extracted from the set and 
developed in isolation to reveal its specific architectural identity. 
4.5.3.  Semi-metric space triangulation 
The triangulation of three points defines fundamental geometric units of structural stability (Williams, 
1972; Fuller, 1982; Wester, 2002) and unique positional information (Davenport, 2013) in a metric space.  
The construction of a metric space by the probabilistic interaction of local topological spaces induces the 
concepts of a topological triangulation, and a probabilistic triangulation.   
A locally triangulated union, or structurally, a locally stable union, is formed when every 
neighborhood in a union of local spaces is part of a 3-connected intersection.  This marks a critical 
threshold in an incomplete union of neighborhoods, where an architectural descriptor undergoes a 
discrete transition to become a unique architectural identity of a set of points.  This writing has 
developed the concept of a unique architectural identity as a dependent on the formation of a locally 
complete space.  Other than a difference in computation time, the implications of accepting a locally 
triangulated incomplete space as the standard for architectural identity are currently unclear.   
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Figure 11.  Configuration dendrogram.  Hierarchical neighborhood intersections, states a-h.  
4.6.  ARCHITECTURAL CONFIGURATION SPACE 
Dendrograms are graph theoretic structures commonly employed to model the relationships and discrete 
developmental sequences of a set of elements (Posada, 2001; Rosenberg, 2002; Butts, 2004; Li, 2004; 
Baum, 2005; Marks, 2006).  While they offer a clear visual expression of the discrete subsets formed by 
the hierarchical unions of elements observed in structural development, dendrograms are limited by their 
inability to delineate structural changes occurring within the boundary of a developing union.  [Figure 11.]
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Figure 12.  Architectural configuration space.  Discrete architectural trajectory of locally complete 
Boolean topology, states a-h.  Discrete developmental sequence  constructs the unique architectural 
identity of the situated configuration (a,b,c,d). 
In 1932 geneticist Sewall Wright introduced the concept of a configuration space to delineate the range of 
structural possibilities available to individuals in an adaptive population.  Mapping differences in boundary 
and internal structure, a configuration space is comprised of two elements (Wright, 1932, 1988; Stadler, 
2002; Vassilev, 2003): 
1.  A search space:  the set of all combinatorial possibilities of a set of elements. 
2.  A morphism:  an operation that transforms one configuration into another and structures 
adjacency and the accessibility distances between configurations.    
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Structuring a configuration space presents two open problems: 
1.  the quantitative definition of the specific set of points that comprise a configuration  
2.  the derivation of a quantitative similarity-dissimilarity measure differentiating two discrete 
configurations. 
The problems of discrete configuration identification and differentiation are currently encountered by 
every branch of science in the search for non-linear relationships in data:  finding clusters, groups, 
patterns, or classifications that correlate to properties.  (Aldenderfer, 1984; Jain, 1988; Vassilev, 2003; 
Gaertler, 2005; Fielding, 2007; Landau, 2010)  Performed by an assortment of ad-hoc discipline-specific 
algorithms developed without a unifying mathematical formalism, current searches for non-linear 
structures uniformly return results of questionable validity.  (Bailey, 1982; Riesen, 2010; Evertt, 2011; 
Arbelaitz, 2013)  The inability to define a unique set of points structuring a configuration as an individual 
discrete mathematical object has curtailed scientific application of Wright’s concept.  (Whitlock, 1995; 
Reidys, 2002; Skipper, 2004; Borenstein, 2005; Jin, 2005) 
4.6.1.  Structure of  configuration space 
Discontinuities induced by the external point of view in mathematics and statistics disclose a Godelian 
truth:  differences between two discrete set of points can be readily observed and described, but cannot 
be precisely defined.  With a situated point of view producing an architectural identity that gives an exact 
definition to a specific set of points, an unstructured search space of combinatorial configurations can be 
structured as a metric space:  an architectural configuration space.  The Euclidean distance between 
two points in an architectural configuration space quantifies the structural similarity-dissimilarity between 
two discrete configurations. 
The parameters outlined in Section 4.5 enable construction of a three dimensional architectural 
configuration space structured by metric, probabilistic, and topological coordinate axes.  The 
introduction of a probability-metric composite space in Section 3.4 permits a structure of two axes, with 
the coordinates of a point in an architectural configuration space defined by the ordered pair of an 
architectural descriptor or an architectural identity [Figure 12.]: 
(probability-metric index, compound connectivity groups).   
4.6.2.  Trajectories in configuration space 
A sequence of architectural descriptors that concludes with an architectural identity forms the ordered 
architectural set of a configuration of points.  An architectural set traces a discrete path or tree graph 
in configuration space to form an architectural trajectory:  the architectural graph unique to that set 
of points.    
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5.  SITUATED CONCLUSIONS 
Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, 
perhaps, the end of the beginning.   
(Winston Churchill, 1942) 
5.1.  STRUCTURES AND PROPERTIES OF THE MODEL 
Using a term like nonlinear science is like referring to the bulk of zoology as 
the study of non-elephant animals. 
(Stanislaw Ulam, in Campbell, 2004) 
5.1.1.  Space-time 
In the simultaneous development of local metric space and local semi-metric topological-probability 
space from a set of points by Poincare inflation, the initial neighborhood intersection of 2 points 
establishes a common unit interval 1 for metric, topological, and probability distances specific to the local 
space of the set.  With the concept of topological distance measured by discrete neighborhood 
intersection increments of time, development of a complete Boolean topology of a local space constructs 
a probabilistic discrete space-time model of interacting fields.   
From an initial condition of a random set of points, hierarchical structure is constructed by recursion of 
the locally probabilistic intersections of neighborhoods.  The sequence of neighborhood intersections 
traces the space-time developmental trajectory of a set of interacting fields in configuration space to 
construct a quantitative definition of hierarchical boundaries:  a scale-independent predictive model of 
the nonlinear processes and structures of inductive pattern formation. 
5.1.2.  In absentia 
Following models of classical physics where temperature and pressure of the environmental container 
determine the states and properties of matter within the container, in situ, in vivo, and in vitro experiments 
in science have been followed by in silico heuristic models that construct external order parameters as 
the determinants of phase transitions of pattern formation.  From the ADMET (absorption, distribution, 
metabolism, excretion, toxicity) interactions of pharmaceuticals to the phase transitions of physics, 
attempting to define the properties of a configuration from topological and graph theoretic structural 
models of invariant internal order parameters has been an open problem.   
In a balloon-like Poincare inflation of the boundary of a point into its neighborhood, topological 
properties remain unaltered.  With recursion of this topological isomorphism, the sequence of local 
interactions within a set of elements constructs an in absentia model of invariant structural parameters of 
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probabilistic self-organization:  the internal order parameter of a system, independent of the properties 
of an external container.  Pattern formation in this model is dependent solely on the initial relative spatial 
position of elements, structuring a base case local probabilistic model of self-assembly without central 
control mechanisms.  The influences of external order modifiers can be modeled by combinations of 
varying initial grain size, synchronous and asynchronous inflation rates, interactions of excitatory and/or 
inhibitory point sets, and threshold limits of intersections. (Appendix C) 
5.1.3.  Causation 
The multiplicity of interacting elements within a hierarchical boundary of a configuration construct 
nonlinear properties of parallel causation, modeled by the Boolean ring and the situated Boolean topology 
structures of a causative configuration. 
5.1.4.  Coherence 
The predictive performance of structural modeling is dependent on structural coherence across four 
model-phenomena order parameters:  central v. local control, unstructured aggregate v. hierarchically 
local specificity, pattern v. process taxonomy, and deductive v. inductive epistemology. 
5.1.4.1.  control coherence 
Alan Turing’s seminal paper The Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis (Turing, 1952) established two 
precedents in modeling self-regulated pattern formation, now known as reaction-diffusion models.  The 
reaction between Turing’s inhibitory and excitatory theoretical morphogens has been widely confirmed, 
most notably in the neural connectivity patterns of the brain. (Schwartzkroin, 1980; Isaacson, 2011; Ben-
Ari, 2012)  However, the diffusion process of the model presents a problem of local positional 
information available to an individual morphogen, inhibiting widespread acceptance by experimental 
biologists.  (Wolpert, 1969, 1971, 1996, 2009, 2011; Kerszberg, 2007; Kondo, 2010) 
A diffusion process models pattern formation using the continuous mathematics of concentration 
gradients:  changing density functions of the number of elements per unit of area or volume.  This 
information is not available to an individual embedded element but is derivable by an external observer 
or control mechanism with the oversight ability to count elements and calculate area or volume from 
defined spatial boundaries.  This is readily accomplished by a control mechanism integral to the system or 
the divine external control agent envisioned by Newton and Leibniz in their development of continuous 
mathematics.  If the elements of pattern formation being modeled have no physical expression of an 
integral control structure, then a density gradient is a structure artificially imposed by the mathematics of 
the model. 
 91 
 
Patterns reproducible by reaction-diffusion models have also been generated by the situated local 
connectivity models of cellular automata. (Gardner, 1970, 1971; Langton, 1984, 1990; Toffoli, 1987; Bays, 
1987, 2012; Rucker, 1989; Wolfram, 2002)  A situated point-of-view structures the internal mathematics 
of an individual element embedded in a gradient as a computation of locally available information.  From 
the element’s point-of-view, the universe that is external to electro-magnetic, gravitational, or other 
sensory fields simply does not exist.  In a situated model, an individual element only ‘knows’ its local 
neighbors – the situated intersections of its local field.  With no oversight control mechanism, it is the 
parallel processing of local information by a configuration of elements that constructs the emergent 
systemic structure and properties of the configuration. 
5.1.4.2.  specificity coherence 
Descendants of the seminal model ontologies of discontinuous inductive pattern formation, statistical 
mechanics (Gibbs, 1902), quantum mechanics (Born, 1924), percolation theory (Broadbent and Hammersley, 
1957),  discrete-event simulation (Lackner, 1964), catastrophe theory (Thom, 1972), Boolean-grain random sets 
(Matheron, 1975), and connectionism (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986), have evolved as structure-
property constructions of external point-of-view probability and continuous mathematics, effectively 
limiting the optical resolution of predictive  models to an aggregate-population level of specificity.  These 
linear mathematical constructions of unstructured collections create structural dissonance when applied 
to the hierarchically local interactions of pattern formation. 
In contrast, the discrete development of a situated Boolean topology constructs a probabilistic process-
structure model that unites connectionist, discrete-event, Boolean-grain, and percolation ontologies with 
the optical resolution of atomistic local specificity:  a recursive sequence of specific local connections 
constructs the unique architectural identity of a configuration, revealing the systemic structure and 
properties emergent from a specific set of initial conditions.   
In configuration space, with structural similarity-dissimilarity measured by the Euclidian distance between 
unique architectural identities, similar architectural identities will form structure-property clusters to 
display the probabilistic taxonomy of categorical patterns.  These configurations of architectural 
identities, or configurations of configurations, form peaks and valleys in a probabilistic fitness landscape of 
the internal order parameters of pattern formation. 
5.1.4.3.  taxonomy coherence 
The success of scientific modeling over the past three centuries has centered on the examination of 
pattern-property relationships, developing external point-of-view models that construct a high fidelity 
reproduction of pattern:  the discrete qualitative mathematical models of binding configurations and the 
continuous quantitative models of quasi-binding and non-binding configurations.   
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However, there is no evidence to suggest these are calculations performed internally by the elements of 
a configuration in a self-regulated process of pattern formation.  Analogous to the concentration 
gradients of reaction-diffusion models of pattern formation, the point and space group symmetry 
operations of mathematical crystallography faithfully reproduce the 3-dimensional structures found in 
crystalline solids, but in the process of mineralization, atoms do not physically rotate, mirror, or translate 
across spatial distance to construct a pattern.  Both of these examples accurately replicate structure but 
not process:  external point-of-view mathematics constructs a descriptive model of a pattern.  
Continuous mathematics provides a quantitative documentary of change in non-hierarchical pattern over 
time but does not reproduce the causative internal computations of a self-organizing process of pattern 
formation.   
Process-pattern models require a modeling taxonomy that departs from the precedents established by 
pattern-property models.  Parallel processing of local neighborhood information by the individual 
elements of a configuration structures the nonlinear self-assembly process of inductive pattern formation.  
A situated point-of-view constructs the necessary structural coherence between model and phenomena. 
5.1.4.4.  epistemology coherence 
The issues of structural dissonance reflect the underlying philosophical inconsistency of attempting to 
model the inductive nonlinear processes of phenomena with a deductive linear process of investigation.   
The external observer’s statistical approximations and deterministic certainty of deductive inference that 
evolved within the computational limits of pencil and paper are restricted to problems that are 
computationally decidable.  While these precedents are embedded in the information structures and 
processes of Western culture, it is the probabilistic certainty of situated inductive inference that is 
embedded in the information structures and processes of natural systems.   
Although much of inductive pattern formation appears to be computationally undecidable, it can now be 
addressed with the electronically extended computational limits of parallel algorithmic recursion.  The 
parallel recursive development of an architectural identity quantitatively traces the evolutionary space-
time trajectory of a configuration of intersecting fields.  This predictive process-pattern model offers 
structural coherence with the discontinuities of nonlinear hierarchical inductive pattern formation of 
natural and artificial systems. 
5.1.5.  Construction 
In the context of accelerating advances in DNA computing and computational nanotechnology, the low 
computational complexity of the model enables it to be embedded in the physical materials of human 
niche constructions, creating the artificial life forms of an adaptive human habitat.  Undergoing the 
parallel distributed processes of situated inductive pattern formation, bipartite recursion of information 
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structures and their physical expression constructs the evolutionary trajectory of hierarchically local 
natural and artificial adaptive configurations. (Appendix B) 
5.2.  STRUCTURE AND PROPERTIES OF HUMAN NICHE CONSTRUCTIONS 
There are certain moments in any mathematical discovery when the 
resolution of a problem takes place at such a subconscious level that, in 
retrospect, it seems impossible to dissect it and explain its origin. Rather, the 
entire idea presents itself at once, often perhaps in a vague form, but 
gradually becomes more precise.   
(Paul Cohen, 2002) 
With variables spanning the domains of man, culture, and environment, there is little, if anything, that 
does not impinge, directly or indirectly, on the design and fabrication of the human habitat.  Human niche 
constructions are an extension of the human phenotype:  the physical expression of the combined 
information structures of the human genotype and the extended genotype, the memetic information 
structures of human culture.  Pattern and properties of the extended phenotype are shaped by the 
configuration of local interactions of the human phenotype, human genotype, cultural memotype, and the 
genotype-phenotypes of their collective environmental container. 
5.2.1.  Critical state of the environmental container 
Reinforced by the few inclusions of nature in urban crystalline structure, the precedents of Judeo-
Christian theology and external-observer science have established a western collective consciousness of 
man-apart-from-nature.  Nature is authoring the dissenting opinion. 
With global climate change being just one parameter of a changing biosphere, there is rapidly mounting 
evidence of an imminent planetary phase transition:  the sixth period of mass extinction in earth’s 4.5 
billion year history.  Conforming to the top-down process of hierarchical disordered phase transitions, 
evidence specific to the extinction of mammal and primate populations has direct bearing on the primate 
species holding the apex position in the top trophic level of the global food web.   
These structural changes reflect a reduction in connectivity of local intra and inter-species adaptive 
configurations undergoing local disordered phase transitions, with the increasing number of local phase 
transitions intersecting to structure the threshold critical state preceding a systemic disordered phase 
transition.  Paralleling deconstruction, clusters of species in disordered phases begin forming the local 
connections of new adaptive configurations in the initial construction of new hierarchical order.   
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In its current state, the global connectivity of science is able to provide the uniquely situated real-time 
documentation for a case study of Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis:  the inductive pattern formation process 
of local configurations structuring the adaptive fundamental group of planet earth. 
5.2.2.  Critical state of the human genotype-phenotype 
Newton’s seminal model of gravitational fields dispelled the apparent magic of noncontact interaction-at-
a-distance between inanimate objects.  The current sciences of adaptive systems remain in an analogous 
pre-Newtonian state, with the magic of adaptive interaction not conducive to examination by models of 
linear causality.   
Macroscopic sensory fields of the human phenotype are well studied with quantitative models of auditory 
and visual fields, but little research has taken up the pioneering map sketched by John Flynn, relating the 
structure of local sensory information to behavioral properties and performance.  The macroscopic 
collective perceptual fields of social groups and the microscopic cellular-genetic fields of individuals are in 
the initial stages of examination, while subliminal perceptual fields and the enteric nervous system have 
only recently re-entered the periphery of science’s attention.  
Conforming to endosymbiotic theory, research of the human microbiome has resulted in the emergent 
definition of the human phenotype as a local fundamental group of interacting species.  The union of 
micro and macroscopic fields in a single fundamental group constructs the configuration of an adaptive 
field.  The set of elements of the local environmental container that fall within the boundaries of an 
adaptive field form a union with the adaptive field to structure a second fundamental group, an adaptive 
configuration.  Unions of adaptive fields construct the hierarchical fundamental group boundaries of 
genetic-cellular, neuro-cognitive, social group, and evolutionary-population adaptive configurations.  
Epigenetics and horizontal gene transfer are just two of the mechanisms that define the bi-directional 
relationship between information structures of adaptive fields positioned in the same adaptive 
configuration.  With the interpretation of local information following a process of inductive pattern 
formation, the properties of an adaptive field are grounded in the structure of its adaptive configuration.   
In the human species, light exposure, contact with soil microorganisms, and visual fields of natural 
greenscapes are known to interact with neurotransmitter chemistry, altering the structure of neural 
connectivity and triggering changes in the hormonal structure and behavioral properties of the 
phenotype.  (Ulrich, 1984, 1991; Brainard, 1991, 2005; Beauchemin, 1996; Benedetti, 2001; Jasser, 2006; 
Stevens, 2007; Rook, 2008, 2012; Azmitia, 2010; Freeman, 2010; Raison, 2010; Berman, 2012; Roe, 2013; 
Reklaitiene, 2014; Kardan, 2015)  The global pattern of increasing urbanization is changing the structure 
of human adaptive configurations by introducing the pervasive overcast cloud cover of urban heat islands, 
low interior light levels, impermeable surfaces, and a greyscape lacking green inclusions.  These and other 
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broad changes to connectivity of human adaptive configurations translate to the well documented 
changes in the properties of individual genotype-phenotype adaptive fields now confronting western 
medicine and society, conforming to Dubos’ observation of patterns of disease specific to a civilization. 
The changes induced by the physical configuration pale in comparison to the unprecedented change in 
the structure of the genotypic-phenotypic adaptive field itself:  the extension of real-time electronic 
connectivity to include information well outside the boundaries of local space defined over evolutionary 
time.  With the limits of information processing imposed by the cognitive load limit, the increased non-
local connectivity of an adaptive configuration alters the structure and properties of the adaptive field, 
limiting attention to local spatial information and effectively situating  neuro-cognitive, social group, and 
population information structures in the electronic artifacts of their own niche construction.  The 
evolving structure and properties of the adaptive field conform to models of information overload in 
cognitive and social sciences that evidence a relationship to performance:  a reduction in decision quality, 
translating to a reduction in fitness of the genotype-phenotype. 
Recent research reveals an average American human adaptive field spends 87% of its time in enclosed 
buildings and 6% of its time in enclosed vehicles:  93% of its life physically encapsulated by its own niche 
constructions. (Klepeis, 2001)  By excluding the environmental container of natural systems, the human 
genotype-phenotype remains embedded only in the extended genotype-phenotype of its own 
construction, structuring a closed loop of adaptive positive feedback.  Positive feedback constructions are 
well modeled in science and engineering, where small structural changes are compounded by recursion, 
accelerating destabilization of the initial system to terminate in a state of systemic collapse and/or a phase 
transition to a new state of stability. 
5.2.3.  Critical state of the extended human genotype 
Following from the precedents of its mathematics and science, western culture has evolved on a premise 
of objectivity and universal truth attainable by deductive inference of an external omniscient observer.  
From jurisprudence, to economics, to sports, the authority of objective truth has permeated the 
structures of western culture.   
But developments in mathematics from 1826-1964 exposed the provable truths of accepted mathematics 
as having constructed an incomplete and inconsistent truth space, providing a nonexclusive model of 
objective reality.  These revelations, coupled with the introduction of the principle relativity in physics 
(1907-1915), triggered the erosion of objectivity and truth in culture’s collective consciousness:   
In mathematics, the universal foundation of set theory initiated by Canter in 1874 is 
yielding to the local relativistic foundation of category theory, introduced by Eilenberg 
and MacLane in 1945. 
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In science, agent based modeling, emerging from von Neumann in 1948 and Conway in 
1970, and qualitative research methods, seminally outlined by Lincoln and Guba in 
1985, assume a local situated perspective in an inductive pursuit of truth. 
In popular culture, the World Wide Web, initiated as a homogeneous structure to 
increase connectivity among researchers of objective truths, has ironically spawned the 
emergence of local electronic cliques of visceral experience.  Dissonance between the 
collective conscious and the perception of local situated realities, in silico and in situ, 
have led to an increased questioning of authority, culminating with the conceptual 
emergence of alternative facts. 
The fragmentation of a homogeneous prevailing collective conscious by spatially isolated pockets of 
dissent is a change in the connectivity pattern of cultural information structures undergoing local 
disordered phase transitions.  With electronic connectivity accelerating the intersection of local phase 
transitions, clusters of local dissent are currently approaching the percolation threshold of a critical state, 
where an incremental increase in connectivity spans the culture in a phase transition to a new cultural 
memome.  
Interaction of the cognitive load limit and the information overload of adaptive fields introduced a second 
change in the connectivity of cultural information structures:  specialization.  With increasing rates of 
urbanization encapsulating more than half of the global human population in 2009 and expected to rise to 
two thirds by 2050 (UN, 2014), the cultural information structures constructed from pre-agricultural and 
agricultural adaptive configurations no longer reside in the collective conscious of a majority of the 
human population.  This change in the connectivity of the memome limits the adaptive properties of the 
population, bringing to mind the words of Churchill:  so much owed by so many to so few.  
Initially residing solely in the neural structure of individual adaptive fields, the collective conscious of 
Western cultural information has now been uploaded to the neural circuits of the World Wide Web.  
The eyu6tgfcvmergence of central repositories of cultural information in the artifacts of human niche 
construction structure a third change in connectivity, altering the robustness-stability properties of the 
memome to be dependent on the global robustness and stability of the physical structures of culture. 
5.2.4.  Critical state of the extended human phenotype  
The evolutionary trajectory of the configuration of human niche construction reveals changes in space-
time connectivity and discontinuous changes in properties that are indicative of structural phase 
transitions.   
The initial habitats of the human population exhibited the non-binding connectivity pattern of a gaseous 
phase:  climate induced expansion and contraction of low density compressible random configurations 
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moving past one another in a diffusion process, filling the container in a roughly uniform distribution 
having large amounts of free space.   
The emergence of agricultural partitioning structured an initial phase transition, with human habitats 
exhibiting a predominant quasi-binding connectivity pattern of a liquid phase:  the seasonal ebb and flow 
of crop rotations forming non-compressible irregular configurations that conform to the shape of the 
local container with little interstitial space.  Limited by local topographic-climatic boundaries and 
coinciding with emergent cultural specialization in local town centers, the global state of human niche 
constructions consisted of coexistent non-binding, quasi-binding and binding phases.  
With the industrial revolution, the emergence of a predominant urban-suburban structure signaled the 
beginning of a second phase transition, with human habitats exhibiting the binding connectivity pattern of 
a solid phase:  rigid close-packed constructions of non-compressible regular configurations of 
independent fixed shape and little interstitial space.  Unlike earlier states of human niche construction, an 
urban solid-state is not an independently sustainable pattern, remaining dependent on the free spaces of 
the initial phase and the partitions of the agricultural phase.   
On a container of finite surface area, growth of the solid phase is directly proportional to reductions in 
the areas of remaining initial and agricultural phases, structuring competition for space and resources as a 
zero-sum game between human and non-human habitats.  In the United States, the accelerating process 
of urban substitution has been directly observable over the past half century, with current 
documentation of the urban-suburban solid extending from Charlotte, NC to Boston, MA, covering 
more than half of the eastern coast.  The dwindling areas that have retained pre-urban phases of 
connectivity have been further subdivided by the connective tissue of human niche constructions.  
Current evidence reveals roadway structure divides the global land surface into 600,000 discrete 
fragments, only a third of which remain unaffected by human niche constructions. (Ibisch, 2016) With an 
enclosed area less than a square kilometer, half of the fragments are considered too small to support 
significant wildlife.  
With the accelerating change from agricultural to urban connectivity, the previously disjoint local 
ordered phase transitions of urban adaptive configurations have intersected to form large components of 
a critical state on the threshold of a systemic global ordered phase transition.  The increasing global 
connectivity of human configurations is directly related to the decreasing global connectivity of non-
human configurations on the critical threshold of a global disordered phase transition, precipitating a 
discontinuous change in the properties of both configurations. 
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5.3.  STRUCTURES AND PROPERTIES OF SCIENCE 
When we make a new tool, we see a new cosmos.  
(Freeman Dyson, 1988) 
The familiar quill of deductive analysis employed by Newton and Leibniz is being supplanted by the 
recursive algorithms of inductive synthesis envisioned by Turing and von Neumann to render the entire 
class of mathematically undecidable problems accessible to scientific inquiry.  Deductive linear 
interpretations of the pattern-property relationships of atomistic elements are yielding to the nonlinear 
inductive inference of the process-pattern relationships of discrete clustering in hierarchical structure.  
Methodologies of a situated investigator long advocated by Lincoln and Guba have been embraced by the 
social sciences to parallel the a-posteriori structuring of unstructured data and the algorithms of 
autonomous agents in computer science:  systemic models are inductively developed from local situated 
perspectives.  The deductive proofs of Godel and Cohen reveal the external point-of-view in 
mathematics is not omniscient, but situated by initial postulates and context. 
Category theory’s local relativistic restructuring of mathematics and the proliferation of domain-specific 
inductive structural models in science are both indications of complex adaptive systems that have 
reached penultimate critical thresholds at the turn of the 20th century.  The inability of current 
mathematics to define the unique architectural identity of a configuration of elements has produced a 
science populated by disjoint clusters of heuristic inductive structural models lacking a common 
formalism.  The point-of-view of an external observer in a metric space acts as a common inhibitory 
morphogen to prevent these clusters from joining together to structure the giant component of a 
systemic Kuhnian phase transition. 
5.3.1.  Structure of non-spooky action at a distance  
5.3.1.1.  semi-metric, metric discontinuity 
In a developing Boolean topology of a random static set, it is only under conditions of extreme locality 
and simplicity, limited to a small number of interacting elements, that the locally developed metric space 
of a configuration is homeomorphic to its locally developed topological and probability spaces.  With 
continued development beyond the formation of an initial boundary ‘hole’, topologically categorized as 
local fundamental group [2], topological and probability distances construct semi-metric spaces that are 
no longer homeomorphic to their corresponding metric space.  This initial ‘hole’ is the signature of a 
critical threshold state of the structural phase transition from metric to semi-metric space, when 
continuous mappings between the structure of metric space and the semi-metric structures of 
topological and probability spaces are no longer possible.  Topological space and probability space appear 
to remain homeomorphic throughout their development. 
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5.3.1.2.  semi-metric nonlinear relationships 
The discontinuities between metric space and topological and probabilistic semi-metric spaces structure 
the pervasive nonlinear metric space relationships now being ubiquitously described as complex systems:  
the fields surrounding individual elements construct semi-metric situated probability spaces of 
interaction.  From a viewpoint situated in a metric space, the probabilistic relationship structures of 
semi-metric space can present a perplexing apparition of interaction at a distance.  
5.3.1.3.  non-primacy of metric space 
The primacy of metric space is implicit in the quantification imperative of modern scientific inquisitions, 
yet a situated development of the local space of a random set of points reveals metric space forms 
discontinuous local patches of covering maps of a base topological-probability space.  Temporal duration 
and topological-probabilistic spatial proximity frame the parameters of local interactions of a probabilistic 
universe.   
5.3.2.  Structure of  nonlinear configurations 
Initially developed for modelling the change in non-binding interaction over time, the independent-
dependent constructions and linear relationships of continuous mathematics are metric space structures 
of implicit non-hierarchical atomism.  In his seminal work of modern statistics, Fisher detailed 
experimental methods to minimize the influence of ‘extraneous’ spatial variation across unstructured sets 
of atomistic elements in metric space models of randomness.  Historically, atomistic structures of metric 
space have been the only predictive models available to science. 
The limited intensity and duration of local interactions of fields in non-binding and quasi-binding structure 
preclude spatial neighborhood models from developing a discontinuity between semi-metric topological-
probability spaces and metric space.  But in the hierarchical universe structured by locally binding spatial-
temporal interactions of fields, topological-probabilistic semi-metric neighborhood connectivity creates 
nonlinear causative clustering. 
Evidenced by hierarchically local phase transitions, multi-variable causation by synergistic interdependent 
fields can be modeled by the situated topological structures of local fundamental and Boolean 
neighborhood groups and the situated algebraic structures of local Boolean rings found in the situated set 
theoretic structures of locally complete and incomplete hierarchical unions of neighborhoods.   
The relationship of the local semi-metric topological spaces, local semi-metric probability spaces and 
local metric spaces developed by Poincare neighborhood inflation of a set of points can be used to define 
a unique quantitative identity of a configuration of elements.   
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5.4.  STRUCTURES AND PROPERTIES OF PROVABLE TRUTH 
5.4.1.  Structure of deductive inference 
5.4.1.1.  boundary structure of deductive inference space 
Historically, scholars in western culture have extrapolated from a set of known deductive truths to 
inductively infer the existence of a single unbounded universal truth space structured by everywhere 
continuous deductive certainty.   
By the close of the 17th century, the work of Leibniz and Newton cemented the belief that the 
continuous certainty of a universal truth space was modeled by the mathematics of an external point of 
view:  the conceptual relationship between unbounded universal truth space and deductive inference 
space was structured as a bijective mapping. 
The dawn of the 20th century brought the common assumption that Cantor’s still evolving set theory 
held the properties of consistency and completeness necessary to finally realize the mathematical 
structure of universal truth.   
Brouwer’s intuitionist constructivism, Russel and Whitehead’s logicism, and Hilbert’s axiomatic formalism 
had all achieved some initial success as mathematical models of truth space when, in 1932, Godel 
presented a proof that the structure of deductive certainty was not everywhere continuous, but 
incomplete:  within any system of provable truth, statements can be made that are true but are not 
provable.  The can’t-get-there-from-here property of Godelian truths constructs the deductive inference 
space of provable truths as a subset of a larger truth space, where the subset is modeled as connected 
infinite single topological space perforated by holes.  The internal discontinuities in deductive certainty 
define the connected structure of a universal deductive inference space as a topological fundamental 
group [>1]. 
Just as non-Euclidean geometries were developed from the independence of Euclid’s fifth axiom, Cohen’s 
1963 proof of the independence of the axiom of choice opens the door for the development of 
alternative set theories and forever fractures the long-held intuitive model of a single universal deductive 
inference space.  Cohen’s proof establishes the existence of an external boundary of deductive inference 
space that is dependent on its initial postulates and context, dividing deductive provable truth into a set 
of categorically situated inference spaces modeled as a set of independent finite topological spaces. 
An unbounded universal truth space may exist, but the path-connected structure of provable certainty 
has limits:  deductive inference space is constructed as a disjoint collection of categorical truths, where 
each categorical inference space is modeled as a finite topological space having a perforated boundary 
structure of fundamental group [>1].  This model is reflected in the current restructuring of 
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mathematics, a transition from the foundation structured by Cantor’s 1884 set theory to a foundation 
constructed on the situated morphisms of MacLane and Eilenberg’s 1945 category theory.  
5.4.1.2.  internal structure of deductive inference space 
A process of deductive inference constructs a linear structure of truth:  each valid deductive step is a 
directed equivalence relation of unit interval 1, connecting the initial premise of an accepted categorical 
truth through a sequence of logical statements to reach the conclusion of a particular truth. 
Discrete statements connected by continuous certainty structures the linear process of deductive 
inference as the vertex-edge relationship of a certainty path graph.  The non-cyclic structure of the 
union of possible certainty path graphs rooted in a single premise of categorical truth suggests a tree 
lattice or semi-lattice structure of a deductive inference graph.  The union of possible certainty path 
graphs derivable from a closed set of categorical truths suggests a multi-rooted tree lattice or multi-rooted 
semi-lattice as the internal structure of a categorical deductive inference space. 
A single certainty path graph of deductive inference forms finite connected topological space without 
holes having a boundary structure of fundamental group [1].  The directed equivalence relation of unit 
interval 1 develops a deductive inference space as a metric space that is isomorphic to its topological 
space.  Every interior vertex of a certainty path graph is structurally equivalent, having a vertex degree of 
2, to define the process of deductive inference as constructing a homogeneous structure of truth.  Path-
connected certainty, ensuring the truth of a conclusion from truth of its premises, defines deductive 
inference as a deterministic model of truth. 
The acyclic process of deductive inference constructs a locally deterministic model of truth as a 
homogeneous linear metric structure embedded in an incompletely connected topological space.   
5.4.2.  Structure of inductive inference 
By reversing the direction of certainty in a deductive inference graph, a linear model of inductive 
inference produces discontinuities in each certainty path from an initial set of particular truths to a 
conclusion of a general categorical truth to define inductive inference as a non-deterministic truth space.  
A discontinuity maps the signature non-linear AH-HA! moment of cognitive categorical-conceptual pattern 
formation structured by a physical phase transition in neural connectivity:  a set of disjoint configurations 
of locally connected neurons join together in the formation of a giant connected component.  
This conceptual leap from a particular to a categorical truth occurs without enumeration of every 
particular instance to mirror the model of adaptation as a multi-variable combinatorial optimization 
process that is not dependent on the examination of every possible combination of a configuration space. 
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Both physical and conceptual local phase transitions of inductive pattern formation can be modeled by 
the situated mathematical structures derivable from the spatial development of a Boolean topology.  In a 
nonlinear threshold-cascade of process of inductive inference, a discrete kernel, or germ, of a specific 
truth is abstracted to structure a neighborhood, field, or grain, of a specific truth.  With increasing 
abstraction constructing local intersections of structural commonality, recursive topological grain 
inflation models ascending generalizations to develop an inductive inference space as a probabilistic 
hierarchical model of truth. 
5.4.2.1.  boundary structure of inductive inference space 
The process of recursive abstraction results in a changing structure of inductive inference space, modeled 
as the developmental trajectory of a configuration of truth grains in an architectural configuration space.  
With an initial condition of a finite stationary set of specific germs, hierarchical abstraction of particulars 
to a categorical generalization is computationally decidable, requiring a finite number of recursions equal 
to the number of edges of the complete graph of germs.  Terminal recursion structures the configuration 
of a complete Boolean topology having a boundary of fundamental group [1], constructing a complete 
truth space. 
An infinite set of situated truth germs undergoing infinite parallel recursion constructs a single infinite 
complete Boolean topology:  an unbounded completely connected infinite truth space. 
5.4.2.2.  internal structure of inductive inference space 
The recursive parallel process of inductive inference constructs a locally probabilistic model of truth as a 
hierarchical nonlinear semi-metric structure embedded in a completely connected topological space.   
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APPENDIX A 
A POSTERIORI HIERARCHICAL DATA STRUCTURE 
To simplify documentation, the discrete granular particulars that form the input sample population of this 
investigation are considered to be individual citations.  Pattern formation output, the set theoretic 
hierarchical structure of categorical generalizations, is presented in outline form.   
The situated conditional chain of knowledge state spaces of the investigation was structured by a 
sequence of questions, each emerging from the preceding stage of the investigation.  This sequence of 
recursive meta-abstractions constructed a scope of five sets of categorical generalization: 
(model models):  the parameters of model space 
(adaptation):  situated inductive pattern formation  
(modularity):  inductive morphism and hierarchical units of synthesis-analysis  
(proof and truth):  existing precedents and boundaries of provable truth 
(architectural identity):  situated mathematics of configuration space 
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A2. MODEL MODELS 
Can an evolutionary design process structure the foundation of a 
science of architecture? 
In the initial knowledge state space of the investigation, the inductive process of a posteriori conceptual 
clustering hierarchically structured the specific data grains of individual citations into a union of five sets 
of generalization: 
(structural design case study) 
(structures of pattern space) 
(set theoretic structuralism) 
(model structures) 
(structure of knowledge domains) 
A2.1.  Structural design case study:  pharmaceutical QSAR and SAR models 
structural design process:  (Randic, 1974, 1992; 2001a, 2001b, 2002; Basak, 1988, 1990, 
1991; Grossman, 1991; Dubos, 1992; Bugg, 1993; Kier, 1993; Goel, 1995; 
Gutman, 2000; Bonchev, 2001; Estrada, 2001, 2003; Hall, 2001; Macina, 2001; 
Churchwell, 2004; Balaban, 2005; Hillier, 2005; Ban, 2003; Churchwell, 2004; 
Clercq, 2004; Skvortsova, 2004; Balaban, 2005; Gilardoni, 2005; Jhoti, 2007; 
Consonni, 2010; Bekker, 2011; Afshar, 2012; Cherkasov, 2014) 
combinatorial database / configuration library:  (Shen, 2004; Landman, 2005) 
graph theoretic predictive modeling:  (Wiener, 1947; Randic, 1974, 2001; Basak, 1990; 
Dubos, 1992; Kier, 1993; Bonchev, 2001; Hall, 2001; Macina, 2001; Estrada, 
2001, 2003; Ban, 2003; Churchwell, 2004; Skvortsova, 2004; Balaban, 2005; 
Hu, 2005;  
artificial neural network, genetic algorithm predictive modeling:  (Gakh, 1994; Kireev, 
1995; Kovesdi, 1999; Agatonovic-Kustrin, 2000; Schneider, 2000; Ichikawa, 
2003; Bayram, 2004; Winkler, 2004) 
A2.2.  Structures of pattern space: 
hierarchical self-similar:  (Mandelbrot, 1982, 1989; Rossler, 1986; Barnsley, 1987, 2010a, 
2010b, 2012, 2013; Röhricht, 1987; Greifswald, 1989; Kahng, 1989; Perreau, 
1989; Bandt, 1992; Falconer, 1995; Kenyon, 1996; Kittel, 1997; Conway, 1998; 
Majewski, 1998; Sole, 1999; West, 1999; Dodds, 2000; Abraham, 2001; 
Fathauer, 2001; Tarafdar, 2001; Gutierrez, 2002; Rani, 2004, 2009, 2013; 
Srinivasan, 2004; Chung, 2005; Freiberg, 2005; Zhou, 2005; Bourke, 2006; 
Landreneau, 2006; Devaney, 2007; Mureika, 2007; Bunde, 2009; Singh, 2012; 
Vejnar, 2012; Goel, 2013; Capriani, 2014) 
periodic:  (Bragdon, 1913; Stuart, 1963; Burt, 1966, 1972, 1996, 2007, 2011; Emmerich, 
1967, 1990; Wood, 1967, 1968; Critchlow, 1969; Guran, 1969; Rittell, 1970; 
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Williams, 1972; Wachman, 1974; Lalvani, 1977, 1981, 1996; Huybers, 1979, 
1995, 1996;  Hyde, 1984, 1989; Fischer, 1987, 1996; Haase, 1987; Andersson, 
1988; Smith, 1988; Hyde, 1994, 2003; Wester, 1994; Gabriel, 1997; Liu, 1998; 
Friedrichs, 1999; Leoni, 2000, 2003; Kleinmann, 2001; Nesper, 2001; Carlucci, 
2002; Giesen, 2002; Sowa, 2002, 2003, 2005; Thompson, 2002; Korren, 2003; 
Schroder, 2003; Piotto, 2004; Robins, 2004; Aste, 2005; Mittemeijer, 2010; 
Thomas, 2012) 
quasi-periodic:  (Penrose, 1974; Shechtman, 1984; Duneau, 1985; Cahn, 1986; Levine, 
1986; de Boissieu, 1990; Goldman, 1991; Baranidharan, 1994; Gopal, 1994; 
Caspar, 1996; Peterson, 1996, 1999; Vainshtein, 1996; Polyakov, 1997; 
Ranganathan, 1997; Steinhardt, 1997, 2011; Hof, 1998; Makowski, 1998; 
Goodman-Strauss, 1999; Radin, 1999; Hu, 2000; Lagarias, 2000; Lück, 2000; 
Baake, 2002; de Prunele, 2002; Abe, 2004; Delvenne, 2004; Steurer, 2004; 
Boroczky, 2006; Macia, 2006; Zhou, 2006; Bohannon, 2007; Lu, 2007; Ben-
Abraham, 2011; Bindi, 2012; Bellos, 2015) 
quasi-random:  (Watts, 1998; Barabasi, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; Newman, 1999; Amaral, 
2000; Barrat, 2000; Jeong, 2000; Bagnoli, 2001; Mathias, 2001; Wagner, 2001; 
Wuchy, 2001; Kim, 2002; Willinger, 2002; Wolf, 2002; Piel, 2003; White, 
2003; Wuchty, 2003; Dekker, 2004; Sporns, 2004a, 2004b, 2006; Stam, 2004; 
Albert, 2005, 2006; Doye, 2005; Dunne, 2005; Lee, 2005; Li, 2005, 2006; Lin, 
2005; Marquet, 2005; Schilling, 2005; Stumpf, 2005; Vazquez, 2005; Zhou, 
2005; Barriere, 2006; Goyal, 2006; Kalisky, 2006; Li, 2006; Louzoun, 2006; 
Mathias, 2006; Sarshar, 2006; Zhang, 2006a, 2006b) 
random:  (Erdos, 1959; Gilbert, 1961; Dacey, 1963; Fortuin, 1972a, 1972b, 1972c; 
Chaitin, 1975; Braddeley, 1980; Serra, 1980; Rivier, 1987; Browne, 1993; 
Luczak, 1994; Grimmett, 1995, 2006; Stahl, 1995; Bollobas, 1996; Cahill, 1996, 
1997, 1998, 2005; Barrett, 1999; Claude, 1999; Stoyan, 2000; Hayes, 2001; 
Newman, 2001, 2006, 2009; Robins, 2001; Aldana, 2002; Calude, 2002; 
Crutchfield, 2002; Passy, 2002; Peterson, 2002, 2003; Sosa, 2002; Watts, 2002; 
Cannings, 2003; Kali, 2003; Venter, 2003; Bentley, 2004, 2005; Gunduz, 2004; 
Ioannides, 2004; Mayer, 2004; Mossel, 2004; Park, 2004; Sood, 2004; Fronczak, 
2005; Griffith, 2005; Malescio, 2005; Abe, 2006; Palla, 2007; Matzutt, 2008; 
D’Souza, 2009; Florens, 2009; van Lieshout, 2012; Brooks, 2015a, 2015b; 
Holmes, 2015) 
A2.3.  Set theoretic structuralism:  (process, structure, properties, performance) 
canalization; structural stability, robustness:  (Agrawal, 1984; Lady, 1995; Tononi, 1999; 
Callaway, 2000; Gibson, 2000; Long, 2001; Krivelevich, 2002; Stang, 2003; 
Jonckheere, 2004; Kitano, 2004; Wilson, 2004; Klau, 2005; Criado, 2006; Ay, 
2007; Lesne, 2008, 2011; Srinivasan, 2011; Demongeot, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 
2012d) 
structure-properties:  (Barnes, 1969; England, 1971; Basak, 1991; Cohen, 1991; Gakh, 
1994; Sumpter, 1994; Lorch, 1999; Jeong, 2000; Skolnick, 2000; Hasty, 2001; 
Lengauer, 2001; Dunne, 2002, 2005; Girvan, 2002; Otten, 2002, 2006; Smith, 
2002; Torquato, 2002; Bu, 2003; Dodds, 2003; Gershell, 2003; Pržulj, 2003; 
Selassie, 2003; Schultz, 2003; Turner, 2003; Whisstock, 2003; Dubois, 2004; 
Hood, 2004; Jordan, 2004; Middendorf, 2004; Seepersad, 2004; Vazquez, 2004; 
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Veith, 2004; Wong, 2004; Yu, 2004; Arita, 2005; Borgwardt, 2005; Brinda, 
2005; Dekker, 2005; Doyle, 2005; Ferrarini, 2005; Gore, 2005; Guimera, 2005; 
Haddon, 2005; Huson, 2005; Ma’ayan, 2005; Stewart, 2005; Wunderlich, 2005; 
Aggarwal, 2006; Phillips, 2006; Ruano, 2006) 
infomatics:  (Wu, 1990, 1992; Emmett, 2000; Hagen, 2000; Paton, 2000; Cohen, 2004; 
Maojo, 2004; Savchuk, 2004; Winkler, 2004; Benoit, 2005; Bradford, 2005; 
Rajagopalan, 2005; Ezziane, 2006; Ferhatosmanoglu, 2006; Jones, 2006) 
configuration space:  (Landau, 1930; Hakim, 1966; Eichinger, 1977; Lozano-Perez, 1983; 
Kirkpatrick, 1985; Fontana, 1993; Latombe, 1999; Shpak, 2000; Gewaltig, 2001; 
Stadler, 2001; Bastert, 2002; Aldana, 2003; Casetti, 2003; Moraglio, 2004; 
Pereira, 2005; Thurner, 2006; Gfeller, 2007; Berdahl, 2008; Kastner, 2008) 
multi-criteria combinatorial optimization:  (Wilcoxon, 1945; Schuyler, 1948; Bradley, 
1954; Bendig, 1956; Matthews, 1966; Bruk, 1972; Farquhar, 1974; Barnett, 
1976; Morse, 1977; Clark, 1978; Eliashberg, 1980; Eshragh, 1980; Stewart, 
1981, 1996; Horsky, 1984; French, 1984, 1985; Weber, 1985, 1997; Allett, 
1986; Eiselt, 1991; Young, 1995; Henig, 1996; Lipovetsky, 1996; Belton, 1997; 
Hamalainen, 1997; Salo, 1997; Buchanan, 1998; Klein, 1998; Elomaa, 1999; 
Kasprzak, 2000; LePelley, 2000; Valls, 2000; Forman, 2001; Levitin, 2003; 
DeWeck, 2004; Kim, 2005; Scott, 2005) 
inductive combinatorial structural design:  (Radford, 1980; Hopfinger, 1984; Bull, 1989; 
Kier, 1993; Macready, 1995; Sepetov, 1995; Richon, 1997; Kauffman, 2000; 
Mann, 2000; Apic, 2001; Dagani, 2001; Debnath, 2001; Shai, 2001; Augen, 
2002; Darvas, 2002; Güner, 2002; Hasty, 2002; Katritzky, 2002; Selassie, 2002; 
Fermeglia, 2003; Aguilar, 2004; Gusfield, 2004; Seepersad, 2004; Walsh, 2004; 
Hatzimanikatis, 2005; Banville, 2006; Merks, 2006; Richardson, 2006; van der 
Velde, 2006; Kennedy, 2008) 
set theoretic structuralism:  (Olson, 1994, 1998, 2000; Bensaude-Vincent, 2001, 2004; 
Campbell, 2001; Desiraju, 2001; Flemings, 2001; Edling, 2002; McDowell, 2004, 
2007; Seepersad, 2004; Fine, 2005; Barat, 2006; Schroder, 2006; Seppelt, 2006; 
Battaile, 2009; Boettiger, 2013; Rahman, 2014) 
A2.4.  Model structures 
A2.4.1.  modeling ontologies 
reductionism:  (Oppenheim, 1956; Schaffner, 1967; Anderson, 2001; Van Regenmortel, 
2004) 
atomism:  (Post, 1975; Shrader-Frechette, 1977; Cushing, 1982; Bell, 1995; Mayberry, 
2000; Schuster, 2006; Frohlich,2007; Sternheimer, 2007; Harris, 2008; 
Anapolitanos, 2009; Izquierdo-Aymerich, 2009; Matthews, 2009) 
creativity, innovation:  (Simon, 1982, 1983, 2001; Thagard, 1987; Bernstein, 1989; 
Horrobin, 1990; Vaughn, 1996; Zucker, 1996; Bhatta, 1997; Gero, 1998; 
Colton, 1999; Goldenberg, 1999; Stepanek, 1999; Carayol, 2000, 2005; Rajan, 
2000; Damsker, 2001; Klahr, 2001; Wolff, 2001; Bhattacharya, 2002, 2005; 
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Cohen, 2002; Taylor, 2002; Temel, 2003; Cosgrove, 2004; Cowan, 2004, 2006; 
Laszlo, 2004; Rank, 2004; Pittaway, 2004; Runco, 2004; Sim, 2004; Sonntag, 
2004; Barabási, 2005; Breschi, 2005; folley, 2005; Gabora, 2005; Guimera, 
2005; Lane, 2005; Miller, 2005; Muller, 2005; Schiffer, 2005; Swan, 2005; Uzzi, 
2005; Wilczek, 2005; Brown, 2006; Bunk, 2006; Chia, 2006; Clemmitt, 2006; 
Creedon, 2006; Jewett, 2006; Klein, 2006; Nettle, 2006a, 2006b; Simonton, 
2006; Bilalic, 2008; Hartmann-Sonntag, 2009) 
systematics, cladistics:  (Goodman, 1971; Penny, 1982; Seberg, 1989; Mishler, 1994; 
Brower, 1996; Mayr, 1998, 2002; Pagel, 1999; Strimmer, 2000; Congdon, 2001; 
Grandcolas, 2001; Ebach, 2002; Jobling, 2003; Willmann, 2003; Agatha, 2004; 
Henz, 2004; Kraus, 2004; Baum, 2005: Hey, 2005; Johnson, 2005; Roth, 2005; 
Bothwell, 2006; Makarenkov, 2006; Rutschmann, 2006) 
game theory:  (Smith, 1974, 1976, 1979; Axelrod, 1981; Leonard, 1995; Sigmund, 1999; 
Arrow, 2003; Nowak, 2004, 2005; Ohtsuki, 2006; McGill, 2007; Roca, 2009) 
general systems theory:  (von Bertalanffy, 1950, 1968, 1972; Boulding, 1956; Simon, 
1962; Caws, 1963; Henning, 1963; Sprague, 1963; Winthrop, 1963; 
Blachowicz, 1971; Becht, 1974; Ball, 1978; Rodin, 1978; Salmon, 1978; 
Denenberg, 1980; Skyttner, 1996, 2005; Barros, 1997; Bogusch, 1997; Ideker, 
2001; Gulyaev, 2002; Hatfield, 2002; Kitano, 2002; Uso-Domenech, 2002; 
Bernard, 2005; Stoyanov, 2005; Schneider, 2006; Arrell, 2010; Seising, 2010; 
Wolkenhauer, 2012; Adams, 2014) 
complexity theory:  (Levy, 1985; Emmeche, 1994; Blakeslee, 1995; Howard, 1997; Levin, 
1997; Mitchell, 1998; Brooks, 2001; Grand, 2001; Strogatz, 2001; Ziemelis, 
2001; Casti, 2002; Giles, 2002; Hayes, 2002; Kitano, 2002; Katagiri, 2003; 
Gambardella, 2004; Crawford, 2005; Bullock, 2006) 
theory structures:  (Ziman, 1965; Ayala, 1989; Gopen, 1990; Collier, 1992; Levin, 1997; 
Benyon, 1999; Bokulich, 2001; Damper, 2001; Gardner, 2001; Pfenninger, 
2001; Konopka, 2002; Nordgren, 2003; Rhyne, 2003, 2004; Johnson, 2004; 
Nerlich, 2004; Poon, 2004, 2005; Baum, 2005; Cardelli, 2005; Goguen, 2005; 
Neuman, 2005; Roth, 2005; Turney, 2005; Caminati, 2006; Ratto, 2006) 
A2.4.2.  modeling precedents 
discrete v. continuous structure:  (Elman, 1990; Olurotimi, 1991; Wang, 1992; Scott, 
1995; White, 1996; Zeigler, 1998; Izard, 2000; Shnerb, 2000; Koopman, 2001; 
Doherty, 2003; Fishwick, 2004; Pelanek, 2004; Bonchev, 2005; Fayez, 2005; 
Huyck, 2005; Fingelkurts, 2006; Freeman, 2006; Kaznessis, 2006) 
deterministic v. stochastic process:  (Fisher, 1922; Matheron, 1963; Gray, 1967; Chayes, 
1972; Hampton, 1973;  Stewart, 1986; Stigler, 1986, 2000; Cohen, 1987; 
Good, 1987, 1988; Hacking, 1987; Stone, 1987; Wise, 1987; Cohen, 1988; 
Clevenson, 1991; Fienberg, 1991; Schneider, 1991; Bozda, 1999; Mumford, 
2000; Stoyan, 2000; Swift, 2000; Breiman, 2001; Ball, 2002; Bridgeman, 2003; 
Atkinson, 2006; Clark, 2006; Callaway, 2008; Lyons, 2008; D’Souza, 2009; 
Wilkinson, 2009; Simeonov, 2010; Augustin, 2011; Parascandola, 2011; 
Melham, 2012; Pépin, 2012; Velasco, 2012; Brooks, 2015a, 2015b; Holmes, 
2015; Nuzzo, 2015) 
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cellular automata, artificial life models:  (Von Neumann, 1951, 1966; Burks, 1957a, 
1957b; Schrant, 1960, 1967; Ulam, 1962; Gardner, 1970; Baer, 1974; Wolfram, 
1984; Couclelis, 1985; Levy, 1985; Bays, 1987; Hogeweg, 1988; Bak, 1989; Li, 
1990; Ermentrout, 1993; Crutchfield, 1995; Lohn, 1997; Barrett, 1999; Blok, 
1999; Hayes, 1999; Sloot, 1999; Sarkar, 2000; Semboloni, 2000; Bedau, 2000, 
2003, 2005; Bandini, 2001; Dormann, 2001; Gordon, 2001; Kundu, 2001; 
Torrens, 2001; Feick, 2002; Tomita, 2002; Boots, 2003; Adami, 2004; Edlund, 
2004; Holmes, 2005; Kari, 2005; Lenaerts, 2005; Kim, 2006; Smith, 2011) 
petri net models:  (Petri, 1962; Peterson, 1977; Peleg, 2002; Pinney, 2003, 2006; 
Errampalli, 2004; Gašević, 2004; Langley, 2006) 
discrete event system models:  (Geoff, 1972; Austin, 1985; Fujimoto, 1989; Ho, 1989; 
Singh, 1989; Zeigler, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1997, 2003; Heileman, 1992; 
Passino, 1992; Schruben, 1993, 2000; Buss, 1995, 1996; Flood, 1995; Lin, 1996; 
Minar, 1996; Bullnheimer, 1997; Righter, 1998; Uhrmacher, 2000, 2001, 2005; 
Deutsch, 2001; Tropper, 2001; Willinger, 2002; Makino, 2003; Lobb, 2005; 
Miller, 2005; Rohl, 2005; Scheiner, 2005) 
simulation:  (Hogeweg, 1980; Shannon, 1998; Ingalls, 2002; Grimm, 2005; Railsback, 
2006; Brown, 2006; Aumann, 2007; Gurney, 2007; Kramer-Schadt, 2007; 
Prescott, 2007) 
phase diagram:  (Bridgman, 1937; Doolittle, 1938; Nishizawa, 1992; Kattner, 1997; 
Lobban, 1998; Slyusarenko, 1999; Kosyakov, 2000; Pogliani, 2003; Epps, 2004; 
Miura, 2006; Zhao, 2006; Reatto, 2007) 
graph theoretic phase transition models:  (Luczak, 1994; Kalapala, 1998; Krishnamachari, 
2001, 2003; Krivelevich, 2002; Aldana, 2003; Ishihara, 2005) 
topological phase transition models:  (Franzosi, 2000; Fiałkowski, 2002; Casetti, 2003; 
Khaldoyanidi, 2003; Derenyi, 2004; Palla, 2004; Teixeira, 2004; Angelani, 2005; 
Baroni, 2006; Kastner, 2006, 2008; Risau-Gusman, 2006; Chen, 2012) 
phase transition process:  (Stanley, 1971; Langton, 1990; Back, 1995; Ormerod, 2006; 
Sole, 1996; Matsushita, 1998; Newman, 1999; Goldstein, 1999; Sachdev, 1999; 
Araki, 2001; Enomoto, 2001; Fiałkowski, 2002; Watts, 2002; Angelani, 2003, 
2005; Casetti, 2003; Kalapala, 2005; Deguet, 2006; Kinouchi, 2006; Fronczak, 
2007; Buchanan, 2008; Dorogovtsev, 2008; Lizier, 2008; Nishikawa, 2011) 
graph theoretic structure:  (Harary, 1960, 1962; Nystuen, 1961; Ramamoorthy, 1966; 
Wirth, 1966; Foulkes, 1967; Essam, 1970; Cartwright, 1975; Randic, 1975; 
Scrensen,1978; Hage, 1979; Kruger, 1979; Burt, 1980; Zubkov, 1980; McKee, 
1985; Hopkins, 1987; Scott, 1991; Tjur, 1991; Osman, 1996; Rabino, 1996; 
Keitt, 1997; Kim, 1999; Remolina, 1999; Shai, 1999a, 1999b; Salingaros, 2000; 
Du, 2001; Modarres, 2002; Redner, 2002; Shmulevich, 2002; Tangmunarunkit, 
2002; Bafna, 2003; Chowell, 2003; Newman, 2003; Penn, 2003; Washio, 2003; 
Barabasi, 2004a, 2004b; Bera, 2004; Haus, 2004; Jiang, 2004; Kakade, 2004; 
Middendorf, 2004; Pržulj, 2004; Torres, 2004; Watts, 2004; Xia, 2004; Dekker, 
2005; Fronczak, 2005; Hillier, 2005; Sarshar, 2005; Wilkins, 2005; Wilkinson, 
2005; Cardillo, 2006; Jain, 2006; Klamt, 2006; Miura, 2006; Porta, 2006a, 
2006b; Costa, 2007) 
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topological structure:  (Phillips, 1971; Brantingham, 1978; Mermin, 1979; Melott, 1990; 
oelzeman, 1994; Archdeacon, 1996; Fleck, 1996; Sahni, 1998; Steadman, 2001; 
Robins, 2002; Gero, 2003; Jupp, 2003; Claramunt, 2004; Crane, 2004; Reitsma, 
2004; Kotschick, 2006; Mackenzie, 2006; Mendoza, 2006; Overbye, 2006; 
Hitchin, 2007; Moore, 2010) 
A2.5.  Structure of knowledge domains 
A2.5.1.  architectural order parameters as complex adaptive systems 
human factors:  (Zeki, 1998; Moore, 2000; Lansing, 2003; Gunduz, 2004; Nolfi, 2004; 
Thadakamalla, 2004; Blanchard, 2005; Lewis, 2005; Lledo, 2005; Percha, 2005; 
Bathellier, 2006; Chialvo, 2006; Roska, 2006; Kurakin, 2007; Motluk, 2007; 
Werner, 2007; Davis, 2008; Grigolini, 2009; Ananthaswamy, 2010; Durstewitz, 
2010; Sadaghianil, 2010; Palombo, 2013) 
culture:  (Maranda, 1972: Mitchell, 1974; Schmidt, 1975; Vastokas, 1976; Beeby, 1980; 
Leach, 1983; Buchanan, 1984; Egenter, 1987; Gilman, 1987; Goss, 1988; 
Croome, 1991; Scott, 1991; Abel, 1992; Boden, 1992; Cook, 1992; Goodstein, 
1992; Szczepanski, 1994; Biddulph, 1995; Senft, 1995; Spreckelmeyer, 1995; 
Coleman, 1996; Jones, 1996; Low, 1996; Rendell, 1996; Simonsen, 1996; 
Steadman, 1996; Harper, 1998; Mohr, 1998; Ramadier, 1998; Xu, 1998; 
Birmingham, 1999; Herman, 1999; Kauffman, 1999; Satler, 1999; Walker, 1999; 
Broder, 2000; Carnes-McNaughton, 2000; Gieryn, 2000; Wilkins, 2000; 
Conzen, 2001; Kranton, 2001; Krishnamachari, 2001; Pellow, 2001; Rapoport, 
2001; Saleh, 2001; Sole, 2001; Hwangbo, 2002; Loukaitou-Sideris, 2002; 
Marzot, 2002; Mills, 2002; Reed, 2002; Watkins, 2002; Aroche-Reyes, 2003; 
Ball, 2003; Bremner, 2003; Lansing, 2003; Auge, 2004; Chiu, 2004; Mallett, 
2004; Moore, 2004; Ronnes, 2004; Brain, 2005; Eerkens, 2005; Forgan, 2005; 
Jeffares, 2005; McNeill, 2005; Mesoudi, 2005; Pauketat, 2005; Samadhi, 2005; 
Sklair, 2005; Anderson, 2006; Fragaszy, 2006; Johnston, 2006; Jones, 2006; 
Sadler, 2006; Sagsoz, 2006; Steels, 2006; Sterelny, 2006; Whitehand, 2006; 
Castellano, 2007; Fronczak, 2007; Tierney, 2007; Garreau, 2008; Rupert, 2008; 
Sudjic, 2008; Bolourian, 2009; Heaney, 2009; Cho, 2013; Wainwright, 2013) 
environment:  (Oster, 1971; Tainaka, 1991; Dietrich, 1992; Ito, 1995; Linehan, 1995; 
Heylighen, 1997; Levin, 1998; Fath, 1999; Pace, 1999; Bacon, 2000; Beekman, 
2001; Urban, 2001; Bascompte, 2003; Mossel, 2003; Ovaskainen, 2003; 
Vermeij, 2004; Baranyai, 2005; Farina, 2005, 2006; Green, 2005; Eilperin, 2006; 
Hansen, 2006; Schmitz, 2006; Balter, 2007; Duger, 2007; Wicks, 2007; 
Wimberley, 2007; Grimm, 2008; Armstrong, 2010; Drake, 2010; Lenton, 2011; 
Seto, 2011, 2012; Carrington, 2014) 
A2.5.2.  science and mathematics as complex adaptive systems 
meta-process of science:  (Kuhn, 1962; Simon, 1962; Gell-Mann, 1992; Holland, 1992, 
2005; Chu, 2003; Sengupta, 2003; Amaral, 2004; Arevalo, 2008; Boccaletti, 
2009; Wang, 2009; Stenholm, 2010; Newman, 2011) 
meta-process of mathematics:  (Crowe, 1975; Dieudonne, 1978; Goodman, 1984; 
Rockafeller, 1988; Feferman, 1992, 1999, 2000; McLarty, 1993; Corry, 1997; 
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Devlin, 1997; Hoare, 1999; Corfield, 2001; Levin, 2002; de Villiers, 2004; 
Greer, 2004; Crossley, 2005; Chaitin, 2007) 
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A3.  ADAPTIVE PATTERN FORMATION 
Are there invariant processes and structures of complex system 
pattern formation, independent of scale and academic 
boundaries, that encompass the range of variables that structure 
the human habitat? 
In the second knowledge state space of the investigation, the inductive process of a posteriori conceptual 
clustering hierarchically structures the specific data grains of individual citations into a union of three sets 
of generalization: 
(hierarchical structures of adaptive pattern formation) 
(bipartite structures of inductive pattern formation) 
(invariant properties of adaptive / inductive pattern formation) 
A3.1.  Bipartite structure of inductive pattern formation 
A3.1.1.  information structures:  genotypes 
multi-sensor data fusion:  (Bar-Shalom, 1978, Luo, 1987; Fincher, 1990; Ruck, 1990a, 
1990b; Wang, 1994; Hall, 1997; Chen, 1998; Cox, 1998; Mazor, 1998; 
Swanson, 1998; Bowyer, 1999; Celinski, 1999; Mahotra, 1999; Dubois, 2000; 
Farooq, 2000; Gandetto, 2003; Ross, 2003;  Mahler, 2004; Fiocco, 2005; 
Pulford, 2005; Huang, 2006; McGeorge, 2006; Starzyk, 2006; Whitehouse, 
2006; Xiang, 2006) 
memes:  (Gabora, 1995, 2004; Feldman, 1996; Tanaka, 1996, 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; 
Flynn, 1997; Best, 1999; Wimsatt, 1999; Bull, 2000; Higgs, 2000; Hirschberg, 
2000; Jeffreys, 2000; Moore, 2001; Barnett, 2002; Salingaros, 2002; Bentley, 
2003; Castro, 2004; Deacon, 2004; Danchin, 2004; Blute, 2005; Shermer, 
2005; Wilkins, 2005; Sterelny, 2006) 
a priori data structure:  (Smardzija, 1990; Aurenhammer, 1991; Mayr, 1994, 1995; 
Graves, 1995; Nielsen, 1996; Agrawal, 1997; Hubbard, 2002; Schneider, 2002; 
Clamp, 2003; Rose, 2003; Stoll, 2003; Green, 2004; Shen, 2004; Weaver, 2004; 
Patrinos, 2005; Frehner, 2006) 
citation networks:  (Peritz, 1992; Yaru, 1997; Ding, 1998a, 1998b; Leydesdorff, 1998, 
2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2007; Allen, 2005; Scharnhorst, 2005; Synnestvedt, 2005) 
graph theoretic data structure:  (Aurenhammer, 1991; Graves, 1994, 1995, 2012; 
Gyssens, 1994; Erwig, 1994; Zurawski, 1994; Ellis, 1995; Harel, 1998; 
Kolpakov, 1998; Lee, 1999; Mitra, 2000; Novak, 2002; Muezzinoglu, 2004; 
Weaver, 2004; Ray, 2005) 
a posteriori self-structuring data:  (Kohonen, 1990, 1996; Ruppin, 1990; Ichiki, 2001; Lee, 
2001; Grim, 2002, 2004a, 2004b; Ayad, 2003; McClelland, 2003; Pomi, 2004; 
Rogers, 2004; Smigiel, 2004; Barb, 2005; Shanmuganathan, 2006; Steyvers, 
2005) 
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meta-data structures:  (Mark, 1990; Snaprud, 1992; Guting, 1994; Lu, 1995; Iannella, 
1998; Miller, 1998; Corby, 2000; Medeiros, 2000; Cannataro, 2002; Sonneck, 
2003; Suleman, 2003; Fujima, 2004; Hayes, 2004; Sayers, 2004; Devillers, 2005; 
Gergatsoulis, 2005; Armstrong, 2006; Christiansen, 2006) 
genome:  (Moss, 1992; D’haeseleer, 2000; Kolchanov, 2000; Sterelny, 2000; Reidys, 
2001; Tseng, 2001; Brazhnik, 2002; Kholodenko, 2002; van Someren, 2002; 
Chen, 2003; Fawcett, 2003; Miller, 2003; Sole, 2003; Zhao, 2003; Harju, 2004; 
Kosak, 2004; Pennisi, 2004; Blute, 2005; Freudenberg, 2005; Sanchez, 2005; 
Holmes, 2006; Nadeau, 2006; Salzberg, 2006) 
bio-information theory:  (Rashevsky, 1955; Shimbel, 1965; Eigen, 1973, 1993; Battail, 
1997; Smith, 1999; Sterelny, 2000; Winnie, 2000; Ricard, 2001; Jablonka, 2002; 
Yockey, 2002; Barbieri, 2003, 2004, 2006; Segal, 2003; Meyer, 2004; 
Farnsworth, 2013) 
information theory:  (Shannon, 1949; Shimbel, 1965; Mowshowitz, 1968; Cole, 1993; 
Kay, 1995; Battail, 1997, 2006; Smith, 1999, 2000; Ohya, 2000; Sterelny, 2000; 
Weiss, 2000; Wilbur, 2000; Shimogawa, 2001; Jablonka, 2002;  Segal, 2003; 
Boniolo, 2003; Frappat, 2003; Linstone, 2003; Segal, 2003; Sullivan, 2003; 
Cornelius, 2004; Furner, 2004; Gherardi, 2004; Sole, 2004; Williams, 2004; 
Bates, 2005; Chang, 2005; Dall, 2005; Stegmann, 2005; Yoo, 2005; Braman, 
2006; Katare, 2006; Schneider, 2006; Zvarova, 2006) 
A3.1.2.  physical expression of information structures:  phenotypes 
sensor nets:  (Pin, 1991; Biel, 2000; Goldberg, 2000; Petriu, 2000; Akyildiz, 2002; 
Stankovic, 2003; Hedley, 2004; Kim, 2005; Singh, 2005; Barros, 2006; Moreno, 
2006) 
evo-devo:  (Takahashi, 2001; Arthur, 2002; Passy, 2002; Griffin, 2003; Hall, 2003a, 
2003b; Johnson, 2003; Vergara-Silva, 2003; Barabé, 2004; Badyaev, 2005; 
Griffiths, 2005; Love, 2005; Medina, 2005; Muller, 2005; Rutishauser, 2005; 
Wilkins, 2005; Furusawa, 2006; Mabee, 2006; Rosenfield, 2006; Salazar-Ciudad, 
2004, 2006; Sheldrake, 2006; Young, 2006; Le Page, 2007; Othmer, 2009) 
phenotypic plasticity:  (Waddington, 1959; Bradshaw, 1965, 1973; Schmid, 1992; Roff, 
1996, 2003; Wagner, 1996; Ramirez, 1999; Amzallag, 2000; Debat, 2001; 
Alpert, 2002; Igel, 2002; Pandolfi, 2002; Callaway, 2003; Suzuki, 2003; Tang, 
2003; Hartman, 2004; Li, 2004; Scriver, 2004; Strand, 2004; van Kleunen, 2004; 
Biesecker, 2005; Borges, 2005; Promislow, 2005; Fordyce, 2006; Jablonka, 
2006; Karmiloff-Smith, 2006; Phillips, 2006; Pigliucci, 2006) 
phenome:  (Mahner, 1997; Lyubich, 2001; Takahashi, 2001; Bochner, 2003; Freimer, 
2003; Crampin, 2004; Scriver, 2004; Burggren, 2005; Jones, 2005; 
Nochomovitz, 2006) 
allometric scaling:  (Berntson, 1997; Bono, 1997; Lewin, 1999; Brown, 2004a, 2004b, 
2004c, 2005; Carpinteri, 2005; Cudennec, 2005; Farrell-Grey, 2005; Gillooly, 
2005; Glazier, 2005; Kaspari, 2005; Kerkhoff, 2005; Li, 2005, 2006; Makarieva, 
2005; Marquet, 2005; van Nimwegen, 2005; West, 2005; Woodward, 2005; 
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Hedin, 2006; Loeuille, 2006; Phillips, 2006; Reich, 2006; Vladar, 2006; Holmes, 
2007; Whitfield, 2007) 
morphology:  (Thompson, 1917; Raup, 1965; Stoddart, 1969; Seilacher, 1974; Stebbins, 
1974; Stevens, 1974; Chappell, 1980; Caldwell, 1986; de Kroon, 1994; 
Kaandorp, 1996; Marquis, 1996; Stone, 1997; McGhee, 1999; Eble, 2000; 
Kobayashi, 2001; Rasskin-Gutman, 2001; Meroz, 2002; Loya, 2001; Stone, 
2003; McHenry, 2004; Ubukata, 2005; Honeycutt, 2008; Kerry, 2012) 
A3.1.3.  bipartite structure  
ambient intelligence; intelligent space; pervasive computing; mixed reality:  (Sharma, 1998; 
Lee, 2002; Strohbach, 2002; Bove, 2003; Eng, 2003; Fogli, 2003; Knuth, 2003; 
Lifton, 2003a, 2003b; Riva, 2003; Yamaguchi, 2003; Briscoe, 2004; Bull, 2004; 
Callaghan, 2004; Paradiso, 2004; Wright, 2004; Broxton, 2005a, 2005b; 
Lektauers, 2005; Manzolli, 2005; Remagnino, 2005; Rutishauser, 2005; 
Chakravarti, 2006) 
evolvable, self-reconfigurable hardware:  (Hikage, 1996; Manderick, 1996; Sipper, 1997, 
1999a, 1999b; Zebulum, 1997; Higuchi, 1999; Yao, 1999; Lahoz-Beltra, 2001; 
Chen, 2002; Sukhatme, 2002; Yoshida, 2002; Lungarella, 2003; Teuscher, 2003; 
Glackin, 2004; Lee, 2004; Murata, 2004; Tan, 2004; Torresen, 2004; Blank, 
2005; Demaine, 2005; Griffith, 2005;  Kamimura, 2005; Wu, 2005; Xu, 2005; 
Zykov, 2005) 
genotype-phenotype mapping:  (Smogi, 1997; Schena, 1998; Marchant, 2000; Mattick, 
2001; Patton, 2001; Reinke, 2001; Southern, 2001; Cooper, 2002; Stoeckert, 
2002; Storz, 2002; Trent, 2002; Cavalli-Sforza, 2003; Furusawa, 2003; Gibson, 
2003; Hansen, 2003; Miller, 2003; Nagy, 2003; Roses, 2003; Sato, 2003; 
Venter, 2003; Wolfe, 2003; Brewster, 2004; Friedman, 2004; Gomes, 2004; 
Jasney, 2004; Ochiai, 2004; Brors, 2005; DiPetrillo, 2005; Ganley, 2005; Jones, 
2005; Moulton, 2005; Repsilber, 2005; Rodriguez‐Caso, 2005; Butte, 2006; 
Meynert, 2006; Phillips, 2006; Rigoutsos, 2006; Shai, 2006) 
inhibitory-excitatory process:  (Turing, 1952; Wardlaw, 1953; Nelson, 1963; Rosen, 1968; 
Goodwin, 1985, 1993; Harrison, 1987; Amato, 1990; Murray, 1990; Ives, 1991; 
Swinney, 1991; Ermentrout, 1993; Dillon, 1994; Mecke, 1996; Bonabeau, 1997; 
Schiffmann, 1997, 2005; Dormann, 2001; Liaw, 2001; Crampin, 2002; 
Theraulaz, 2002; Weimar, 2002; Cho, 2004; Cickovski, 2005; Genieys, 2006; 
Karmarkar, 2006; Liu, 2006; Roska, 2006; Colizza, 2007; Wolpert, 2009; 
Miyazawa, 2010; Saey, 2010; Short, 2010; Cerveny, 2012; Chen, 2012; 
Tompkins, 2014) 
bipartite network models:  (Von Foerster, 1988; Friedler, 1998; Merker, 2003; Caldarelli, 
2004; McIlraith, 2004; Ramasco, 2004;  Robins, 2004; Toyoda, 2004; Borner, 
2005; Doslic, 2005; Huang, 2005; Lambiotte, 2005; Fortuna, 2006; Guillaume, 
2006; Lewinsohn, 2006; Zhang, 2006) 
bipartite graph theory:  (Eades, 1994; Balbuena, 2001; Estrada, 2005; Morris, 2005; 
Ohkubo, 2005) 
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A3.2.  hierarchical structures of adaptive pattern formation  
A3.2.1.  genetic-cellular adaptation  
transposable genes, jumping genes:   
genetic adaption:  (Walbot, 1996; Frank, 1997; Moore, 2001; Elena, 2003; Beltman, 
2004, 2005a, 2005b; Shea, 2004; Zheng, 2004; Bijlsma, 2005; Dekel, 2005; 
Feder, 2005; Frankham, 2005; Howe, 2005; Lexer, 2005; Zhuravel, 2005; 
Angilletta, 2006; Grennan, 2006; Lortie, 2006; Shinar, 2006) 
network models:  (Bray, 1990; Marijuan, 1991; Lowndes, 1992; Thomas, 1993; Graves, 
1994, 1995; Somogyi, 1997; Kasabov, 1998, 2002, 2004; 2005; Scheetz, 1998; 
Weng, 1999; D’haeseleer, 2000; Guarente, 2000; Kolchanov, 2000; Mattick, 
2001; Reidys, 2001; Brazhnik, 2002; Forst, 2002; Kholodenko, 2002; van 
Someren, 2002; Chen, 2003; Falk, 2003; Krul, 2003; Sole, 2003; Stetter, 2003; 
Deckard, 2004; Harju, 2004; Kosak, 2004; Sauro, 2004; Rudge, 2005; Sanchez, 
2005; Wood, 2005; Dicke, 2006; Kell, 2006; Kholodenko, 2006; Klamt, 2006; 
Salzberg, 2006; Macía, 2012) 
A3.2.2.  neural-cognitive adaptation 
attention; perception:  (Bundesen, 1987; Field, 1994; Makeig, 1997; Barsalou, 1999, 2003; 
Robertson, 2003; VanRullen, 2003, 2005, 2006; Arnott, 2004; Cichocki, 2004; 
Muller, 2004; Bartels, 2004, 2005; Choi, 2005; Gupta, 2005; Millar, 2005; Palva, 
2005; Humphries, 2006; Raz, 2006; Uchida, 2006; Cardin, 2007; Dhamala, 
2007; Tosh, 2007) 
classification; category learning:  (Clancey, 1985; Redington, 1998; Roy, 2002; Rehder, 
2003a, 2003b, 2004; Ashby, 2001, 2004, 2005; Huyck, 2005; Pothos, 2006; 
Spratling, 2006; Sun, 2006) 
concept formation:  (Medin, 1984; Hori, 1994; Bhatta, 1997; Schena, 1998; Sloman, 
1998; Sinha, 2000; Thompson, 2000; Richards, 2001; Dogil, 2002; Barsalou, 
2003, 2005, 2009; Griffiths, 2003c, 2009; McClelland, 2003; Cela-Conde, 2004; 
Härle, 2004; Kawabata, 2004; Khallad, 2004; Lin, 2004; Mandler, 2004; 
Maguire, 2004; Nelson, 2004; Tapp, 2004; Binder, 2005; Goguen, 2005; Heit, 
2005; Hutchins, 2005; Inselberg, 2005; Wermter, 2005; de Kamps, 2006; 
McCray, 2006; Tenenbaum, 2011) 
concept integration:  (Fisher, 1987; Fauconnier, 1998; Chiappe, 2000; Grady, 2000; Kim, 
2000; Smith, 2000; Teng, 2000; Pereira, 2002; Ritchie, 2004) 
concept graph:  (Vaughan, 1974; Lehmann, 1992; Bovasso, 1993; Carley, 1993; Young, 
1996; Hartley, 1997; Mohr, 1998; Wang, 1998; Resnik, 1999; Berners-Lee, 
2002; Feng, 2002; Rindflesch, 2003; Heesch, 2004; McRae, 2004; Pelekis, 2004; 
Dieng-Kuntz, 2005; Mazard, 2005; Menczer, 2005; Miller, 2005; Bales, 2006; 
Guo, 2006; Kay, 2006; Sowa, 2006) 
cognition:  (Hinton, 1989; Brown, 1990; Muller, 1996; Stewart, 1996; Song, 2000; 
Newell, 2002; Zeigler, 2002; Martin, 2003; Munakata, 2003, 2004; Makeig, 
2004; Siegler, 2004; Ridderinkhof, 2005; Segura, 2005; Shanks, 2005; Sol, 2005; 
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Barrett, 2006; Basar, 2006; Elman, 2006; Karakaș, 2006; Shaw, 2006; 
Westermann, 2006; Waber, 2007; Khundrakpam, 2014) 
memory:  (Schneider, 1993; Raffone, 2001; Noppeney, 2004; Fenker, 2005; Malin, 2006; 
Yago, 2006; Fedulov, 2007) 
consciousness:  (Greenwald, 1992; Zeki, 1998; Coward, 1999; Young, 1999; Atkinson, 
2000; Brust, 2000; John, 2002; Rees, 2002; Thier, 2002; Crick, 2003; Harnad, 
2003; Holland, 2003, 2004; Tunney, 2003; Fell, 2004; Tononi, 2004, 2005; 
Aleksander, 2005; Cleeremans, 2005; Maia, 2005; Seth, 2005, 2006; Broks, 
2006; Bower, 2007; Buchanan, 2007; Deutsch, 2007; Fox, 2007; Henig, 2007; 
Shadlen, 2007; Anthes, 2013) 
self-consciousness:  (Kao, 1996; Lee, 1998; Posner, 1998, 2005; Hauber, 2001; 
Churchland, 2002; Craig, 2002; Johnson, 2002; Baars, 2003; LeDoux, 2003; 
Thom, 2004; Gusnard, 2005; Hobson, 2005; Macinnes, 2005; Bongard, 2006; 
Decety, 2006; Morin, 2006; Northoff, 2006; Pérez, 2006; Plotnik, 2006; 
Raichle, 2006; Ross, 2007; Sedikides, 2007; Kaipa, 2010) 
neural structure:  (Brown, 1990; Bressler, 1995, 2006; Muller, 1996, 2004; Bower, 1998, 
1999, 2000, 2004, 2007; Mckeown, 1998; Omurtag, 2000; Page, 2000; Richter, 
2000; Sporns, 2000, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2011; Baillet, 2001; Bi, 2001; Jung, 
2001; Bhattacharya, 2002, 2005; Makeig, 2002; Burrone, 2003; Glassman, 
2003; Siegelmann, 2003; Bartels, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Buchel, 2004; Chialvo, 
2004; Croxson, 2005; Eguiluz, 2005, Esposito, 2005; Gupta, 2005; Hoke, 2005; 
Knoch, 2005; Segura, 2005; Stam, 2005; Zeki, 2005; Freeman, 2006; 
Karmarkar, 2006; O’Brien, 2006; Abbot, 2007; Livet, 2007; Lichtman, 2008; 
Bullmore, 2009, 2012; Stam, 2010; Boersma, 2011; Alexander-Bloch, 2012) 
artificial neural networks:  (McCulloch, 1943, 1949; Pitts, 1947; Rosenblatt, 1958; Block, 
1962a, 1962b; Peretto, 1984; Chalmers, 1990; Gustin, 1990; Widrow, 1990; 
Hassoun, 1991; Lin, 1991; Bishop, 1992; Chakrabarti, 1992; Freund, 1992; 
Hunt, 1992; Yoon, 1992; Fritsch, 1993; Hammerstrom, 1993; Honavar, 1993; 
MacLennan, 1993; Zwietering, 1993; Fiesler, 1994, 1996; Wang, 1994; 
Chakrabarti, 1995; Arena, 1996; Mahapatra, 1996; Parisi, 1996; Sumpter, 1996; 
Xu, 1996; Ghazanfari, 1997; Lyon, 1997; Maass, 1997; Michel, 1997; Portas, 
1997; Roadknight, 1997; Cooper, 1998; Daqi, 1998; De Falco, 1998; Kung, 
1998, 1999; Papik, 1998; Sabuncuoglu, 1998; Tsoi, 1998; Jedra, 1999; Kurfess, 
1999; Lek, 1999; Vellido, 1999; Biel, 2000; Bojkovic, 2000; Kartam, 2000; 
McLaren, 2000; Paik, 2000; Patterson, 2000; Peterson, 2000; Roy, 2000; Smith, 
2000; Zhang, 2000; Adeli, 2001; Bailer-Jones, 2001; Bayro-Corrochano, 2001; 
Recknagel, 2001; Rosa, 2001; Bien, 2002; Cardot, 2002; Chen, 2002; Hanson, 
2002; Natarajan, 2002; Poulton, 2002; Tijsseling, 2002; Xu, 2002; Harnad, 
2003; Knuth, 2003; Meireles, 2003; Merlo, 2003; Sima, 2003; Stankovic, 2003; 
Wakeling, 2003; Bedaux, 2004; Kasabov, 2004; Lin, 2004; Narayanan, 2004; 
Robert, 2004; Seiffert, 2004; Černá, 2005; Chortaras, 2005; Ferentinos, 2005; 
Kinbara, 2005; Bianchini, 2006; Gruning, 2006; Li, 2006; Muselli, 2006; Wang, 
2006) 
multi-layer artificial neural networks:  (Benedict, 1988; Mavrovoijniotis, 1992; Sontag, 
1992; Bose, 1993; Funabiki, 1997; Rudolph, 1997; Svozil, 1997; Egmont-
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Petersen, 1998; Vaughn, 1999; Pal, 2001; Utgoff, 2002; Krawczak, 2005; Park, 
2006a, 2006b) 
A3.2.3.  social group adaptation 
quorum sensing:  (Kempner, 1968; Nealson, 1979; Bassler, 1999; Miller, 2001; Nakagaki, 
2004; Amos, 2005; Terrazas, 2005; Waters, 2005; Fricker, 2008; Nadell, 2008; 
Takamatsu, 2009; Dussutour, 2010; Niizato, 2010; Tero, 2010; Dandekar, 
2012; Adamatzky, 2011; Reid, 2012) 
swarm, flocking:  (Hamilton, 1971; Pulliam, 1973; Eriksson, 2010;  
slime mold:  ( 
formal, informal networks; invisible colleges:  (Crane, 1969; Van Rossum, 1973; Boorman, 
1975; Kronin, 1982; Todorov, 1986; Hartman, 1990; Lievrouw, 1990; Gould, 
1991; Morris, 1994; Falkenberg, 1995; Morand, 1995; Lievrouw, 1996; Walsh, 
1996; Kautz, 1997; Baker, 1999; Moenaert, 2000; Stiglitz, 2000; Jirojwong, 
2001; Kronick, 2001; Tuire, 2001; Priss, 2002; Wilkinson, 2003; Owen-Smith, 
2004; Heisenberg, 2005; Muller, 2005; de Mesquita, 2006; Fry, 2006; Kossinets, 
2006; Nunes, 2006; Zuccala, 2006) 
animal culture:  (Laland, 2003; Sumpter, 2006 
plant communication:  (Trewavas, 2005a, 2005b; Callaway, 2007; 
community genetics:  (Antonovics, 2003; Chase, 2003; Collins, 2003; Neuhauser, 2003; 
Rickleps, 2003; Whitham, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008; Biernaskie, 2005; Turegon, 
2005; Vellend, 2005; Crutsinger, 2006; Fordyce, 2006; Garrett, 2006; Shuster, 
2006; Urban, 2006; Silvertown, 2009; Leo, 2010; Hersch-Green, 2011; Tack, 
2012) 
artificial neural network ensembles:  (Hansen, 1990; Opitz, 1999; Ghosh, 2002; Valentini, 
2002; Zhou, 2002; Kolter, 2003; Fernández-Redondo, 2004; Torres-Sospedra, 
2005; Hernández-Espinosa, 2005; Garcez, 2007) 
interconnection nets:  (Bhuyan, 1987; Reed, 1987; Akers, 1989; Cooperman, 1991; Hatz, 
1992; Stiihr, 1991; Kotsis, 1992; Schibell, 1992; Blazewicz, 1993; Harary, 1993; 
Barth, 1994; Fraigniaud, 1994; Keller, 1994; Tzeng, 1994; Wong, 1995; Bhatt, 
1996, 1998; Vadapalli, 1996; Hasunuma, 1997; Agrawal, 1998; Bermond, 1998; 
Huang, 1998; Wei, 1999; Taghiyareh, 2000; Hwang, 2001; Comellas, 2003; 
Ziavras, 2003; Jan, 2004; Xiao, 2005; Wagh, 2006) 
community parallel distributed processing:  (Noy-Meir, 1987; Findler, 1992; Nordhaus, 
1992; Gordon, 1996; Hirsh, 2001; Hubbell, 2001; Bijlsma, 2005; Brookfield, 
2005; Chase, 2005; Monzeglio, 2005; Friedmann, 2005; Harnad, 2005, 2006; 
Gravel, 2006) 
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A3.2.4.  evolutionary-population adaptation 
population genetics:  (Dawkins, 1976; Lewin, 1982; Wade, 1998; Skyrms, 2000; Singh, 
2003; Buss, 2004; Dyer, 2004; Wilke, 2005; Song, 2006) 
evolution:  (Smith, 1978; Smith, 1983; Delsol, 1991; Sereno, 1991; Mayr, 1992, 1993; 
1999, 2000, 2005; Pocklington, 1997; Channon, 1998; Lyman, 1998; Kauffman, 
1999; Sole, 1999; Wallace, 1999; Ben-Ari, 2000; Jeffreys, 2000;  Nowak, 2000; 
Brookfield, 2001, 2004, 2009; Hodgson, 2001; Hoenigsberg, 2002; Padian, 
2003; Bentley, 2003, 2004, 2005; Borges, 2005; Eerkens, 2005; Hey, 2005; 
Jeffares, 2005; Reynolds, 2005; Wilkins, 2005; Mesoudi, 2006; Sterelny, 2006; 
Lieberman, 2007; Prosser, 2007; Spinney, 2007; Atkinson, 2008; Gross, 2008; 
Rogers, 2008; Laland, 2010) 
fitness landscape:  (Jones, 1987; Kauffman, 1991; Bak, 1992, 1997; Mangel, 1992; Stadler, 
1995, 1996, 1999, 2002; Whitlock, 1995; Westhoff, 1996; Bagnoli, 1997; 
Sloman, 1998; Weber, 1998; Imada, 1999; Skipper, 2001, 2004; Wilke, 2001; 
Yu, 2001; Reidys, 2002; Blackburne, 2005; Borenstein, 2005; Doye, 2005; 
Iguchi, 2005; Jain, 2005, 2007; Ochoa, 2008) 
ecosystem connectionism:   (Keitt, 1997; Urban, 2001; Jordan, 2004; Green, 2005; 
Brooks, 2006; Memmett, 2006; Pascual-Hortal, 2006; 
 
graph theory giant component:  (Newman, 2001; 
A3.3.  invariant properties of adaptive inductive pattern formation 
A3.3.1.  interpretive information processing 
mimicry:  (Bates, 1862; Thayer, 1918; Dafni, 1984; Oldstone, 1987, 1998, 2005; 
Behrens, 1988; Albert, 1999; Stebbins, 2001; Sherratt, 2005; Yuki, 2005; 
Hanlon, 2007; Stevens, 2007, 2009; Skelhorn, 2010; Scott-Samuel, 2011; 
Cusick, 2012; Heliconius Genome Consortium, 2012; Hoffman, 2012; von 
Beeren, 2012) 
positional information:  (Wolpert, 1969, 1989, 1994, 1996, 1971, 1981, 2009, 2011; 
Lewis, 1977; Maden, 1977; Jeong, 2001; Kerszberg, 2007; Richardson, 2009) 
cybernetics:  (Wiener, 1954; Miller, 1956; Rapoport, 1956; Trucco, 1956; Cowan, 1965; 
Johnson, 1970; Thomas, 1995; Battail, 1997; Heylighen, 2001; Riegler, 2005; 
Gupta, 2006; Wang, 2008; Denning, 2012) 
semantic web: 
semiotic; semantic systems:  (Morris, 1938; Yates, 1985; Hoffmeyer, 1997; Kao, 1996; 
Battail, 1997; Posner, 1998; Kirschvink, 2001; Bookheimer, 2002; Chandler, 
2002; Craig, 2002; Jablonka, 2002, 2009; Friederici, 2003, 2009; Ben Jacob, 
2004; Khallad, 2004; Maguire, 2004; Mateo, 2004; Noppeney, 2004; Binder, 
2005; Macinnes, 2005; Gupta, 2006; Schultz, 2006; Thom, 2006; Milius, 2009; 
Saey, 2009; Atkin, 2010) 
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A3.3.2.  distributed local control, local phase transition processes  
self-assembly; self-organization:  (Crane, 1950; Ashby, 1962; Caspar, 1962, 1963; Eigen, 
1971, 1977; Klug, 1972; Bak, 1987, 1988, 1990; Tang, 1987; Constance, 1991; 
Farmer, 1992; Sipper, 1999; Lee, 2000, 2002; Anderson, 2002; Banzhaf, 2002; 
Pascual, 2002; Whitesides, 2002; Lifton, 2003; Skår, 2003; Van Orden, 2003; 
Abrescia, 2004; Guerin, 2004; Pfeifer, 2004; Tan, 2004; Costa, 2005, 
Krishnamurthy, 2005; Remagnino, 2005; Rutishauser, 2005; Årzén, 2006; 
Halley, 2006, 2008; Edelmann, 2007; Garlaschelli, 2007; Keller, 2007; Werner, 
2007; Dressler, 2008; Karsenti, 2008; Kurdi, 2008; Rusu, 2008; Keller, 2009; 
Prokopenko, 2013; 
connectionism, parallel distributed processing:  (Rumelhart, 1986; McClelland, 1988; 
Parunak, 1988; Elman, 1990; Mjolsness, 1991; Raghupathi, 1991; Rasmussen, 
1992 ; Bray, 1993; Fu, 1993,1995; James, 1996; Coward, 1997; Merigot, 1997; 
Somogyt, 1997; Machado, 1998; van der Vet, 1998; O’Brien, 1999; Browne, 
2000; Fletcher, 2000,2001; Page, 2000; Haberly, 2001; Kang, 2001; Kremer, 
2001; Wirth, 2001;  Seilewiesiuk, 2002; Paton, 2003;  Kasabov, 2004; Lobb, 
2005; Sander, 2005; Shapiro, 2005; Reza, 2006; Roth, 2006; Rogers, 2014) 
morphology of porous media:  (Roberts, 1997; Perret, 1999; Prasher, 1999; Suding, 1999; 
Ioannidis, 2000; Liang, 2000; Hilpert, 2003; Hillmyer, 2005; Hunt, 2009) 
first passage time:  (Weiss, 1967; Ricciardi, 1999; Condamin, 2005, 2007; Shlesinger, 
2007; Ma, 2009; Oshanin, 2009; Mejía-Monasterio, 2011; Mattos, 2012; 
percolation:  (Broadbent, 1957; Shante, 1971; Kirkpatrick, 1973; Essam, 1980; Wierman, 
1982; Kesten, 1987; Yonezawa, 1989; Winsor, 1995; Galam, 1997; Prea, 1997; 
Stauffer, 1997; van der Marck, 1997; Berkowitz, 1998; d’Iribarne, 1999; 
Callaway, 2000; Moore, 2000; Blanchard, 2002; Cohen, 2002; Wierman, 2002; 
Banaei-Kashani, 2003; Gamba, 2003; Martins, 2003; Arns, 2004; Krapivsky, 
2004; Beffara, 2005, 2008; Christensen, 2005; Gandolfo, 2005; Kozma, 2005; 
Perez, 2005; Wierman, 2005; Bollobás, 2006a, 2006b; Camia, 2006a, 2006b; 
Giménez, 2006; Moukarzel, 2006; Sarshar, 2006; Acin, 2007; Balter, 2007; 
Henry, 2007; Motluk, 2007; Davis, 2008; Haenggi, 2009; Hunt, 2009; Son, 
2012) 
catastrophy theory bifurcation:  (Zeeman, 1971, 1976, 1977, 1988; Thom, 1975, 1976; 
Bellairs, 1977; Poston, 1978; Sibatani, 1978; Stewart, 1977, 1981,1982; 
Saunders, 1980; Wilson, 1981; Oster, 1982; Arnol’d, 1984; Silvi, 1994; Kappos, 
1995; Krokidis, 1997; Marx, 1997; Priest, 1997; Borisuk, 1998; Brown, 1999; 
Margalef-Roig, 2000; Tyson, 2001, 2007; Garliauskas, 2003; Stark, 2003; 
Maclean, 2005; Rosser, 2007; Kitajima, 2009; Lundstedt, 2009; Strogatz, 2012) 
biological bifurcation:  (Maynard Smith, 1985; Brown, 1988; Goodwin, 1990; Gilbert, 
1991; Thatcher, 1992; Koch, 1994; Affolter, 2003; Cinquin, 2005; Foster, 
2009) 
speciation:  (Barton, 1989; Weitzman, 2003; Beltmanan, 2004, 2005a, 2005b; Atkinson, 
2005; Bull, 2005; Butlin, 2005, 2006; Lexer, 2005; Sadedin, 2005; West-
Eberhard, 2005; Nosil, 2008)  
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A4.  HIERARCHICAL MODULAR UNITS OF ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS 
What are the units of adaptation and the mechanism of their 
interaction?  
In the third knowledge state space of the investigation, the inductive process of a posteriori conceptual 
clustering hierarchically structured the specific data grains of individual citations into a union of three sets 
of generalization: 
(individual element as a local fundamental group) 
(hierarchical modular structure) 
(quantitative configuration descriptors) 
A4.1.  individual element defined as a local fundamental group 
human microbiome:  (Cossins, 2016; 
extended phenotype:  (Dawkins. 1978, 2004; Blyth, 1994; LaBarbera, 2000; Schuck-Paim, 
2000; Sterelny, 2000; Miller, W., 2002; Miller, M., 2003; Turner, 2002, 2003, 
2004; Jablonka, 2004; Laland, 2004; Stake, 2004; Lambrechts, 2006; Hoover, 
2011) 
niche construction:  (Odling-Smee, 1988, 1996a, 1996b; Jones, 1994, 1997; Layland, 
1999, 2000, 2001, 2006; Smith, 2002; Day, 2003; Keller, 2003; Robert, 2003; 
Stone, 2003; Cintas, 2004; Donohue, 2004; Taylor, 2004; Vandermeer, 2004; 
Brodie, 2005; Jones, 2005; Shorthouse, 2005; Sterelny, 2005; Sultan, 2005; 
Suzuki, 2005; Borenstein, 2006; Wright, 2006) 
distributed cognition:  (Hutchins, 1989, 1995, 1999, 2000, 2014; Rogers, 1994; Zhang, 
1994; Derry, 1998; Moore, 1998; Hollan, 2000, 2009; Parsons, 2014) 
interspecies horizontal gene transfer:  ( 
epistatic clustering:  (Bateson, 1907; Wright, 1935; Fraser, 1960; Kojima, 1964; Spassky, 
1965; Jinks, 1973; Perkins, 1973; Orr, 1996; Bateson, 2002; Cordell, 2002, 
2009; Phillips, 2002, 2008; Nei, 2003; Pepper, 2003; Carlborg, 2004; Segre, 
2004; Battle, 2005; Moore, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2009; Van Driessche, 2005; 
Weinreich, 2005; Wong, 2005; Bershtein, 2006; Gjuvsland, 2007; Oti, 2007; 
Taylor, 2007; Hintze, 2008; Shao, 2008; Ma, 2008; Tang, 2009; Tyler, 2009; 
Greene, 2010; Lunzer, 2010; VanderWeele, 2010; Lehner, 2011; Ostman, 
2011; Breen, 2012; Huang, 2012; Valverde, 2012; Xie, 2012; Zhang, 2013; Sun, 
2014; Turner, 2016) 
epigenetics; Baldwin effect:  (Waddington, 1953; Jablonka, 1989, 1994, 1998a, 1998b, 
2002, 2009; French, 1994; Carley, 1997; Turney, 1997; Reik, 2001; 
Gershenson, 2002; Griesemer, 2002; Van De Vijver; 2002; Van Speybroeck, 
2002a, 2002b; Jaenisch, 2003; Mameli, 2004, 2005; Yong-hui Jiang, 2004; Grant-
Downton, 2005; Berthouze, 2005; Harper, 2005; Prince, 2005; Balter, 2006; 
Hogenesch, 2015; Ropars, 2015) 
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endosymbiosis:  (Margolis-Sagan, 1967; Travis, 1998; Husnik, 2011, 2013; Lawrence, 
2012) 
hierarchical multi-species symbiosis:  (Hooper, 2001; Willis-Karp, 2001; Brogaard, 2004; 
Lowery, 2007; Rook, 2008; Blaser, 2009, 2012, 2013; Nikoh, 2009; Rajagopal, 
2009; Hehemann, 2010; Hellman, 2010; Jaenike, 2010; Meadows, 2010; 
Ochman, 2010; Feldhaar, 2011; Harder, 2011; Anthony, 2014; Bultman, 2014) 
fundamental group topology:  (Croom, 1978; Mermin, 1979; Simon, 2008; Dooley, 2011) 
A4.2. hierarchical modular structure 
modularity:  (Caspar, 1963; Parnas, 1984; van der Linden,1995; Auda, 1996; Wagner, 
1996; Draye, 1997; Sharkey, 1997; Calabretta, 1998; Minelli, 1998; Coltheart, 
1999; Husken, 2002; Langlois, 2002; Lipson, 2002, 2007; Michl, 2002; Ravasz, 
2002; Sole, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2008; Inbar, 2003; Peretz, 2003; Sole, 2003; 
Ethiraj, 2004; Guimera, 2004; Han, 2004; Ma, 2004; Variano, 2004; Danon, 
2005; Guimera, 2005; Hughes, 2005; Irizarry, 2005; Pawson, 2005; Prill, 2005; 
Sadedin, 2005; Arney, 2006; Barrett, 2006; Gavin, 2006; Newman, 2006; 
Barrett, 2006; Karmiloff-Smith, 2006; Pan, 2007; Wagner, 2007; Alexander-
Bloch, 2010; Meunier, 2010; Clune, 2013) 
cognitive chunking:  (Miller, 1956; Simon, 1974; Gobet, 1998, 2001, 2004; Sweller, 1998; 
Cowan, 2000; Pollock, 2002; Glassman, 2003; Freudenthal, 2005; van 
Merrienboer, 2005; Hockey, 2006; O’Reilly, 2006; Uchida, 2006; Stevens, 
2012; 
graph motifs:  (Milo, 2002, 2004; Berg, 2004; Kashtan, 2004, 2005; Sporns, 2004; Tanay, 
2004; Arenas, 2008; Gherardini, 2010) 
A4.3.  quantitative configuration descriptors 
ordination:  (Goff, 1972; Dale, 1975; Austin, 1985; Kent, 1988) 
statistical physics:  (Maxwell, 1856; Boltzmann, 1897 (1974); Gibbs, 1902; Hastings, 
1909; North, 1970; Suffritti, 1987; Brush, 1994; Gilbert, 1995; Flamm, 1997; 
Shafer, 1998; Ball, 2002a, 2002b; Cecconi, 2005; Thurner, 2006; Uffink, 2006; 
Oestreicher, 2007; Ny, 2008; Kadanoff, 2009a, 2009b, 2014; Dembo, 2009; 
Mussardo, 2010; de Vladar, 2011) 
spatial statistics:  (Gould, 1970; Jumars, 1997; Baddeley, 1980; Wiencek, 1993; 
Kerscher, 1998; Stoyan, 2000; Diaz, 2001; Shimatani, 2001; Mayer, 2004; Cliff, 
2009; Lucas, 2013; Stojanova, 2013)  
morphometrics:  (Prusinkiewicz, 1997; Laffont, 2011) 
mathematical morphology:  (Maragos, 1986; Vincent, 1989; Vincent, 1991; Michielsen, 
2000, 2001, 2002; Eckhardt, 2003) 
fragmentation of homogeneous connectivity in the prevailing collective conscious by 
spatially isolated clusters of dissent 
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minkowski functionals:  (Kellerer, 1984; Mecke, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2005; Burchert, 1994; 
Kerscher, 1995, 2000; Platzoder, 1995; Schmaltzing, 1995, 1997, 1999; Mecke, 
1997, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003; Sahni, 1997, 1998; Schmalzing, 1997, 1999; 
Michielsen, 2000; Dominguez, 2001; Arns, 2002; Beisbert, 2002; Hilfer, 2002; 
Karimova, 2003; Sheth, 2003, 2005; Agterberg, 2004; Sych, 2004; Platzoder, 
2005; Kjeldsen, 2008) 
boolean grain models:  (Wicksell, 1925; Solomon, 1953; Serra, 1980; Lutwak, 1986; 
Weil, 2000; Agterberg, 2004; Stoyan, 2005a, 2005b; Moller, 2010; Chiu, 2013) 
graph theoretic descriptors:  (Hasegawa, 1976; von Schnering, 1987; Liu, 1998; 
Fernandez, 2005; Conte, 2007; Gfeller, 2007; Barthelemy, 2011; Goel, 2013) 
topological descriptors:  (Hyde, 1987, 1989; Boxer, 1999; Melott, 2000; Svensson, 2003) 
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A5.  LIMITS OF PROOF AND TRUTH 
What are the cultural precedents and boundaries of provable 
truth structures? 
The fourth knowledge state space of the investigation structured the specific data grains of individual 
citations into a union of four sets of generalizations: 
(structures of proof) 
(structures of provable truths) 
(boundaries of provable truth structures) 
(emerging situated point-of-view in science and mathematics) 
A5.1.  structures of proof 
deductive proof:  (Wang, 1960; Tarski, 1969; Troelstra, 1977; Feferman, 1979; Kleiner, 
1991, 1997; Horgan, 1993; Andrews, 1994; Thurston, 1994; Devlin, 1997, 
2002, 2003; Barker, 2000; Kvasz, 2000; Van Bendegem, 2000, 2005, 2009; 
Mancosu, 2001; Lee, 2002; Barendregt, 2005; Cohen, 2005; Macintyre, 2005; 
MacKenzie, 2006; Khamsi, 2006; Hales, 2008; Harrison, 2008; Van Kerkhove, 
2008; Wiedijk, 2008; Crosley, 2011) 
inductive proof:  (Bussey, 1917; Morris, 1938; Wang, 1960; Aubin, 1979; Bundy, 1988; 
Kounalis, 1990; Paulson, 1990; Parigot, 1992; Merritt, 1997; Bouhoula, 2001; 
Lange, 2001; Urso, 2004; Hutter, 2005; Polycarpou, 2008; Paenke, 2009; 
Blanchette, 2010; Palla, 2011; Roychoudhury, 2012; Moller, 2013) 
visual proof:  (Epstein, 1991; Brown, 1997; Goldstein, 1998; Casselman, 2000; Faris, 
2000; Thornton, 2001; de Villiers, 2003; Mancosu, 2005; Hanna, 2007) 
A5.2.  structures of provable truths 
set theoretic foundation  of mathematics:  (Weyl, 1946; Tucker, 1963; Cohen, 1967; 
Erdos, 1967; Kreisel, 1967; Monk, 1970; Johnson, 1972; Bell, 1975; Weston, 
1976; Dauben, 1978, 1983; Hegner, 1978; Moore, 1978; Dauben, 1979; Maddy, 
1980; Burgess, 1984; Smorynski, 1987; Dale, 1990; Anellis, 1991; Hallett, 1991; 
Roitman, 1992, 2011; Potter, 1993; Franzosi, 1994; Kanamori, 1996, 2004; 
Dreben, 1997; Allen, 2000; Marek, 2001; Muller, 2001, 2004, 2011; Hardegree, 
2003; Burgess, 2004; Ferreiros, 2004; Shapiro, 2004, 2005; Graham, 2006; 
Holmes, 2006; Kerkhove, 2006; Bell, 2007; Kanamori, 2008; Shulman, 2008; 
Strogatz, 2010; Ferreiros, 2011; Roitman, 2011; Dasgupta, 2014) 
category theoretic foundation of mathematics:  (Eilenberg, 1945; Lawnere, 1964, 1999; 
Bell, 1981, 1982, 1986, 2001, 2005a, 2005b; McLarty, 1987, 1993, 1998; 2004, 
2005, 2007; Lambek, 1989; Adamek, 1990; Goguen, 1991; Fokkinga, 1994; 
Marquis, 1995; Awodey, 1996, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; Isham, 1996; 
Martini, 1996; Corfield, 2002; Shapiro, 2005; Zafiris, 2005; Hellman, 2006a, 
2006b; Landry, 2005, 2006; Pedroso, 2008; Linnebo, 2011) 
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probability theory:  (Laplace, 1902; Fisher, 1922; Molina, 1930; Matheron, 1963; Gray, 
1967; Chayes, 1972; Hampton, 1973; Hacking, 1975, 1987, 1990a, 1990b, 
1990c; Stewart, 1986; Cohen, 1987, 1988; Kruger, 1987; Stone, 1987; Wise, 
1987; Oberschall, 1989; Shafer, 1989; Clevenson, 1991; Fienberg, 1991; 
Schneider, 1991; Bogza, 1999; Hacking, 2000; Mumford, 2000; Swift, 2000; 
McCullagh, 2002; Hodgson, 2004; Atkinson, 2006; Callaway, 2008; Wilkinson, 
2009; Augustin, 2011; Parascandola, 2011; Pépin, 2012; Nuzzo, 2015) 
philosophy of mathematics:  (Brouwer, 1913; Hilbert, 1923; Weyl, 1946, 1953; 
Grabiner, 1974; Heyting, 1974; Putnam, 1975; Beeson, 1980; Mac Lane, 1980; 
Maddy, 1980, 2001, 2008; Giaquinto, 1983; Machover, 1983; Detlefsen, 1990; 
McLarity, 1993, 1997, 2007; Gauthier, 1994; Lambek, 1994; Nagorny, 1994; 
Tieszen, 1994; Corry, 1997; Mancosu, 1997; Feferman, 1999, 2000a, 2000b; 
Folina, 2000; Reck, 2000; Reed, 2000; Steen, 2000; Muller, 2001; Devlin, 2002; 
Lomas, 2002; Raatikainen, 2003; Bell, 2004; Shapiro, 2004; Schlimm, 2005; 
Zach, 2005; Chaitin, 2006; van Kerkhove, 2006;  Carter, 2008; Cantini, 2009, 
2010; Kreinovich, 2011; Tait, 2011; Liston, 2012; Aron, 2013; Hartimo, 2013; 
Pollard, 2013) 
A5.3.  boundaries of provable truth structures 
theological precedent of an external point-of-view:  (Huygens, 1678; Bernoulli, 1713; 
Bayes, 1763; David, 1955, 1962; Kendall, 1956; Torrance, 1972; Feyerabend, 
1975; Hall, 1979; Force, 1981; Green, 1981; Dolby, 1987; Bellhouse, 1993; 
Fuller, 1997; Osler, 1997; Garber, 1998; Sylla, 1998; Zabell, 1998; Ramati, 
2001; Antognazza, 2003; Guicciardini, 2004; Shapiro, 2004; Adamson, 2005; 
Batanero, 2005; Breger, 2005; Cook, 2005; Koetsier, 2005; Markley, 2005; 
Rudiger, 2005; Krants, 2006; Oestreicher, 2007; Mazzotti, 2007; Shea, 2007; 
Hannabuss, 2009; Bradley, 2011) 
atomistic continuity, discontinuity:  (Piaggio, 1951; Youschkevitch, 1976; Waesberghe, 
1982; Wilson, 1982; Dunham, 1990; Ponte, 1992; Watson, 1993; Brace, 1998; 
Malet, 1996a, 1996b; Baker, 1998; Garber, 1998; Laugwiz, 1999; Palmer, 1999; 
Rosser, 2000; Thomson, 2001; Ausin, 2005; Cooke, 2005; Koutsoukos, 2005; 
Rusnock, 2005; Dahan-Dalmedico, 2009; Rosser, 2009, 2011; Stillwell, 2010; 
Drago, 2011; Kleinert, 2011; Velupillai, 2011; Bell, 2014) 
incompleteness; inconsistency:  (Cohen, 1967; Davis, 1982, 2005, 2006; Dawson, 1991; 
Uspensky, 1994; Stillwell, 1998, 2002; Feferman, 1999, 2000, 2006, 2012; 
Chaitin, 2002; Devlin, 2002; Davis, 2003; Goldstein, 2006; Grattan-Guinness, 
2006; Hellman, 2006; Zach, 2006; Binder, 2008; Kanamori, 2008; Wolpert, 
2008, 2010; Collins, 2009; Elwes, 2010, 2011; Plisko, 2011; Tait, 2011; 
Critchley, 2014) 
computability; computational complexity:  (Rosen, 1962; Steen, 1975; Lewis, 1977; 
Kleene, 1981; Davis, 1982; Cipra, 1989; Hartmanis, 1989; Stewart, 1991; 
Sipser, 1992, 1996; Fenstad, 1993, 2004; Feferman, 1994; Leivant, 1994; Vinay, 
1994; Matthews, 1995; Blum, 1996; Goldreich, 1996; Papadimitriou, 1996; 
Razborov, 1996; Soare, 1996a, 1996b, 1999; Wigderson, 1996; Peterson, 1998; 
Cooper, 1999; Stillwell, 2004; Lakshmikantham, 2005; Marchal, 2005; Peterson, 
2006; Chaitin, 2006; Erdi, 2008; Rosenberg, 2009; Velupillai, 2009; Apon, 2010; 
Elwes, 2010; Rosenberg, 2010; Pavlus, 2012; Smith, 2012; Tourlakis, 2012) 
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inductive inference:  (Kuo, 1923; Sloctemyer, 1923; Fisher, 1935; Neyman, 1955; 
Solomonoff, 1957, 1964; Gold, 1965; Blum, 1974, 1975; Buchanan, 1979; 
Mohr, 1982; Angluin, 1983; Arnold, 1983; Baird, 1983; Ernest, 1984; Daley, 
1986a, 1986b; Pitt, 1989; Kounalis, 1990; Ligomenldes, 1990; Paulson, 1990; 
Parigot, 1992; Crutchfield, 1993, 2011; Ernest, 1994; Jiang, 1995; Carmesin, 
1996; Dybjer, 2000, 2003; Mandler, 2000; Shalizi, 2001; Blackwood, 2004; 
Urso, 2004; Galik, 2006; Kisner, 2008; Zeugmann, 2008; Lange, 2009; 
McCaskey, 2010; Palla, 2012; Guedon, 2013; Moller, 2013; Zenil, 2013; Zhou, 
2013; Ghani, 2015; Scantamburlo, 2015) 
A5.4.  emerging situated point-of-view in science and mathematics: 
situated cognition:  (Brown, 1989; Glenberg, 1997; Greeno, 1998; Kirshner, 1998; Smith, 
1999; Auslander, 2001; Clark, 2001; Goldin, 2001; Weng, 2001; Presmeg, 
2002; Semin, 2002, 2013; Wilson, 2002; Anderson, 2003; Smith, 2004, 2007; 
Costa, 2005; Yeh, 2006; Barsalou, 2008, 2009; Clancey, 2009; Gallagher, 2009; 
Robbins, 2009, 2010; Wilson, 2009; McNerney, 2011; Wilson, 2011; Wilson-
Mendenhall, 2011; Wilson, 2016) 
self-other; self-identification:  (Kauffman, 1987; Kao, 1996; Lee, 1998; Posner, 1998; 
Kitcher, 2002; Lee, 2000; Hauber, 2001; Reiss, 2001; Wolff, 2001; Churchland, 
2002; Craig, 2002; Johnson, 2002; Baars, 2003; LeDoux, 2003; Sedikides, 2003; 
Mateo, 2004; Thom, 2004; Gusnard, 2005; Hobson, 2005; Macinnes, 2005; 
Posner, 2005; Bongard, 2006; Cohen, 2006; Decety, 2006; Kozma, 2006; 
Morin, 2006; Northoff, 2006; Perez, 2006; Plotnik, 2006; Synofzik, 2006; 
Dudley, 2007; Ross, 2007; Zuger, 2007; Grayling, 2009; Karban, 2009; Yovel, 
2009; Edgell, 2011; Lander, 2011; Weir, 2011; Falk, 2012; Palombo, 2013) 
neural network self-feedback:  (Hopfield, 1982, 1987, 1999; Getz, 1991; Perfetti, 1991; 
Salam, 1991; Dong, 1992; Liu, 1994; Quero, 1994; Douglas, 1995; Chang-song, 
1997; Young, 1997; Brandt, 2007; Narayan, 1997; Stauffer, 2003; Ganguli, 
2009; Goldman, 2009; Ma, 2010; Wang, 2011) 
predictive; adaptive control:  (Widrow, 1964; Khol, 1969; Garcia, 1989; Antsaklis, 1991; 
Levin, 199; Cota, 1994; Botto, 1998; Miall, 1998; Hagan, 2002; Ou, 2002, 2003; 
Mears, 2003; Hontoria, 2005; Bastain, 2006; Basso, 2006; Raichle, 2006; 
Marshall, 2007; Szpunar, 2007; Soon, 2008; Grupe, 2013) 
2nd order cybernetics:  (von Foerster, 1973, 1979, 1984, 2003; Hoffman, 1985; Griffith, 
1990; Scott, 1996, 2004; Leydesdorff, 1997; von Glasersfeld, 1996; Heylighen, 
2001; Umpleby, 2001; Vanderstraeten, 2001; Brier, 2004; Glanville, 2004; 
Scott, 2004; Kauffman, 2005; Romesín, 2005; Ziemke, 2005; Garland, 2007; 
Froese, 2010) 
agent-based modeling:  (Bainbridge, 1994; Menczer, 1995; Carley, 1996; Doran, 1997; 
Parunak, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2005; Bieszczad, 1998; DeCanio, 1998; 
Iglesias, 1999; Davidsson, 2000; Filipe, 2000; Moss, 2000; Rose, 2001; 
Sarjoughian, 2001; Uhrmacher, 2001; Wilson, 2001; Brueckner, 2002; Gulyas, 
2002; Kennedy, 2002; Mamei, 2003, 2004; 2005; Odell, 2003, 2005; Suematsu, 
2003; Turkett, 2003; Zambonelli, 2003; Guerin, 2004; Luck, 2004; White, 
2004; Bernon, 2005; Fletcher, 2005; Janssen, 2005; Kadar, 2005; Lees, 2005; 
Muhammad, 2005, 2006; Weyns, 2005; Kuznar, 2006; Ota, 2006; Zhu, 2006) 
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choice structure:  (Simon, 1945, 1955, 1956, 1995; Arrow, 1951, 1958, 1959, 1966; 
Rubin, 1963; Zuckerman, 1967; Bryant, 1972; Orr, 1972; Luce, 1977, 1994; 
Beeson, 1980; Richardson, 1982; Shamir, 1982; Troelstra, 1983, 1996; 
Neuringer, 1986; Swait, 1987; Suck, 1992; Horowitz, 1995; Marahrens, 1998; 
Feferman, 2000; Stillwell, 2002; Roy, 2003; Xue, 2003; Ben-Akiva, 2004; 
Bonsall, 2004; Dugundji, 2005; Erev, 2005; Bekhor, 2006; Clerc, 2006; 
Ioannides, 2006; Davidson, 2007; Wutz, 2007; Minks, 2009; Prato, 2009; 
Durlauf, 2010; Apt, 2011; Fox, 2011; Hackney, 2011; Han, 2011; Cariani, 2012; 
Mueller, 2012, 2013; McCausland, 2013; Wang, 2013, 2015) 
fuzzy; rough structure:  (Zadeh, 1965, 1968a, 1968b, 1971, 1976, 1978, 1980a, 1980b, 
1984, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008a, 2008b, 2011; Marinos, 1966, 1969; 
Wee, 1969; Bellman, 1970; Thomason, 1974; Kraft, 1983; Pedrycz, 1990, 1991, 
2009; Carpenter, 1991, 1992; Kacprzyk, 1991; Stout, 1991; Xie, 1991; 
Drossos, 1992, 1993; Pal, 1992; Satyadas, 1992; Wood, 1992; Castro, 1994, 
1997; Atonsson, 1995; Burgin, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2009, 2011; Gustin, 1994a, 
1994b; Gerstenkorn, 1995; Wong, 1995; Herencia, 1996; Baraldi, 1999; Pham, 
1999; Turksen, 1999; Walczak, 1999; Dubois, 2001, 2002; Maji, 2002; 
Skowron, 2003, 2005; Ferrero, 2004; Oberkampf, 2004; Singpurwalla, 2004; 
Bazan, 2006; Behounek, 2006; Ekel, 2006; Pawlak, 2007a, 2007b; Vlachos, 
2007) 
local symmetry; semi-group; groupoid structure:  (Pepper, 1948; Ito, 1950, 1976; 
Dornberger-Schiff, 1956, 1961, 1972; Bagley, 1970; Baronnet, 1978; Fichtner, 
1980, 1986, 1988; Hohne, 1981; Mosseri, 1984; Brown, 1987, 2011; Zvyagin, 
1988; Masuda, 1993; Makovicky, 1997; Zvyagin, 1997; Paterson, 1998; Howie, 
1999; Schein, 1999, 2002; Sun, 1998; Vainshtein, 2000; Nespolo, 2002; 
Belokoneva, 2005; Mitra, 2006; Hollings, 2007, 2009; Nespolo, 2008a, 2008b) 
homogeneous structure:  (Gardiner, 1976, 1978; Ronse, 1978; Vince, 1981; Meyers, 
1985; Nedela, 1993; Conder, 1996; D’Atri, 2005; Cameron, 2006; Taylor, 
2007; Gray, 2010, 2011; Hedman, 2010; Rusinov, 2010; Dolinka, 2011; 
Macpherson, 2011; Mašulović, 2011; Hamann, 2012, 2013; Leger, 2014; 
Lockett, 2014; Al-Addasi , 2015) 
embodied; non-classic; unconventional; natural computation:  (Latto, 1990; Collin, 1998; 
Henningsen, 2000; Knight, 2001; Stepney, 2003, 2008, 2009, 2014; McLennan, 
2004, 2009, 2010, 2011; Doursat, 2005; Cooper, 2006, 2013a, 2013b; Nadin, 
2016; Abramsky, 2007a, 2007b; Bentley, 2007; Bhalla, 2007, 2012; Hamann, 
2007; Kaiser, 2007; Dodig-Crnkovic, 2008, 2012b; Kari, 2008; Oxman, 2008; 
Piccinini, 2008; Teuscher, 2008; Ben-Jacob, 2009; Crutchfield, 2009; Sekanina, 
2009; Welch, 2009; Gelenbe, 2011; Traub, 2011; Yue, 2011; Burgin, 2013; 
Burms, 2015) 
local mathematics:  (Bell, 1986, 2001; Lambek, 1989; Gernert, 1997; Kosub, 2005; 
Zakharov, 2005; Dodig-Crnkovic, 2012a; Burgin, 2013) 
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A6.  ARCHITECTURAL IDENTITY OF A CONFIGURATION 
Is there a local probabilistic structure underlying the 
hierarchically local interaction of neighborhoods constructed by 
topological inflation in the Boolean grain model of pattern 
formation ? 
In the fifth knowledge state space of the investigation, the inductive process of a posteriori conceptual 
clustering hierarchically structured the specific data grains of individual citations into a single set of 
categorical generalizations that were used to inform situated constructions: 
(structures of external point-of-view mathematics) 
 
A6.1.  structures of external point-of-view mathematics 
metric space:  (Bing, 1951; Shore 1993; Ha, 2006 Korner, 2015) 
semi-metric space:  (Wilson, 1931; Maehara, 1983; Matthews, 1994; Arandelovic, 2009) 
topological space:  (von Neumann, 1935; Strong, 1966; Duke, 1971; Krishnamurthy, 
1977; Morales, 1980; Kong, 1989; Stewart, 1989; Egenhofer, 1992, ????; Kraw, 
1995; Saha, 1995; Weinshall, 1999; Arns, 2001, 2003; Hatcher, 2001; Liu, 2002; 
Darmochwał, 2003; Damiand, 2004; Kopperman, 2005; Ballerini, 2007; 
Singleton, 2007; Deza, 2009; Davenport, 2013) 
point-set topology:  (Lynn, 1967; Farrag, 1999; Muscat, 2006; Shick, 2007; Marijuan, 2010; 
Kolli, 2014) 
graph topology:  (Bhargava, 1968; Marijuan, 2010; Diestel, 2011; Richter, 2011; Kannan, 
2012; Kim, 2012) 
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APPENDIX B 
BIPARTITE PARALLEL PROCESSING  
The emergence of commonality across genetic, cognitive, social group, and population scales of adaptive 
structural transformation lead to construction of a feedforward connectionist model, where pattern 
develops through a sequence of threshold-cascades reciprocating between information structures and 
their physical expression: a hierarchically self-similar parallel distributed processing (PDP) model with 
predictive control, homomorphic to bipartite ensembles of ‘black box’ artificial neural networks.   
Theoretically capable of being embedded in the physical materials of habitat construction, this is an 
adaptive meta-model of autonomous nonlinear inductive pattern formation where the model itself 
evolves in response to the co-evolving relationships of internal and external variables.   
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B2.  BIPARTITE RECURSION 
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Figure B1.  Parallel feedforward inductive pattern formation:  internal processing of multi-
channel external input with cross-channel feedforward. 
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Figure B2.  Bipartite feedforward inductive pattern formation.  
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Figure B3.  Parallel bipartite feedforward inductive pattern formation: 
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B3.  RECIPROCATING BIPARTITE RECURSION 
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Figure B4a.  Reciprocating bipartite recursion:  recursive threshold-cascade model of 
genotype-phenotype development. 
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Figure B4b.  Reciprocating bipartite recursion (continued). 
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B4.  HIERARCHICAL BIPARTITE RECURSION 
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Figure B5a.  Hierarchical parallel bipartite feedforward inductive pattern formation.   
Left:  Non-hierarchical bipartite genotype-phenotype model homomorphic to Figure B2.3.  
Right:  Self-similar hierarchical model, detail of light grey area follows in Figure B4.2. 
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Figure B5b.  Detail A. Hierarchical parallel bipartite feedforward inductive pattern 
formation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
175 
 
 
Figure B6.  Hierarchical local fundamental group parallel bipartite feedforward inductive 
pattern formation: 
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APPENDIX C 
SITUATED STRUCTURAL MODELING  
Defining boundaries of hierarchical structure has historically presented problems for atomistic models of 
units of analysis and synthesis.  The interpretation of local information is a situated response within a 
level of a structural hierarchy, presenting the problem of synthesis and analysis units as one of uniquely 
defining an interacting configuration of elements and its boundary.   
The third recursive meta-loop developed the topological operation of Poincare inflation of a point to 
form its neighborhood, effectively modeling a field surrounding an element.  A set of elements 
undergoing simultaneous Poincare inflation structures a situated Boolean grain model of the set, with 
continuous inflation constructing hierarchical sequence of topological fundamental groups and their 
embedded graph structures.   
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C.2.  MODELING RANDOM STRUCTURE 
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Figure C1.  Initial state of a random situated set:  a static random distribution of 42 points. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
181 
 
    
    
Figure C2.a.  Situated development of local space.   
Sequence of Boolean topology and graph connectivity states developed by parallel Poincare 
neighborhood inflation of initial random situated set.   
External neighborhood boundary structure (black) defines fundamental group of local finite 
topological space.  Internal neighborhood boundary structure (gray) defines connectivity of 
the situated Boolean topology of the set.  Graph edges (red) define metric distance, semi-
metric probabilistic distance, semi-metric topologic distance.   
Discrete sequence of local space states:  top left, 35 local fundamental groups [1]; top right, 
27 local fundamental groups [1];  bottom left, 15 local fundamental groups [1]; bottom 
right, 3 local fundamental groups [1]. 
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Figure C2.b.  Situated development of local space. (continued)  
Sequence of discrete states:  fundamental group boundary (black); Boolean topology (light 
gray neighborhoods); graph connectivity (red). 
Top left:  1 local fundamental group [1], 1 local fundamental group [3].  Top right: 1 local 
fundamental group [3].  Bottom left:  1 local fundamental group [3].  Bottom right:  1 local 
fundamental group [2]. 
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Figure C2.c.  Situated development of local space. (continued)   
Completely connected finite topological space, local fundamental group [1] boundary 
(black); Boolean topology (light gray neighborhoods); graph connectivity (red). 
 
 
 
  
184 
 
 
Figure C2.d.  Situated development of local space. (continued)   
Terminal connectivity and morphological development:  local fundamental group [1] 
boundary (black); complete situated Boolean topology (light gray neighborhoods); 
complete graph (red). 
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Figure C3.a.  Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space.   
An event is defined as a change in neighborhood connectivity that results in a boundary 
change of the local space.   
Fundamental group (black) defines boundary of local topological space.  Discrete-event 
chronology (light gray neighborhood) records the hierarchical discrete state sequence of 
neighborhood intersections.  Minimum hierarchical spanning ring (red) defines connectivity 
sequence of hierarchical subset structure in coherence with topological fundamental group 
of the local space.   
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Figure C3.b.  Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space. (continued) 
Fundamental group boundary (black); discrete-state chronology (light gray neighborhood); 
minimum hierarchical spanning ring (red).   
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Figure C3.c.  Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space.  (continued) 
Local fundamental group boundary (black); discrete-state chronology (light gray 
neighborhood); minimum hierarchical spanning ring (red).  Lower right:  terminal 
minimum hierarchical spanning ring, fundamental group [1].  With uniform neighborhood 
inflation, terminal minimum hierarchical spanning ring is equivalent to minimum spanning 
tree. 
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Figure C4.  Interstitial void structure in spatial development. 
Top left:  sum of discrete-state minimum hierarchical spanning rings (red) mapped on 
Delaunay triangulation (light red).  Top right: Voronoi spatial partitioning (blue).  Bottom 
left:  sum of discrete-state voids situated in Delaunay triangulation.  Bottom right:  sum of 
discrete-state voids situated in sum of discrete-state minimum hierarchical spanning rings.   
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Figure C5.  Structures of connected finite topological space. 
Topological fundamental group [1] boundary (black).  Hierarchical discrete-state 
chronology (light gray neighborhoods).  Giant component boundary at percolation 
threshold (medium gray neighborhood).  Completely connected single finite topological 
space boundary (dark gray neighborhood).  Voronoi spatial partitioning (blue).  Terminal 
minimum hierarchical spanning tree (red) mapped on to summation of discrete-state 
minimum hierarchical spanning rings (light red). 
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Figure C6.  Definition of essential Minkowski set and choice  set.   
The essential Minkowski set is the minimum subset of neighborhoods necessary to generate 
Minkowski functionals (morphological descriptors)identical to those of the full set of a 
configuration.   
Top left:  situated Boolean topology and graph of configuration.  Top right:  non-essential 
Minkowski set (green), choice set (blue), selection of at least one member is required to 
complete the essential Minkowski set.  Bottom left:  non-essential Boolean topology (light 
green), non-essential graph (green).  Bottom right:  essential and essential-choice set 
Boolean topology (gray neighborhoods, essential set graph (red).  Non-essential set (green), 
non-essential choice set (blue), non-essential graph (gray). 
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Figure C7.a.  Development of local space from essential and choice sets. 
Boolean topology (gray neighborhoods) and complete graph (red) of essential Minkowski 
and essential-choice set.  Non-essential set (green), non-essential choice set (blue), non-
essential graph (gray). 
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Figure C7.b.  Development of local space from essential and choice sets. (continued) 
Boolean topology (gray neighborhoods) and complete graph (red) of essential Minkowski 
and essential-choice set.  Non-essential set (green), non-essential choice set (blue), non-
essential graph (gray). 
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Figure C7.c.  Development of local space from essential and choice sets.  (continued) 
Terminal morphological development and connectivity.  Complete Boolean topology (gray 
neighborhoods) and complete graph (red) of essential Minkowski set.  Non-essential set 
(green), non-essential graph (gray). 
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Figure C8.  Definition of primitive ring. 
A primitive set is the minimum subset of intersecting neighborhoods necessary to generate 
the topological fundamental group of a configuration.  A primitive ring is the minimum 
spanning ring of the primitive set. 
Top left:  minimum spanning ring connectivity (red) and spatial partitioning (blue) of 
situated Boolean topology (gray neighborhoods).  Top right:  Primitive ring (red) with 
spatial partitioning (blue).  Bottom left:  Primitive ring (red) with spatial partitioning by 
local minimum spanning tree (light red).  Bottom right:  primitive ring (red) mapped on to 
minimum hierarchical spanning ring (light red) with spatial partitioning (blue).   
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Figure C9.a.  Development of spatial partitioning by primitive ring. 
Left column:  discrete sequence of primitive ring subset spaces equivalent to topological 
fundamental group of local space.  Local topological space (light gray); equivalent 
topological primitive boundary (black); primitive ring (red); spatial partitioning (blue). 
Right column:  discrete sequence equivalent to left column; primitive ring (red) mapped on 
to minimum hierarchical spanning ring (light red), spatial partitioning (blue). 
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Figure C9.b.  Development of spatial partitioning by primitive ring. (continued) 
Left column:  discrete sequence of primitive ring subset spaces equivalent to topological 
fundamental group of local space.  Local topological space (light gray); equivalent 
topological primitive boundary (black); primitive ring (red); spatial partitioning (blue). 
Right column:  discrete sequence equivalent to left column; primitive ring (red) mapped on 
to minimum hierarchical spanning ring (light red), spatial partitioning (blue). 
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Figure C9.c.  Development of spatial partitioning by primitive ring. (continued) 
Left column:  discrete sequence of primitive ring subset spaces equivalent to topological 
fundamental group of local space.  Local topological space (light gray); equivalent 
topological primitive boundary (black); primitive ring (red); spatial partitioning (blue). 
Right column:  discrete sequence equivalent to left column; primitive ring (red) mapped on 
to minimum hierarchical spanning ring (light red), spatial partitioning (blue). 
Bottom left, right:  connected single finite topological space. 
 
  
198 
 
    
Figure C10.a.  Spatial partitioning by primitive ring and nearest neighbor. 
Nearest neighbor (light red) connectivity to primitive ring (red).  Resulting spatial 
partitions (blue) lack coherence with hierarchical discrete-event chronology (light grey 
neighborhoods) in development of local topological space. 
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Figure C10.b.  Spatial partitioning by primitive ring and nearest neighbor. (continued) 
Nearest neighbor graph (light red) connectivity to primitive ring (red).  Resulting spatial 
partitions (blue) lack coherence with hierarchical discrete-event chronology (light grey 
neighborhoods) in development of local topological space. 
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Figure C11.a.  Spatial partitioning by primitive ring and minimum local spanning tree. 
Minimum local spanning tree (light red) connectivity to primitive ring (red).  Resulting 
spatial partitions (blue) lack coherence with hierarchical discrete-event chronology (light 
grey neighborhoods) in development of local topological space. 
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Figure C11.b.  Spatial partitioning by primitive ring and minimum local spanning tree.  
(continued) 
Minimum local spanning tree (light red) connectivity to primitive ring (red).  Resulting 
spatial partitions (blue) lack coherence with hierarchical discrete-state chronology (light 
grey neighborhoods) in development of local topological space. 
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Figure C12.a.  Spatial partitioning by embedded primitive ring. 
Primitive ring (red) mapped on to minimum hierarchical spanning ring (light red).  
Resulting spatial partitions (blue) lack coherence with hierarchical discrete-state 
chronology (light grey neighborhoods) in development of local topological space. 
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Figure C12.b.  Spatial partitioning by embedded primitive ring. (continued) 
Primitive ring (red) mapped on to minimum hierarchical spanning ring (light red).  
Resulting spatial partitions (blue) lack coherence with hierarchical discrete-state 
chronology (light grey neighborhoods) in development of local topological space. 
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C3.  MODELING MORPHOLOGICAL PARAMETERS
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Figure C13.  Synchronous arithmetic inflation, variable radius initial state neighborhoods.  
Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space from initial points randomly 
selected for differing initial neighborhood radii undergoing uniform arithmetic inflation.   
Local fundamental group boundary (black); discrete-state chronology (light gray 
neighborhoods); minimum hierarchical spanning ring (red). 
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Figure C14.a.  Asynchronous arithmetic inflation. 
Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space from initial points randomly 
selected for differing arithmetic inflation rates.   
Local fundamental group boundary (black); discrete-state chronology (light gray 
neighborhoods); minimum hierarchical spanning ring (red). 
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Figure C14.b.  Asynchronous arithmetic inflation. (continued) 
Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space from initial points randomly 
selected for differing arithmetic inflation rates.   
Local fundamental group boundary (black); discrete-state chronology (light gray 
neighborhoods); minimum hierarchical spanning ring (red). 
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Figure C15.  Asynchronous geometric-arithmetic inflation. 
Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space from initial points randomly 
selected for geometric or arithmetic inflation rates.   
Local fundamental group boundary (black); discrete-state chronology (light gray 
neighborhoods); minimum hierarchical spanning ring (red). 
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Figure C16.a.  Asynchronous excitatory geometric-arithmetic inflation. 
Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space from initial points with default 
arithmetic inflation, interrupted by situated geometric inflation.  Neighborhood 
intersection triggers 1 subsequent excitatory state of geometric inflation, followed by 
return to default.   
Local fundamental group boundary (black); discrete-state chronology (light gray 
neighborhoods); minimum hierarchical spanning ring (red). 
 
  
210 
 
 
Figure C16.b.  Asynchronous excitatory geometric-arithmetic inflation. (continued) 
Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space from initial points with default 
arithmetic inflation, interrupted by situated geometric inflation.  Neighborhood 
intersection triggers 1 subsequent excitatory state of geometric inflation, followed by 
return to default.   
Local fundamental group [1] boundary (black); discrete-state chronology (light gray 
neighborhoods); terminal minimum hierarchical spanning ring (red). 
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Figure C17.a.  Asynchronous bipartite geometric-arithmetic inflation. 
Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space from an initial situated set spatially 
partitioned for geometric or arithmetic inflation. 
Local fundamental group boundary (black); discrete-state chronology (light gray 
neighborhoods); minimum hierarchical spanning ring (red). 
 
 
 
 
  
212 
 
    
    
Figure C17.b.  Asynchronous bipartite geometric-arithmetic inflation. (continued) 
Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space from an initial situated set spatially 
partitioned for geometric or arithmetic inflation. 
Local fundamental group boundary (black); discrete-state chronology (light gray 
neighborhoods); minimum hierarchical spanning ring (red). 
 
 
  
213 
 
 
Figure C17.c.  Asynchronous bipartite geometric-arithmetic inflation.  (continued) 
Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space from an initial situated set spatially 
partitioned for geometric or arithmetic inflation. 
Fundamental group [1] boundary (black); discrete-state chronology (light gray 
neighborhoods); terminal minimum hierarchical spanning ring (red). 
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Figure C18.  Asynchronous arithmetic inflation, initial state variable radius neighborhoods. 
Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space from initial points randomly 
selected for differing initial neighborhood radii with differing arithmetic inflation rates.   
Local fundamental group boundary (black); discrete-state chronology (light gray 
neighborhoods); minimum hierarchical spanning ring (red). 
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Figure C19.a.  Asynchronous geometric-arithmetic inflation, initial state variable radius 
neighborhoods.  
Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space from initial points randomly 
selected for differing initial neighborhood radii with geometric or arithmetic inflation rates.   
Local fundamental group boundary (black); discrete-state chronology (light gray 
neighborhoods); minimum hierarchical spanning ring (red). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
216 
 
 
Figure 19.b.  Asynchronous geometric-arithmetic inflation, initial state variable radius 
neighborhoods.  (continued) 
Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space from initial points randomly 
selected for differing initial neighborhood radii and geometric or arithmetic inflation.   
Local fundamental group boundary (black); discrete-state chronology (light gray 
neighborhoods); terminal minimum hierarchical spanning ring (red), fundamental group 
[1]. 
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Figure C20.  Development of local Voronoi-dual space. 
Local fundamental group boundary (black); discrete-state chronology (light gray 
neighborhoods); minimum hierarchical spanning ring (blue). 
Top left: initial Voronoi-dual situated set.  Bottom right:  Connected local topological 
space, fundamental group [1] 
 
 
  
218 
 
    
    
Figure C21.a.  Voronoi-dual inhibitory development of local space. 
Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space from 2 inhibitory situated sets.   
Red:  local space developed from initial situated set inFigure C1.  Blue:  local space 
developed from initial Voronoi-dual situated set in Figure C20. 
Top right:  blue minimum hierarchical spanning ring achieves percolation. 
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Figure C21.b.  Voronoi-dual inhibitory development of local space. (continued) 
Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space from 2 inhibitory situated sets.   
Red:  local space developed from initial situated set in Figure C1.  Blue:  local space 
developed from initial Voronoi-dual set in Figure C20. 
Terminal minimum hierarchical spanning ring, red fundamental group[3] with blue 
inclusions. 
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Figure C22.  Development of local void-dual space. 
Local fundamental group boundary (black); discrete-state chronology (light gray 
neighborhoods); minimum hierarchical spanning ring (blue). 
Top left: initial void-dual situated set.  Bottom right:  Connected local topological space, 
fundamental group [1]. 
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Figure C23.a.  Void-dual inhibitory development of local space. 
Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space from 2 inhibitory situated sets.   
Red:  local space developed from initial situated set inFigure C1.  Blue:  local space 
developed from initial void-dual situated set in Figure C22. 
Bottom left:  red minimum hierarchical spanning ring achieves percolation.  Bottom right:  
red forms single connected topological space, fundamental group [2]. 
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Figure C23.b.  Void-dual inhibitory development of local space. (continued) 
Discrete-event hierarchical development of local space from 2 inhibitory situated sets.   
Red:  local space developed from initial situated set inFigure C1.  Blue:  local space 
developed from initial void-dual situated set in Figure C22. 
Terminal minimum hierarchical spanning ring, red fundamental group[5], with blue 
inclusions.  
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Figure C24.  Binding set development of inhibitory local spaces. 
Identical discrete-event states in inhibitory (left) and binding (right) development of local 
topological space. 
Left:  local space developed from 3 inhibitory initial situated sets.  Minimum hierarchical 
spanning ring, purple fundamental group [3] achieves percolation.  Right:  Local space 
developed from 2 inhibitory initial sets (red, blue) and binding initial set (purple).  Minimum 
hierarchical spanning ring, red-purple-blue fundamental group [2], achieves percolation. 
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Figure C25.  Synchronous development of multi-layer local space. 
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C4. MODELING POINT FORMATION 
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Figure C26.a.  Deterministic point set automata:  4-neighborhood intersection. 
The intersection of 4 neighborhoods in a local space creates a new point.  With generative 
recursion, 4 neighborhood intersections are modeled by intersecting edges of the 
connectivity graph of a local space, generation G, with intersection points constructing a 
new situated set, generation G+1. 
Local spaces G1 (purple), situated set G2 (red). 
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Figure C26.b.  Deterministic point set automata:  4-neighborhood intersection. (continued) 
Top left:  local space G1 (purple), local spaces G2 (red).  Top right:  local space G1 (purple), 
local spaces G2 (red).  Bottom left:  local space G1 (light gray), local spaces G2 (purple), 
situated set G3 (red).  Bottom right:  local space G1 (light gray), local spaces G2 (purple), 
local spaces G3 (red). 
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Figure C26.c.  Deterministic point set automata:  4-neighborhood intersection. (continued) 
Top left:  local space G1, (light gray), local space G2 (purple), local spaces G3 (red).  Top 
right:  local space G1, G2 (light gray), local space G3 (purple), situated set G4 (red).   
Bottom left:  local space G1, G2 (light gray), local space G3 (purple), local spaces G4 (red).  
Bottom right:  local space G1, G2 (light gray), local space G3 (purple), local spaces G4 
(red).  
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Figure C26.d.  Deterministic point set automata:  4-neighborhood intersection. (continued) 
Local space G1, G2, G3 (light gray), local space G4 (purple), situated set G5 (red). 
Bipartite structure of situated sets constructed on left side of developing spaces suggest 
possible infinite recursion of point nursery.  Inflating boundary of developing local space 
suggests space-time wavefront. 
 
  
230 
 
    
    
Figure C27.a.  Deterministic point set automata:  3-neighborhood intersection. 
The intersection of 3 neighborhoods in a local space creates a new point.  With generative 
recursion, 3 neighborhood intersections are modeled by the Voronoi partition of a local 
space, generation G, with Voronoi vertices structuring the new situated set G+1. 
Top left:  Local space G1 (purple), Voronoi partition (light blue), situated set G2 (red).  Top 
right:  Local space G1 (purple), situated set and local spaces G2 (red).  Bottom left:  Local 
space G1 (purple), situated set and local spaces, G2 (red).  Bottom right:  Local space G1 
(light gray), local spaces G2 (purple), situated set G3 (red). 
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Figure C27.b.  Deterministic point set automata:  3-neighborhood intersection. (continued) 
Top left:  local space G1 (light gray); local spaces G2 (purple); situated set and local spaces 
G3 (red).  Top right:  local space G1 (light gray); local spaces G2 (purple); situated set and 
local spaces G3 (red).  Bottom left:  local space G1, G2 (light gray); local space G3 (purple); 
situated set G3 (red).  Bottom right:  local space G1, G2 (light gray); local spaces G2 
(purple); situated set and local spaces G3 (red).  
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Figure C27.c.  Deterministic point set automata:  3-neighborhood intersection. (continued) 
Local space G1, G2, G3 (light gray); local space G4 (purple); situated set G5 (red). 
 
 
  
233 
 
 
Figure C28.a.  Probabilistic empty set automata: local space intersection. 
On a continuous surface of fluctuating peaks and valleys of random probability values, a 
threshold value traces a contour line.  Closed contour lines define boundaries of discrete 
threshold-value neighborhoods, constructing an array of local independent probability 
spaces. 
Four continuous surfaces are  superimposed, interacting only above the threshold level, to 
construct an intersecting neighborhood structure of local spaces. (above)  Intersections 
form a union of local space, with the intersecting sub-space forming the sum of independent 
neighborhood probabilities.   
When a union of 4 neighborhoods constructs a complete situated boolean topology, the 
complete intersection space creates a sum of independent probabilities > 1.  This is a phase 
transition in probability space:  a point is formed.  
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Figure C28.b.  Probabilistic empty set automata: local space intersection. (continued) 
Critical state of intersecting local probability spaces.   
Formation of a complete Boolean topology in a union of local spaces (red) produces a point 
formation probability >1.  Probability threshold neighborhoods (white); discrete-state 
chronology (light gray neighborhoods). 
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Figure C29.a.  Discrete-event development of periodic finite topological space.  
Left:  initial state of situated set.  Right:  disjoint local spaces developing from situated set; 
local fundamental group [1] boundary (black). 
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Figure C29.b.  Discrete-event development of periodic finite topological space. (continued) 
Single finite topological space.  Top left:  fundamental group boundary (black);  hierarchical 
discrete-event chronology (light gray neighborhoods); minimum spanning ring (red) 
constructs tesselation 3.4.6.4.  Top right, bottom left:  fundamental group boundary (black);  
hierarchical discrete-event chronology (light gray neighborhoods); one member of the set 
of minimum spanning rings (red).  Bottom right:  fundamental group [1] boundary (black);  
discrete-state chronology (light gray neighborhoods); one member of the set of minimum 
spanning trees (red). 
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Figure C30.  Topological unit cell of infinite periodic local space.   
Unit cell boundary (purple); local fundamental group [4] boundary (dark gray 
neighborhoods); local minimum spanning ring (red). 
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Figure C31.a.  Development of Zeno’s infinite minimum spanning tree.  
Recursive development of one member of a set of Zeno’s infinite minimum spanning trees 
(red); topological unit cell (purple). 
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Figure C31.b.  Development of Zeno’s infinite minimum spanning tree. (continued) 
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Figure C32.a.  Development of hierarchically self-similar finite topological space.   
Top left:  initial state of situated set.  Top right:  local spaces developing from situated set; 
local fundamental group [1] boundary (black).  Bottom left:  fundamental group [14] 
boundary (black); minimum spanning ring (red).  Bottom right:  one member of the set of 
minimum spanning rings (red); fundamental group [14] boundary (black); discrete-state 
chronology (light gray neighborhoods). 
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Figure C32.b.  Development of hierarchically self-similar finite topological space. 
(continued) 
Left:  fundamental group [5] boundary (black);  discrete-state chronology (light gray 
neighborhoods); one member of the set of minimum spanning rings (red).  Right:  
fundamental group [2] boundary (black);  discrete-state chronology (light gray 
neighborhoods); one member of the set of minimum spanning rings (red). 
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Figure C32.c.  Development of hierarchically self-similar finite topological space. 
(continued) 
Terminal hierarchical connectivity and morphological development.  Fundamental group 
[1] boundary (black);  discrete-state chronology (light gray neighborhoods); one member of 
the set of minimum spanning rings (red). 
 
 
 
